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1.1. Context 
 
The vast mineral wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been exploited 
since the pre-colonial (De Hemptinne, 1926) and colonial eras (Hönke, 2013). This 
exploitation continued after DRC’s independence in 1960 (Rubbers, 2006). Large 
reserves of copper and cobalt are mined in Katanga, diamonds are mined in the Kasai 
region, gold and diamonds are mined in the provinces of Orientale and Equateur, and tin 
(cassiterite), coltan
1
, tungsten and gold are mined in the Kivus and the Maniema province 
(De Failly, 2001; Geenen, 2011a). Until the 1980s, these resources were mainly exploited 
through state-owned industrial mining companies, but, after a period of privatisation and 
mismanagement, the mining sector became dominated by artisanal and small-scale 
mining. 
 
In the last 15 years, Congolese minerals have carried a negative reputation. Despite the 
potentially pivotal role of the mining sector in post-conflict reconstruction (World Bank, 
2008) and the fact that artisanal mining sustains the livelihoods of millions of people in 
DRC (PACT, 2010), minerals are associated with conflict, violence and corruption. Rebel 
groups, foreign armies and the Congolese army have fought over and seized mining sites, 
as well as being involved in mineral trafficking. 
 
This situation triggered a number of national and international reform initiatives in the 
mining sector. These reforms were meant to support the Congolese government to break 
through the cycles of resource-related conflicts. In 2014, 13 reform initiatives—10 
focusing on 3T
2
 and the three on gold—were operational in eastern DRC (Cuvelier et al., 
2014: 5). These initiatives aim to make the Congolese artisanal mining sector more 
transparent and to prevent conflict minerals, that is, minerals thought to feed violence, 
conflicts and the involvement of armed actors in the mining business (Autesserre, 2012; 
De Koning, 2012), from entering the international market (Garrett and Lintzer, 2010; 
Verbruggen et al., 2011). Among these initiatives is the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative 
                                                 
1
 Coltan is an abbreviation of columbite–tantalite commonly used in eastern Democratic Republic 
of Congo. This is a mixture of two mineral ores, namely niobium and tantalum, used for 
industrial applications in high-tech industries. For more details, see Nest M. (2011). Coltan. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 3–30. 
2
 The abbreviation ‘3T’ refers to three types of minerals extracted in DRC: tin (cassiterite), 
tantalum (coltan) and tungsten (wolframite).  
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(iTSCi)
3
, a conflict minerals policy implemented, along with trading houses (also known 
as buying houses) and mining cooperatives, in most of the coltan mining sites
4
 in the 
northern part of Katanga (as well as in the North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema 
provinces). This thesis focuses especially on what happened around the iTSCi initiative. 
This is important, because many mineworkers (creuseurs) extracting coltan in mining 
sites where iTSCi was in force were frustrated about the impact of this policy on their 
everyday lives. One miner in Kahendwa expressed his frustration as follows: 
 
Trading houses and mining cooperatives operating in northern 
Katanga can be compared to a car without a driver, breaks or 
headlights, but that drives in the dark, over bumpy roads, without 
anyone being able to stop it. [Interview in January 2014] 
Hearing this metaphoric statement inspired four questions. First, how do creuseurs 
perceive the ongoing mining reforms? Indeed, the metaphor implies that the reforms have 
raised both a sense of powerlessness and a profound resentment. From the metaphor, one 
may conclude that the creuseurs perceive the actual reforms as vast and powerful 
machinery functioning in an invisible manner. Such bottom-up reactions have been 
under-researched in the Congolese coltan mining areas, resulting in a gap in our 
knowledge that this thesis aimed to fill. 
The second question involves whether this car reached its destination, and, if so, where 
did this happen and what did it look like? In creuseurs’ everyday experiences with 
institutions and actors engaged in executing the reforms—especially the trading houses, 
mining cooperatives and middlemen (négociants)—the car reached some of its intended 
destinations: For instance, the reforms profoundly changed previous patterns of accessing 
and marketing coltan. However, as it turned out, the car also travelled over unintended 
pathways and was steered by different people in quite different directions. 
The third question arising from the metaphor relates to the everyday interactions between 
trading houses, mining cooperatives and négociants. Specifically, how did these 
interactions affect the creuseurs in the environment of ‘darkness’ suggested by the 
                                                 
3
 The International Tin Research Institute is a UK based industry association. It is largely funded  
by tin producers and smelters and defends the interests of the tin industry. For more information 
see: www.itri.co.uk.  
4
 In this thesis, the phrases ‘mining sites’ and ‘mining areas’ are used interchangeably, as are the 
terms ‘miners’, ‘mineworkers’, ‘artisanal miners’ and ‘creuseurs’.  
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metaphor? This ‘darkness’ signals the opposite of increasing transparency in the mineral 
supply chain, which is the main tenet of the mining reforms. Pursuing answers to the 
three questions above constantly reminded me a fourth: How can fieldwork be carried out 
successfully in such an environment, characterised by ‘darkness’? This thesis offers 
answers to each of these questions. 
1.2. Introduction to the thesis 
This study investigated initiatives intended to ‘formalise’ artisanal mining in DRC—in 
other words, they aimed to bring mining under state control. This thesis presents a fine-
grained case study of one of these initiatives: the iTSCi. Designed by ITRI in 2009, 
iTSCi provides a means of determining the origin of 3T and documenting the trading 
chain for these minerals by ‘tagging and bagging’ the loads of 3T near miners’ shafts (at 
postes d’achat/selling points or buying stations), at counting offices (comptoirs) and in 
mineral depots, before the minerals are exported through the international market. In 
practice, the tag contains a barcode, which holds information on the origin, transport 
route and actors involved in the extraction, trade and transport of these minerals. 
As the title of this thesis suggests, the study’s main hypothesis was that, while the pre-
existing organisation of mining in DRC was shaped by a number of structural problems 
associated with artisanal mining (e.g. the informal character of the coltan trade, abuses of 
creuseurs by armed actors, and the smuggling of coltan), the ongoing mining reforms 
have reproduced these problems and also generated new challenges. Thus, the present 
study is especially concerned with the question of how the new reform initiatives played 
out in practice. It examines how they blended, overtook, altered or were subsumed into 
existing institutional arrangements, and how two key groups of actors (miners and 
négociants) fared under the reforms. 
Thus, this thesis explores the micro-dynamics of changes after the arrival of the mining 
reforms. Because the mining reforms are just one aspect of the explanation of local 
realities, this thesis specifically investigates the changes following iTSCi’s 
implementation at three coltan mining sites, namely Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi. 
These sites are located in the territories of Kalemie and Nyunzu (northern Katanga, 
Tanganyika province), where iTSCi has been in force since April 2011.
5
 In the course of 
                                                 
5
 Following the 2006 Congolese constitution—article 2—regarding state decentralisation, the 
former province of Katanga was administratively divided into four provinces in July 2015: Haut- 
Haut-Katanga, Lomami, Lualaba and Tanganyika.  
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its implementation, iTSCi collaborates with trading houses and mining cooperatives. 
These two entities set the prices for the minerals after recruiting a number of négociants 
who are qualified to purchase 3T from the creuseurs. 
Since the first decade of the 2000s, reforming Congolese artisanal mining has been 
privileged in both the international and national policy agenda. This has also been the 
case in many sub-Saharan African countries affected by conflict minerals (Maconachie 
and Hilson, 2011a; Van Bockstael and Vlassenroot, 2009). In DRC, it is implicitly 
assumed that mining reforms will fully ‘clean’ artisanal mining of violence, corruption 
and the involvement of militias, and that this will contribute to sustaining people’s 
livelihoods (Garrett and Mitchell, 2009: 12; World Bank, 2008: 5). 
However, questions have been raised about the efficiency of the reform initiatives that 
have been implemented in the artisanal mining sector. For instance, it has been argued 
that these initiatives do little to address the structural problems shaping the sector, such as 
corruption, the smuggling of minerals, and the involvement of armed groups and other 
powerful actors in the mining business (Geenen, 2012; Vogel and Radley, 2015). 
Questions also concern the performance of these initiatives in terms of boosting people’s 
livelihoods (Cuvelier et al., 2014). 
To shed light on these questions, this thesis addresses a series of themes. It first examines 
the historical contexts of mining and reforms, before moving on to study the process of 
institutional creation and change through exploring how, after the reforms, newly 
introduced institutions (mining cooperatives) interacted with pre-established miners’ 
organisations. Additionally, I analyse how these interactions changed pre-existing 
patterns of accessing and trading coltan. I also explore the implications of these changes 
for the livelihoods and economic position of négociants and how creuseurs experienced 
this group of mineral brokers throughout the coltan supply chain. Finally, this thesis 
examines how and why the creuseurs and négociants complied with or bypassed the 
reforms, especially the iTSCi politics around ‘tagging and bagging’ mineral loads. 
1.3. Scope 
This thesis can be seen as a case study that contributes to debates about two interrelated 
processes: ‘conflict resources’ and mining reform as a driver of socioeconomic recovery 
in post-conflict area. 
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1.3.1.  Conflicts and natural resources  
Natural resources, political stability and conflicts have been the subject of academic 
debates for a long period of time. Since the end of the 1980s, academics have debated the 
‘resource curse’ thesis, which holds that ‘natural resource abundance (or at least the 
abundance of particular types of natural resources) increases the likelihood that countries 
will experience negative economic, political and social outcomes’ (Rosser, 2006: 7).  
 
Proponents of the ‘resource curse’ proposition embrace various analytical angles. 
Scholars such as Sachs and Warner (1995), Auty (2001) and Lamb et al. (2009) have 
taken an economic line of reasoning, arguing that an abundance of natural resources 
causes low economic performance (mainly Dutch disease)
6
 and generates poor political 
effects (e.g. poor governance or corruption), which undermines countries’ development 
and economic growth. 
 
Another group of scholars (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Ross, 2006) have established 
linkages between the presence of natural resources and poor democracy records, because 
of the risk that these resources will feed despots (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004) or make 
governments less keen to respect human rights (Ross, 2006). In addition to this view, 
Nordstrom (2004), for instance, has explained that the malfunctioning of governance 
structures, corruption and the illicit trade of natural resources encourage criminalised 
networks. 
 
There also exists a group of scholars who argue that the presence of lootable resources 
and the ‘greed’ and competition of armed actors for these resources cause civil conflicts 
and explain why these may be protracted (Berdal and Malone, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 
1998). This line of reasoning has been influential in the reforms undertaken in the 
Congolese mining sector. Although the ‘greed hypothesis’ has been criticised for its 
inconsistent performance in explaining resource-related conflicts (Le Billon, 2001; Ross, 
2006; Vlassenroot and Raeymakers, 2004), policymakers and other observers have been 
convinced, since the end of the 1990s, that the exploitation and trade of Congolese 
minerals are linked to conflicts (Global Witness, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2005).  
                                                 
6
 ʽDutch disease’ is a situation where a high level of resources and export revenues lead to an 
appreciation of the national currency, and this, in turn, has a negative effect on non-resource 
economic sectors. See Ross M.L. (1999). The political economy of the resource curse. World 
Politics. 51:297–322. 
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Nevertheless, some have questioned the association between minerals and conflicts. 
Following Lahiri-Dutt (2006), who argued in her study of coal mines in Southern Asia 
that the images of paradox of plenty and resource conflicts suggest deviant and unruly 
behaviour among the third world poor, I argue that linking resources to conflicts tends to 
turn a blind eye to other drivers of the Congolese conflicts. These drivers predominantly 
relate to limited state authority (Raeymaekers et al., 2008), the presence of regional and 
criminal commercial networks (Utas, 2012) and internal divisions pitting local 
communities against one another, for instance over land issues and identities (Van Acker, 
2005; Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005; Vlassenroot et al. 2016). Stressing that all 
conflicts are exclusively linked to resource exploitation also overlooks the structural 
problems shaping the mining sector noted above, such as the rampant corruption of 
political elite (Global Witness, 2006). Linking conflicts and resource exploitation does 
not take into account ‘the myriad other causes causing instability, conflicts and poverty’ 
(Autesserre, 2012:4) and therefore ‘lacks a nuanced understanding of the complex 
interactions between resources and conflicts’ (Vlassenroot and Perks, 2010: 65). 
 
This thesis contributes to understanding the issues raised in the larger body of work 
exploring links between natural resources and conflicts. This existing work informed my 
choice to focus the present study on iTSCi as a conflict minerals policy, because, given 
that iTSCi aimed to establish order in the mining sector, it is important to examine how 
structural problems in the sector have survived or been reshaped along with iTSCi and 
how these problems continue to obstruct the working of artisanal mining. 
 
1.3.2.  Reforms and socio-economic recovery 
In war-torn, resource-rich countries recovering from violent conflicts, such as DRC, 
reforming the mineral sector can be seen as a shift from the view of conflicts being driven 
by resources, as explained above, to the idea that a well-functioning system of resource 
governance can contribute to economic growth and improve the well-being of the 
population (Binns and Maconachie, 2005; Maconachie and Hilson, 2011a; Varisco, 
2009). This view aligns with the broad meaning of socioeconomic recovery, which 
recognises ‘the role of economic actors in causing conflict, but also in building peace and 
reconstruction (Hilhorst et al., 2017: 2). 
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The reform initiated in the Congolese mining embraces the above optimistic view. 
Although pockets of violence still exist, and despite the fact that the relationship between 
mining and development is often ‘contentious and ambiguous’ (Bebbington et al., 2008, 
Campbell, 2009), some scholars and observers have argued that a formalised mineral 
sector can become a ‘basis of development’ (Garrett et al., 2010: 5). In other words, when 
mining governance is improved, reforms have potential for poverty reduction (Ansoms 
and Marysse, 2011). They can thus ‘improve productivity and recovery factors of 
artisanal miners’ (World Bank, 2008: 76) through ensuring better technical assistance, 
equipment and safety standards. 
 
However, in post-war, resource-rich countries, the governance of artisanal mining is a 
complex process (Maconachie, 2009). The reforms and socioeconomic recovery itself are 
shaped by the ‘micro-politics of recovery […] entailing variations in social outcomes of 
recovery (Hilhorst et al., 2017: 4). This thesis therefore aims to find out how 
socioeconomic recovery works, with a special focus on if and how the mining reforms 
actually improve people’s livelihoods. This work specifically looks at how, why and 
under which conditions the reforms have been beneficial to people, what the reforms 
have meant for these people and whether the mining sector has become more or less 
inclusive following the implementation of the reforms. 
 
In DRC, the mining reforms have been enforced through various measures. In 2002, a 
new Mining Law was passed. From 2003 to 2007, after several calls for policy responses 
addressing conflict minerals,
7
 concrete initiatives to make artisanal mining and the 
mineral trade more transparent gained traction. The first reform initiative that came into 
being in 2009 was the iTSCi programme, which was then tested in the Kalimbi mine 
(South Kivu). Around the same period, the Congolese government started to demarcate 
Artisanal Exploitation Zones (AEZ).
8
 These were mainly granted to mining cooperatives. 
In July 2010, the United States Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, which includes a section (1502) on conflict minerals requiring 
                                                 
7
 For instance, significant reports documenting the involvement of armed actors in the 
exploitation of resources include the United Nations panel of experts’ reports (from 2001 to 
2009); the Porter Commission report on Ugandan stakes in the DRC war economy (2002); ‘Curse 
of gold’ by Human Rights Watch (2005); and ‘Under-mining peace: tin–the explosive trade in 
cassiterite in eastern DRC’ by Global Witness (2005). 
8
 According to the Congolese Mining Law (Title 4, Ch. 1, Art. 109), the AEZ are areas where ‘the 
technological and economical factors are not suited for the site to be industrially exploited’. AEZ 
are therefore reserved exclusively for artisanal mining.   
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companies listed on the United States stock exchange to provide specific assurances that 
any products they have manufactured or contracted to manufacture do not contain 
minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in DRC or 
neighbouring countries.
9
 A special measure taken by the government of DRC was a ban
10
 
on artisanal mining in the Kivus and in Maniema province (Geenen, 2012).  
 
Other measures directly targeted the governance of artisanal mining areas. In 2010–2011, 
the government encouraged creuseurs to register in mining cooperatives or, ideally, to 
create them. Importantly, while many creuseurs were already established within AEZ 
where they were accustomed to extracting minerals and setting up various local structures 
(e.g. comités des creuseurs—miners’ committees), granting AEZ to mining cooperatives 
could be seen as a process of privatisation, ‘dispossession and accumulation’ (Bush, 
2009) that brought new tensions. Although creating AEZ encouraged the establishment of 
private entities in artisanal mining areas, it also created conditions that deprive creuseurs 
of mining as their traditional activity. 
 
To this point, many academics, researchers from NGOs and think tanks have examined 
the working of the mining reforms in DRC. They have taken several analytical angles, 
ranging from analysing legislative measures to working to gain an understanding of the 
on-the-ground effectiveness and impact of the initiatives. For instance, Mazalto (2005) 
explored how international institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund) have been influential in the design of the Congolese Mining Law, increasing 
foreign capital in large-scale mining extraction. Furthermore, according to other 
academics (Cuvelier, 2010; Vogel and Radley, 2015), most of the reform initiatives 
targeting the mining sector are bureaucratic solutions to problems shaping artisanal 
mining. Correspondingly, in her study on the effectiveness of the mining ban that hit the 
mining business in the Kivus and in Maniema province, Geenen (2012) has argued that 
this measure was too ‘technical and narrow, thereby neglecting broader socio-economic 
and political issues’ (Geenen, 2012: 329). Some have also argued that the initiatives taken 
                                                 
9
 Another document addressing these topics is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Paris-formulated Voluntary Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible 
Mineral Sourcing.  
10
 The six-month ban (September 2010–March 2011) was decreed by President Kabila to end the 
militarisation of artisanal mining in these provinces. 
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are insufficiently in tune with one another (Geenen and Custers, 2010).
11
 These initiatives 
are often designed by different entities and are implemented at different levels, in 
different periods and across different locales to such an extent that they poorly take into 
account the complexity of the problems associated with artisanal mining. Reflecting this 
point, Kinniburgh (2014: 64) asserted that ‘the number of supply chain monitoring 
initiatives alone […] has become almost as dizzying as the list of armed groups involved 
in the conflict’. 
 
Moreover, other authors have noted that many reform initiatives have had ambiguous 
effects on the ground and have done little to improve the governance of artisanal mining 
or to boost people’s livelihoods (Cuvelier et al., 2014; Mattyssen and Montejano, 2013; 
Vogel and Radley, 2015). The effects described above cannot all be attributed to a single 
factor. Rather, the reasons for these observations need to be contextualised and may vary 
from one mining area to another. For instance, Mattyssen and Montejano, (2013: 33–34) 
have noted that, in northern Katanga—where this study was undertaken—creuseurs have 
often been dissatisfied with the mineral prices set by the trading houses, predominantly 
Mining Mineral Resources (MMR). 
 
Following the initiation of the reforms, many observers have formulated a series of 
recommendations aimed at making the ongoing reforms efficient. A non-exhaustive list 
of these recommendations includes De Koning (2011) and Global Witness (2009; 2010), 
who have proposed the demilitarisation of artisanal mining areas. Additionally, Spittaels  
(2010:59) has argued that making the mineral commodity chain more transparent can 
contribute to fighting conflict minerals. Other recommendations include enforcing a 
regulatory framework that encourages ‘operators to move from a-legal to fully legal 
activities’ (Garrett et al., 2010: 33) and designing policy for the ‘formalisation of the 
entire production and trade process’ (Geenen, 2012: 324). This process should be 
‘context-sensitive […] starting from the bottom-up and providing incentives to miners 
and traders (Geenen, 2012: 329). Further recommendations align with fighting corruption 
(Trefon, 2016) and undertaking a finer analysis of the underlying problems creating 
violence and instability in eastern DRC (Vlassenroot and Perks, 2010; Vogel and Radley, 
2015). Notably, these recommendations all call for contextually informed reforms. 
                                                 
11
 Maconachie and Hilson (2011b) observed similar issues regarding a governmental initiative 
taken in Ghana’s mineral sector, stating that this initiative ‘has been driven primarily from the top 
down, with minimal interaction with target groups’ (Maconachie and Hilson, 2011b: 608). 
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In many respects, this thesis is quite focused. Although the authors cited above are mostly 
concerned with providing analysis, criticism, wake-up calls and recommendations for 
reforming artisanal mining, many of them do not sufficiently address the questions of 
how mining reforms work in practice, what these reforms entail for people’s livelihoods, 
which ‘glocalized’12 responses the reforms have elicited and to what extent they have 
contributed to socioeconomic recovery in artisanal mining areas. These issues deserve 
attention, especially as many mineral-rich countries in the Third World are witnessing a 
phenomenon of ‘globalized miners’ (Ballard and Banks, 2003: 294) because of increased 
privatisation, dispossession and exclusion (Bush, 2009; Fischer, 2007; Geenen, 2016). 
Drawing on the case of iTSCi, this study attempts to address these issues. Additionally, 
as Cuvelier et al. (2014: 349) have noted, ‘while existing literature offers some insights 
into the resilience and adaptation of populations living in conflict-affected areas, less is 
known about how shifts in power constellations and reconfigurations in hybrid 
governance frameworks affect livelihoods’. This thesis will try to fill this gap in 
knowledge. 
1.4. The ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative  
 
The intention of the present study was not to perform an exhaustive examination of all of 
the conflict mineral initiatives designed and implemented in eastern DRC. Although this 
region experienced the implementation of 13 reform initiatives in 2014, iTSCi can be 
considered a primary case, and a starting and ending point that deserves an in-depth 
analysis. Focusing on iTSCi alone has the advantage of unravelling the lessons that can 
be learned from this kind of conflict mineral initiative. Although iTSCi is further 
explained in Chapter 2, it is important to inform the reader in brief about its development. 
In DRC, the first conflict minerals campaign can be traced back to 2001 (Nest, 2011: 
112). After the promulgation of the Mining Law in 2002 and following the increased 
concern expressed by Western governments, advocacy groups and the United Nations 
about conflict minerals in the Great Lakes Region, especially in the eastern part of 
                                                 
12
 Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004: 75) use this term to explain how commercial 
entrepreneurs or predatory elites in eastern DRC  link and develop their activities between local 
opportunities and economic opportunities offered by regional markets. For more on this concept, 
see Roland R. (1995). ‘Glocalization: Time–Space and Homogeneity–Heterogeneity’. pp. 25–44 
in Featherstone M. and Roberstone R. (eds.) Global Modernities. London: SAGE publications. 
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DRC,
13
 campaigns against conflict minerals focused mainly on the ‘iconic’ (Smith, 2011: 
31) mineral of coltan. Developed from 2000 to 2007, this campaign resulted in the design 
of iTSCi in 2008 by the ITRI. After being tested at Kalimbi mine in 2009, iTSCi was 
expanded to the former Katanga province in 2011. 
The iTSCi policy deserves attention for various reasons. First, in eastern DRC, iTSCi has 
been the most widely implemented conflict minerals policy. In March 2015, iTSCi was 
implemented in 471 mining areas, 232 of which were located in the former Katanga.
14
 
The second reason for focusing on iTSCi relates to its approach. In practice, iTSCi 
mainly consists of ‘tagging and bagging’ mineral loads as a strategy to track the coltan 
flow.
                                                 
13
 iTSCi was largely inspired by the creation of the Kimberley Process at the beginning of the 
2000s, which now governs the international diamond trade. On the Kimberley Process, see, for 
example, Van Bockstael S. and Vlassenroot K. (2009). From conflict to development diamond: 
the Kimberley process and Africa’s Artisanal Diamond Mines. Studia Diplomatica. 62(2):79–96. 
14
 iTSCi general overview, 9
th
 OECD meeting, Paris, May 2015. 
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Figure 1. iTSCi’s role in the coltan supply chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Primary data collected in 2013–2014. 
 
Researching iTSCi offered several advantages for this study. As iTSCi’s ‘tagging and 
bagging’ system provided a down-to-earth enactment of the iTSCi policy, this study 
enabled me to observe interactions between institutions and actors engaged in performing 
the iTSCi policy at the mining sites in a comprehensive manner. Thus, this thesis tries to 
unravel the micro-dynamics of changes by exploring in detail the emerging realities 
around iTSCi. 
1.5. Creuseurs and négociants as the unit of analysis  
 
Without downplaying the implications of ongoing mining reforms on other groups of 
people (e.g. customary chiefs, civil servants, local traders and other ‘big men’15), this 
thesis focuses on two specific groups: creuseurs and négociants. 
                                                 
15
 ‘Big men’ refers to individuals using their power position to command others or to profit from 
resources’ exploitation. See for instance, Utas M. (ed.) (2012). African conflicts and informal 
power: big men and networks. London: Zed Books; Kyamusugulwa P.M. and Hilhorst D. (2015). 
Power Holders and Social Dynamics of Participatory Development and Reconstruction: Cases 
from the Democratic Republic of Congo. World Development, Vol. 70: 249–259.   
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Focusing on these groups is important for several reasons. The examined mining reforms 
are predominantly based on untested assumptions, and the policymakers supporting these 
reforms have fixed ideas about how artisanal mining and the mineral trade should be 
organised (Verbruggen et al., 2011) around policy (iTSCi) and institutions (trading houses 
and cooperatives). These policymakers therefore tend to overlook the meaning and effects 
of this organisation for creuseurs and négociants, who are directly dependent upon 
artisanal mining for their livelihoods. It is often reported that, because of their easier 
access to information (Geenen, 2011a), financial assets and connections, négociants are 
powerful actors in the mineral supply chain, enjoying a brokering position that allows 
them to dupe the creuseurs (Global Witness, 2006; Maconachie and Hilson, 2011b: 296). 
However, initial interviews in the mining sites cast some doubt about this representation 
of négociants vis-à-vis creuseurs. It was therefore decided to study both groups, 
examining the position of the négociants in the wake of the reforms as well as the 
experiences of creuseurs with these reforms. 
Focusing on creuseurs and négociants allowed for a detailed study of how mining 
reforms have affected these two groups of key actors in coltan production and trade. Prior 
to the reforms, there were an estimated 10, 000 creuseurs in the study area and about 100 
négociants. These creuseurs were men aged 19–45 years, with different backgrounds, 
including farmers, deserters and demobilised soldiers. As for négociants, some were 
independent traders and others purchased coltan for urban-based trading houses 
(comptoirs) based in Kalemie (northern Katanga), Uvira and Bukavu (South Kivu), and 
Goma (North Kivu). At that time, mining cooperatives and trading houses were not yet 
established in the mining areas. This thesis studies the changes that the ongoing mining 
reforms have brought about from the perspective of the creuseurs and négociants. 
1.6. Research objectives and questions  
 
This study pursues two objectives. First, it aims to provide insights into how iTSCi is 
concretely implemented in 3T mining areas and how it has altered the organisation of 
mining and the trade of coltan. Second, this thesis aims to examine how this organisation 
affected creuseurs and négociants regarding their livelihoods and mineral access, and 
how these two groups responded to iTSCi. Both objectives will contribute to formulating 
recommendations that are policy relevant for making the mining reforms more efficient. 
As Hilson has noted, ‘to date, the impact of efforts to support ASM [artisanal and small-
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scale mining] in sub-Saharan Africa [...] in particular has been negligible, in large part 
because of poor understanding of the sector’s dynamics’ (Hilson, 2012: 184). 
 
The main question that this thesis seeks to answer is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This question was divided into the following sub-questions: 
1. What are the contexts of coltan mining and reforms in northern Katanga? 
2. How, following the implementation of iTSCi, have mining cooperatives as newly 
introduced institutions interacted with pre-existing miners’ organisations? 
3. How have these interactions altered patterns of property rights and access to coltan? 
4. What implications have the changes in property rights and access to coltan had for 
the livelihoods of négociants? 
5. How have creuseurs and négociants responded to iTSCi? 
 
1.7. Theoretical framework 
1.7.1. Actor-orientation 
This thesis uses an actor-oriented approach. Building on critiques of prevailing 
structuralist development ideologies and practices, this approach starts from the premise 
that individual actors have the agency, knowledge and experience necessary to reflect 
upon their situation and to respond to changes in their surrounding contexts (Biggs and 
Matsaert, 1999; De Bruijn et al., 2007; Giddens, 1984; Long, 2001). Importantly, actor-
orientation is particularly useful because it goes to the heart of debates among social 
scientists about examining the role of institutions in making people vs. the role of people 
in making institutions. Thus, actor-orientation takes both directions in the sense that 
‘individuals shape institutions and are shaped by them’ (Cleaver, 2012: 112). 
How have initiatives to reform artisanal mining (iTSCi in particular) affected 
institutional change, how does this relate to changes in patterns of coltan 
production and trade, how were creuseurs and négociants affected by these 
changes, and how did these groups respond in the coltan mining areas of 
Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai Baridi (northern Katanga) from 2009 to 2014? 
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Incorporating the concepts of policy, institution and social change is consistent with the 
actor-oriented approach. Policy as ‘project design, model and approach’ (Mosse, 2004: 
640) is usually put into practice through institutions. Through an actor-oriented 
perspective, Long and Van Der Ploeg (1989: 226), for instance, view policy interventions 
(such as iTSCi) and the institution through which these operate as a ‘multiple reality’, 
where social actors are confronted with diverging interests. These actors bring their 
interpretations and strategies to the arena of ‘policy speak’, institutions and practices 
(Hilhorst, 2013: 8), and to social change (Christoplos and Harvey, 2017). 
More importantly, policy acquires meaning and interpretation as a result of interactions 
between different stakeholders, ‘who try to make policy fit their own perspectives of the 
problem and goals’ (Hilhorst, 2013: 8). In the processes of social change—such as those 
occurring in mining areas—actors socially negotiate policy outcomes while institutions 
and rules are produced as a result of people’s interactions. This means that policy 
processes and the institutions they bring about cannot be considered fixed or planned 
(Colebatch, 2009). Rather, they are best understood as emergent and negotiated (Hilhorst 
et al., 2010) or as being shaped through the blending of the old and the new, of customs 
and inventions, a process that Cleaver (2012: 43–46) aptly describes as ‘institutional 
bricolage’. However, these processes can also be shaped by ‘elite capture’, where 
powerful actors (also referred to as ‘big men’) negotiate policy outcomes for individual 
rather than community interests (Platteau, 2004). However, the ‘big men’ can also 
contribute to community interests (Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst, 2015).  
Through the use of an actor-orientation, this thesis demonstrates that, rather than being 
fixed or planned, the ongoing reforms and related institutions can be viewed as an arena 
that is shaped through the interactions of actors (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). In the case 
of the iTSCi policy, this thesis brings out several examples of how iTSCi was shaped by 
clashes and resistance between the creuseurs, trading houses and cooperatives. Such 
resistance confirms Long’s (2004: 15) decade-old argument that ‘it’s here [in the field of 
intervention] that we see most clearly the emergence of various kinds of negotiated 
orders, accommodations, oppositions, separations and contradictions’.  
In post-war reconstruction processes such as those continuing in northern Katanga, 
institutions defined by North (1990: 3) as ‘the rules of the game in a society, or more 
formally humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions’ are in constant flux. 
In such settings, the meanings ascribed to institutions are usually negotiated and 
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manipulated by social actors (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009; Hilhorst et al., 2010). This 
will be shown regarding, for instance, the working of mining cooperatives (Chapter 3).  
In the present study, the nexus of policy, institutions and social change is important in 
two ways. First, it helps in explaining how iTSCi as a planned policy intervention has 
encouraged the introduction of new institutions in the mining communities, how these 
have been shaped by the influence of the ‘elite’ and what have been the outcomes of this 
process (Chapter 3). The thesis pays less attention to the distinction between informal and 
formal institutions, concentrating instead on their merging and on the results of this 
process. 
Second, using the concepts of policy, institutions and social change helps in explaining 
how iTSCi, along with trading houses and cooperatives, put into force new ‘rules of the 
game’ around iTSCi’s ‘tagging and bagging’ (Figure1), what organisational arrangements 
have emerged from these rules and how they have been negotiated and contested. I view 
the ongoing mining reforms and the changes they bring about as social processes shaped 
by the (diverging) interests of actors, as well as their interactions and reactions to policy. 
As this thesis is concerned mainly with the changes that followed the implementation of 
iTSCi, an actor-orientation allows for an understanding of societal change. According to 
De Sardan (2005: 38), societal change can take a variety of forms and result from 
multiple sources, including outside interventions initiated by the state, activists or private 
operators trying to transform the behaviour and everyday practices of actors. 
1.7.2. The sociology of economic life 
This thesis also draws upon the sociology of economic life school of thought. The 
varying nature of changes that followed the introduction of iTSCi—and the responses of 
creuseurs and négociants to these—are interesting points that need to be analysed 
through a sociological lens. Therefore, I moved beyond official regulations and the 
formal market exchange promoted by iTSCi by exploring how the reforms and the 
reactions to them are socially constructed. For instance, to examine the livelihoods of 
négociants after the reforms (Chapter 5) or what strategies this group developed when 
smuggling minerals (Chapter 6), it would be very superficial to look only at the 
négociants’ everyday activities or at how many individual smugglers were arrested. 
Livelihood activities and mineral smuggling occur in the context of complex processes 
and may involve many actors inside and outside the mining areas. Studying such 
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complexities best tallies with ideas such as ‘social networks’, which are prominent in 
many studies inspired by the sociology of economic life (Beckert, 2007; Granovetter, 
1985; Hilhorst et al., 2017; Twijnstra, 2014). 
The sociology of economic life approach emerged with Karl Polanyi in the 1950s 
(Beckert, 2007) in response to the classic economics approach of perceiving people and 
institutions as purely rational and profit-maximising. The sociology of economic life 
draws on the main idea that economic action is a form of social action that is socially 
‘embedded’, meaning that it is linked to or dependent on actions and institutions that are 
non-economic in content, goals and processes (Granovetter, 2005; Hilhorst et al., 2017). 
The mining reforms are concerned with making transparent the formal economic 
transactions between entities (trading houses and cooperatives) and actors (creuseurs and 
négociants), and the social networks in which these actors are embedded are often 
disregarded. This is the case even though these networks strongly impact the performance 
of the reforms. In this thesis, the sociology of economic life school of thought is 
incorporated through the concepts of social networks and livelihoods. The next two 
sections explore the academic debates around these concepts and explain their relevance 
for this study. 
Social networks  
In sub-Saharan Africa, social networks have been used extensively to study informal 
economic activities and their role in the processes of societal change. For instance, in 
their study on transnational trade between Central Africa and Europe, MacGaffey and 
Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000: 13) asserted that long-term and recurrent relations of 
economic exchanges between buyers and sellers are a key feature of a network, beyond 
market transactions. Researching the shoe and garment trade networks in Aba, Nigeria, 
Meagher (2010: 10) used social networks to ‘refer to informal organizational 
arrangements based on social ties’, a definition adopted by this thesis. 
 
There is an abundant literature about social networks. This body of work points to various 
types of networks that are set up in various contexts and for diverse ends. Although not 
all of these types of networks will be used in this thesis, it is useful to introduce some of 
the proposed network types to provide an idea of the concept’s range. In their work on 
clandestine economic activities in Central Africa, Nordstrom (2004) and Taylor (2003), 
for instance, discussed ‘shadow networks’ that developed in war-torn African countries 
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around a wide range of non-state actors and transactions. Using the concept of ‘war 
networks’, Duffield (2001) explained existing interconnections between different interest 
groups in war activities. ‘Elite networks’ (Raeymaekers, 2010) and ‘networks of power’ 
(Roitman, 2001) refer, to varying degrees and in varying contexts, to groups with 
political influence or large economic interests, such as actors gathered around Utas’ 
(2012) ‘networks of conflict economies’, a network type that is used extensively in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
Many of the accounts of networks described above seem to be consistent with a political 
economy approach. This revolves around the analysis of the ‘interaction of political and 
economic processes in a society, the distribution of power and wealth between different 
groups and individuals and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relations 
over time’ (Collison, 2003: 3). This thesis, however, opts for the sociology of economic 
life perspective, which I find to be theoretically more satisfying because the social is 
broader and more encompassing than the political in terms of understanding the realities 
of mining communities. 
 
There are continued debates about the role of social networks in the economy. Some have 
argued that social networks serve to trace informal organisation processes. Meagher 
(2010: 23) emphasises the importance of institutions in shaping social networks and the 
need to analyse these institutions’ power and relations to the state to understand how 
networks are constructed. In contrast, the concept of social networks also helps to explain 
how peoples’ agency allows individuals or marginalised groups to circumvent 
institutional constraints and structures of exclusion or marginalisation within the wider 
society (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). This thesis embraces this line of 
reasoning. However, other scholars believe that social networks are detrimental to 
economic development, arguing that these networks foster social liabilities and encourage 
predatory or criminal activities (Bayart, 2000; Chabal and Dalloz, 1999; Collier, 2000; Le 
Billon, 2001; Reno, 2004). 
  
The most important aspect highlighted in the literature above is the fact that the concept 
of social networks transcends the notion of ‘formal’ market exchange, pointing to 
patterns of reciprocal relations that may or may not be clandestine. For this thesis, social 
networks form an important theoretical cornerstone that makes it possible to understand 
how mineworkers and négociants formed their ‘networks of exclusion’. These actors 
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relied on their social ties to make ends meet and to bypass and react to iTSCi, while 
dealing with institutional constraints and process of exclusion from mining activities and 
the mineral trade. 
Livelihoods 
Developed since the 1990s (Chambers and Conway, 1992) as a response to the 
conventional approach to development, which mainly explained poverty in terms of low 
income, the livelihoods framework has generally been used as a holistic, people-centred 
development approach to poverty eradication. It is based on the assumption that a 
livelihood is broader than monetary income (De Haan, 2000). Ellis (2000), for instance, 
asserts that one should analyse issues of livelihoods in terms of assets (natural, human, 
financial, social and physical), activities and people’s access to them, through ‘social 
relationships and institutions that mediate people’s access to different assets and income 
streams’ (Ellis, 2000: 291). 
Despite its popularity in development interventions, the livelihoods framework has been 
criticised in many ways. Associating assets with ‘types of capital’ tends to overlook other 
aspects affecting people’s vulnerability and the strategies they develop to build up a 
livelihood portfolio. As an illustration of this, Hinton (2011: 49) contends that ‘the escape 
route out of poverty is far more complex and depends on many factors such as policies, 
institutional practices, or the ways in which the market is organized’. These factors 
influence not only access to assets but also the broader social context. Bebbington (1999) 
and Krantz (2001) contend that livelihoods are shaped by non-economic elements, such 
as cultural aspects or ‘informal structures of social dominance and power within the 
communities themselves’ (Krantz, 2001: 4). These broad insights from the literature 
indicate that livelihoods are more than material but also tie in social relations, identity 
and processes of meaning. 
Debates about understanding people’s livelihoods in artisanal mining have evolved along 
three lines of reasoning. These debates do not often pay attention to explaining how 
people cope to sustain their livelihoods or which mechanisms they use in doing so. In the 
1970s and 1980s, policymakers and donors were convinced that people chose to engage 
in artisanal mining to ‘get rich quick’, in other words, to earn fast money (Banchirigah, 
2006). However, in the 1990s, several authors pointed out that the artisanal mining sector 
was actually ‘poverty-driven’. Stimulated by the collapse of the agriculture sector, the 
expansion of mining and the engagement of people in it resulted predominantly from the 
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negative effects of economic reforms initiated by multilateral institutions (the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund) in most developing countries (Banchirigah, 
2006). Further, it is increasingly argued—and will also be shown in this thesis—that 
many people involved in artisanal mining are stuck in a vicious cycle of indebtedness and 
‘poverty traps’ (Perks, 2011). 
For this thesis, the concept of livelihoods is used against the backdrop of social networks. 
Instead of using a livelihood model, which has been criticised on different grounds 
including the lack of attention for supra-local economic relations, this thesis uses the 
livelihoods concept to show the role of networks in building people’s living. As has also 
been found in other studies, this thesis demonstrates that, when social networks are based 
on kinship relationships or other forms of informal social relations, they may become 
what Chimhowu (2002: 570) calls ‘livelihood cells’ or localised networks of sharing and 
support. These networks therefore act as informal systems of mutual risk mitigation 
allowing people to borrow and exchange assets, as in reciprocal labour pools, or to access 
resources and markets (Lourenco-Lindell, 2002; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). 
1.7.3.  Conceptualising ‘enclaves of regulations’  
To analyse the changes iTSCi has introduced into artisanal mining areas, this thesis coins 
the concept of ‘enclaves of regulations’. This concept corresponds to the process 
undertaken by the Congolese government in demarcating the AEZ. The establishment of 
AEZ can be interpreted as the creation of mining ‘enclaves’ in a geographical and 
economic sense of closed and isolated territories where rules of reforms regarding mining 
and the mineral trade are to be enforced (Mining Law, Title 4, Ch. 1, Art. 109). The 
concept of ‘enclaves of regulations’ aligns with the concepts of ‘mining enclaves’ (Bush, 
2009: 58), ‘extraction enclaves’ developed by Hönke (2013: 13) and ‘arena’ of 
interventions developed by Hilhorst and Jansen (2010). For this reason, I chose to use the 
metaphorical notion of ‘enclaves of regulations’, which also draws on the theoretical 
notions of ‘semi-autonomous social field’ coined by the legal anthropologist Moore 
(1973).  
 
Bush (2009: 58) used the phrase ‘mining enclaves’ to describe mining concessions 
prohibited to ‘unlicensed miners’ in Ghana, but the research also found that miners 
‘resisted’ this policy (Bush, 2009: 61). In her study on mining and security governance in 
South Africa and DRC, Hönke (2013) referred to ‘extraction enclaves’ to explain how 
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industrial mining companies established order to secure mining extraction, but she also 
noted that ‘illegal miners and thieves pose major security problems’ (Hönke, 2013: 86). 
These enclaves appear to be closed and insulated from the environment, but in reality 
such closure is not complete. They thus have the character of a ‘semi-autonomous social 
field’, referring to as a small field that an anthropologist can observe in its semi-
autonomous character (Moore, 1973: 720). This field generates rules, customs and 
symbols internally. However, Moore (1973) argued that rules and decisions or ‘other 
forces’ emanating from the large social matrix or persons inside the field make it 
vulnerable to invasion (Moore, 1973: 720). 
 
The key to the concepts of semi-autonomous fields, the arena of interventions and my 
original idea of ‘enclaves of regulations’ is their potential to produce rules and 
institutions, and the diversity of actors involved, which renders these rules and 
institutions non-definite and changing. Further, these enclaves experience constant 
change, as actors involved in mineral exploitation seek to advance their strategic 
interests. 
 
This thesis is therefore concerned with demonstrating that artisanal mining areas where 
reforms are in force, which resemble ‘enclaves of regulations’, are arenas that are not 
fully local or ‘locked down’. While ‘enclaves of regulations’ are geographically bounded 
areas—mining sites—where regulations are introduced and there is an elaborate 
institutional framework aimed to impose and monitor these regulations, these areas 
cannot be viewed as ‘small islands of transparency’ (Spittaels, 2010: 59). For this reason, 
beyond the mining areas, attention will be paid to analysing ‘other forces’ surrounding 
these areas; how these forces are connected to urban political and economic elites, 
mineral smugglers and local actors; and how local actors allow these ‘forces’ to bypass 
the reforms taking place around the iTSCi policy (Chapters 3, 4 and 6). 
1.8. The study area 
 
This section introduces the study area, briefly describing its geographical location and 
population, as well as explaining how the cases were selected. 
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1.8.1.  Geographical location and population 
This study was undertaken in Kalemie and Nyunzu (see Maps 1 and 2), two territories of 
the Tanganyika province (formerly the Tanganyika district) in the northern part of what 
was then the Katanga province. The Tanganyika province comprises six territories—
Kabalo, Kalemie, Kongolo, Manono, Moba and Nyunzu—and has a surface of 
134,940 km
2
.
 
It has approximately 2.5 million inhabitants (Omasombo et al., 2014: 401), 
the majority of whom are of the Baluba, Bakalanga and Hemba ethnic groups. In DRC, a 
territory is the medium administrative structure below the province and chieftaincies 
(chefferies). In 2011, Kalemie, with an area of 30,000 km
2
, counted 400,000 inhabitants, 
while Nyunzu had 300,000 inhabitants spread over 17,275 km2. Kalemie is both the 
capital city of Tanganyika province and the territorial city of Kalemie territory. It is 
located on the shore of Tanganyika Lake. The territorial capital city of Nyunzu is located 
194 km west of Kalemie. 
Four reasons drove me to focus this research in Kalemie and Nyunzu. Apart from 
Manono—where tin has been extracted since 1932, during the colonial era—Kalemie and 
Nyunzu are the first territories of northern Katanga to witness the expansion of coltan 
mining beginning in 2007. Additionally, these territories host the most rapidly growing, 
populated and productive coltan mines in the region—namely, Kahendwa, Kisengo and 
Mai-Baridi. These three mining areas could be seen, to some extent, as representative of 
the dynamics of coltan mining and reforms in the area. Importantly, Nyunzu and Kalemie 
both border on South Kivu. In the past decade, the informal coltan trade thrived between 
both territories and South Kivu, contributing to the ‘conflict minerals’ narrative. In 
addition, iTSCi was the first conflict minerals policy implemented in northern Katanga, 
especially in Kalemie and Nyunzu (at the Kisengo and Mai-Baridi sites) in April 2011, 
before it was expanded to other mining sites of Katanga, including Kahendwa in 2012. 
Finally, apart from several NGO reports (De Koning, 2011; IPIS, 2007, Jorns and 
Cishugi, 2015; Spittaels, 2010), very little academic research has been done on coltan 
mining in Kalemie and Nyunzu—and in northern Katanga as a whole. For these reasons, 
studying the everyday realities of changes in the exploitation and trade of coltan after the 
reforms in Kalemie and Nyunzu was interesting for this research. 
1.8.2. Selecting the mining areas  
Druckman (2005: 163) has described case-based research as ‘a bound process that can be 
documented in time/order or space’. In the social sciences of which this study is part, 
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selecting cases also allows the researcher to draw attention to the question of what 
specifically can be learned about the cases selected (Yin, 2009).  
Map 3. Selected mining areas 
 
Source: Adapted from De Koning (2010: 2). 
Initially, my intention was to select six artisanal mining areas in Kalemie and Nyunzu on 
the basis of the following criteria: mining areas where iTSCi had been implemented, 
including 3 coltan mining areas and 3 tin mining areas. This selection would allow for the 
diversification of cases for comparison. However, initial information gathered in Kalemie 
convinced me to take another approach. I was told that in many artisanal mines in 
Kalemie and Nyunzu, tin was neither extracted nor traded. Although these two territories 
had significant deposits of tin, MMR—the largest trading house in Tanganyika—did not 
privilege the trade of tin and was interested instead in the coltan business.
16
 MMR’s 
interest in coltan probably resulted from the fact that, at that time, coltan was more 
                                                 
16
 Interview with the chief office of Division des Mines in Kalemie, April 2013.  
  
40 
lucrative than tin.
17
 Because there were no trading houses (such as MMR) or mining 
cooperatives in tin-mining areas, iTSCi could not be established there. I therefore decided 
to focus the research on coltan mining areas. After selecting three of these areas—
Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi—I was able to study the ongoing reform process in 
detail. In addition, I also decided to examine how actors and entities engaged in the 
reforms were connected to other actors and entities in cities such as Nyunzu-centre and 
Kalemie, as well as Uvira and Misisi (South Kivu). Each of the examined cities hosted 
the mining administration (e.g. offices of the SAESSCAM and Division des Mines) or the 
territorial offices of trading houses or cooperatives
18
, or they harboured clandestine coltan 
négociants, in other words traders who smuggled coltan. Table 1 provides data about the 
population of creuseurs, négociants and other inhabitants in the mining areas. The data 
were obtained from different sources including annual reports (2012, 2013 and 2014) of 
the offices of the Division des Mines and SAESSCAM.  
Table 1. Population of the selected mines 
Territory Mining site Population 
 Creuseurs Négociants Inhabitants 
Kalemie  Mai-Baridi  300 2 700 
Nyunzu Kisengo  1,500 21 17,000 
Kahendwa   230 5 650 
Total    2,030 28 18,350 
Source: Primary data collected in May 2014. 
When selecting the specific cases, additional factors came into play. In 2007, Mai-Baridi 
and Kisengo were the first mining sites in the Tanganyika province to witness coltan 
extraction, as well as the implementation of iTSCi in 2011. Selecting these mines and 
also including Kahendwa allowed me to reconstruct and document the reforms over a 
long period of time. Additionally, prior data about mining reforms in the area indicated 
that the selected mining sites, where iTSCi was in force, witnessed revolts of local coltan 
traders against MMR (Johnson, 2013: 38). There, creuseurs and négociants experienced 
new rules and repertoires of practices regarding mining extraction and the coltan trade. 
                                                 
17
 At that time, one kilogram of coltan cost around 30 USD, whereas one kilogram of tin was 
worth 5 USD. 
18
 In October 2014, additional interviews were held in Lubumbashi (the former provincial capital 
of Katanga) with staff members of mining cooperatives.  
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These rules and their enforcement needed to be thoroughly studied to understand how and 
why people complied with or bypassed them. 
1.8.3.  Looking beyond the ‘enclaves’  
In addition to the three selected mining areas, the data collection for this study was 
expanded to South Kivu for several reasons. Prior to the reforms (2007–2010) and the 
implementation of iTSCi (2011), the coltan trade flourished between South Kivu and the 
mining areas of Kalemie and Nyunzu through informal channels and smuggling 
(Spittaels, 2010: 17). As Spittaels (2010: 59) has noted, while smuggling minerals 
appears to be a deeply rooted practice across the region, ‘north Katanga is the most 
important supplier of coltan to Bukavu and quite possibly the most important coltan 
mining area in eastern DRC as a whole’. Before the reforms, many coltan négociants 
were based in Uvira and Bukavu (South Kivu) and in Goma (North Kivu). Expanding the 
data collection to South Kivu thus enriched the data that I was able to collect. This is 
clear especially in Chapter 2 (on mining and reforms in a historical perspective), Chapter 
6 (on the smuggling of minerals) and the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
1.9. Methodology  
 
This study is grounded in the ethnographic tradition, which studies peoples’ activities, 
accounts and interactions in their everyday context. Following Hammersely and Atkinson 
(2007), ethnography entails long-term immersion and participation in peoples’ lives, 
explicitly or implicitly. For this research, this meant staying at selected mining sites and 
travelling between them for a period of 19 months (March 2013–October 2014), 
interviewing people, and observing how artisanal mining and the coltan trade were 
organised. Studying different facets of changes resulting from the reforms in a 
comprehensive manner required the use of three research methodological approaches: 
multi-sited ethnography, historical ethnography and research uptake.  
1.9.1. Multi-sited ethnography  
Marcus (1995) defines multi-sited ethnography as a mobile ethnography. This is 
‘designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in 
which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an 
explicit, posited logic of association or connection among sites that defines the argument 
of the ethnography’ (Marcus, 1995: 105). In other words, multi-sited ethnography studies 
  
42 
contemporary changes in culture and society and acknowledges that such changes are 
being multiply produced in different sites. 
 
A multi-sited ethnography approach was useful to this study in many ways. It allowed me 
to view society and the changes occurring within it in a larger perspective, rather than in a 
confining single site or research location (Marcus, 1995: 98). This notion of ‘perspective’ 
reinforces the idea of ‘following things and people’, in other words, tracing the 
circulation of objects—such as minerals—and traders across various locations. For 
instance, I followed groups of coltan smugglers across multiple social contexts and 
locales. In this sense, multi-sited ethnography is not at odds with the heavy emphasis this 
study places on the actor-oriented approach. Because there is no central locus of 
representation that can unveil the working of the mining sector in northern Katanga—or 
DRC as a whole—the use of the multi-sited approach allowed for studying people’s 
practices, experiences and connections to one another. For instance, négociants are 
known to move frequently from one location to another when purchasing mineral ore, 
and it was interesting to study how mining reforms have influenced their mobility and 
activities. A major strength of multi-sited ethnography is that it allows for a cross-cutting 
and symmetrical
19
 analysis of actors and relations among them. 
Moreover, collecting data at the selected locations of Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi 
allowed me to closely examine—in both a focused and a broader perspective—how the 
mining reforms took place, how different actors interacted and the main characteristics of 
these areas in terms of similarities and differences. In addition, taking a multi-sited 
ethnography approach allowed me to study in detail how the reforms were challenged by 
groups of people (e.g. smugglers, locally known as hiboux), who were connected through 
various networks from the local mining areas to large cities (Chapter 6). Studying coltan 
mining and the effects of the reforms on people without taking these aspects into account 
through a broader perspective would have missed an opportunity to gain an 
understanding of how the reforms were challenged in a variety of settings in terms of 
efficiency, effectiveness and impact. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Symmetrical here means that I do not make a priori assumptions about the hierarchy between 
different sites or actors, but that I retain an open mind as to the ways in which meanings and 
routines get produced. 
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1.9.2.  Historical ethnography 
This thesis also embraces a historical ethnographic approach. According to Silverman 
and Gulliver (1992: 16), ‘a historical ethnography provides a description and analysis of a 
past era of the people of some particular, identifiable locality, using archival sources and, 
if relevant, local oral history’. 
How artisanal mining came into being, how it evolved and what were the traditional 
activities in the study areas were mainly investigated through historical ethnography 
(Chapter 2). This involved in-depth interviews with mineworkers, who were previously 
farmers, and with négociants, who had traded (or smuggled) coltan in and from northern 
Katanga before the reforms. Among other topics explored, these interviews asked about 
traditional activities before 2007, about how the mining and the trade of coltan were 
organised before the reforms and about the changes the reforms had introduced in the 
mining areas. The ethnographic approach taken also included participant observation in 
villages were artisanal mining had become more important than farming activities, 
complemented by a document review of reports by NGOs or state agencies on the study 
areas and on the coltan trade between northern Katanga and South Kivu. 
Taking a historical ethnographic approach also allowed for the study of how traditional 
activities were affected by the initiation of coltan mining and how this was affected by 
the involvement of armed actors in the mining business. As the territory administrator of 
Nyunzu noted, ‘avant de reformer, il faut connaitre la forme qui existait’ [literally, before 
reforming, one needs to know the form that previously existed].
20
 This statement conveys 
that it is important to be informed about pre-existing realities to grasp how the reforms 
met and were mirrored in these realities. 
Following Comaroff and Comaroff (1992) and Fujii (2009), historical ethnography 
should pay attention to the context, power and meaning of the situation that is analysed to 
avoid accounting for people’s subjective stories and accounts of past events. In a context 
where the ongoing reforms comprised a series of externally driven interventions (through 
iTSCi), it was therefore important to look at what these reforms meant for local people 
and what changes occurred in existing patterns of accessing and trading coltan, as well as 
in  people’s livelihoods. In each chapter, I provide data to inform the reader about the 
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 Interview in Nyunzu, April 2014.  
  
44 
historical evolution of artisanal mining, how measures to reform this sector were 
developed over time and the effects of these measures on people. 
1.9.3.  Research uptake  
For the Down to Earth programme research uptake has been a key issue. This means that 
the research team has made consistent and systematic efforts to reach out to different 
audiences for whom the reforms in artisanal mining matter. In the process of my research, 
I thus also embraced a series of activities for research uptake. Research uptake may 
contribute to generate change in terms of awareness raising and by informing key 
stakeholders about issues regarding current reforms of the mineral sector. More 
specifically, research uptake intended to build linkages between the academic lens of the 
researcher, and perspectives of policy and practice. Throughout the project, research 
uptake took the form of active networking and sharing evolving insights with 
stakeholders. 
 
In the course of this thesis, I participated in a number of different activities, including 
conferences where academic researchers, donors, policymakers and NGOs were gathered. 
These ranged from the World Conference of Humanitarian Studies in Addis Abeba in 
2016 to yearly gatherings of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in Paris. The Down to Earth project organised a mid-term 
conference in Lubumbashi in October 2014. At the end of the programme, the Down to 
Earth project took part in the organisation of two final conferences to present our findings 
in DRC: in December 2016 in Bukavu and in February 2017 in Kinshasa. For both 
conferences, efforts were made to invite a mix of academics and relevant government and 
non-government participants. In these different fora, I presented my findings and shared 
my research brief that summarized the main findings —also translated into French—with 
other researchers and people interested in my research, and received useful comments 
from the audience. 
 
We also developed a series of activities geared to a broader audience in DRC. I 
developed a short YouTube movie on cooperatives and artisanal mining in northern 
Katanga.
21
 I also participated in radio shows, for instance at the Radio Maendeleo 
(Bukavu in December 2016) and Radio Top Congo in Kinshasa (February 2017) and had 
                                                 
21
 See Youtube: handle humanitarian aid and reconstruction 
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several interviews with journalists of Radio Okapi (Bukavu and Kinshasa) and magazines 
like Le Souverain (in Bukavu), La Référence Plus and the Radio Télévision Nationale 
Congolaise (RTNC) in Kinshasa.  
 
Finally, to enhance the accessibility of the thesis in DRC and other French speaking 
areas, it was translated into French. This was supported by the WOTRO Science for 
Global Development programme of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. 
The manuscript has been accepted for publication by L’Harmattan.  
 
1.10. Data collection techniques 
 
In this study, I conducted many individual and group interviews with miners, 
representatives of their committees (comités des creuseurs), négociants, staff members of 
mining cooperatives and trading houses, civil servants and customary chiefs. These 
interviews were supplemented with participant observation, life histories and secondary 
data. 
1.10.1. In-depth interviews  
Interviews were the main method of data collection in this study. These enabled me to get 
an in-depth understanding of the experiences of mineworkers and négociants with iTSCi, 
trading houses and mining cooperatives. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted either individually or in small groups in the mining areas, at selling points 
where mineworkers sold their coltan to négociants, in miners’ camps and in the villages 
where the miners’ households lived. During the interviews, I asked open-ended questions 
from a previously determined question list. Additional semi-structured interviews were 
conducted on particular themes to collect data on a variety of topics that are elaborated in 
the following chapters. These interviews covered topics including the history of mining, 
the functioning of mining cooperatives, interactions with miners and négociants, how 
pre-existing patterns of accessing minerals changed, how these changes affected people, 
and what strategies miners, négociants and hiboux used to bypass iTSCi. 
1.10.2. Informal interviews  
 
Informal interviews dealt with aspects of the research that participants often wanted to 
keep hidden. For instance, some of these interviews related to confidential reports by 
iTSCi staff members, for example on corruption, the illegal taxation of miners or 
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négociants by civil servants or the smuggling of coltan. Other findings that needed to be 
cross-checked included information on how creuseurs and négociants built up their social 
networks and how these operated. On these types of questions, many interviewees did not 
speak candidly during group interviews. Therefore, for a given practice, activity or event, 
I selected specific informants and asked them individually to recount exactly what 
happened, who the people involved were and why these people participated in such an 
event. Cross-checking interviews were also useful to check the accuracy of data 
collected, for instance in terms of location, the sequence of events or the actors involved. 
Those interviewed included iTSCi field staff members, state officials and civil servants of 
intelligence agencies such as the National Intelligence Agency (Agence Nationale des 
Renseignements). Interviewing these persons often took the form of informal 
conversations. During these conversations, I carefully took into account ethical issues by 
ensuring that the initial sources of information were not revealed. In general, the cross-
checking interviews enabled the triangulation of data through comparing sources of 
information (Silverman, 2009). 
 
1.10.3. Playing soccer as a particular form of participant observation 
 
Observation is a method through which an observer takes part in the daily activities of the 
people being studied, experiencing and observing dimensions such as social actions, 
events, interactions, relationships and behaviour (Mason, 2012). This method was 
particularly important in the present study, because it supplemented the data collected 
through interviews. I regularly observed how creuseurs extracted coltan, how négociants 
purchased it at selling points, how iTSCi’s ‘tagging and bagging’ was carried out by civil 
servants and how all of these actors interacted at the mining sites. 
 
While conducting participant observation, I also became ‘one of the crowd’. I spoke 
Kiswahili (a local language) with people and was able to listen carefully to them talking 
amongst themselves. On various occasions, I participated in specific events, such as  
football tournaments, meetings convened by the comités des creuseurs and mourning 
ceremonies that took place when mineworkers lost their lives during extractive activities. 
During all of these events, I heard and learned a lot about mineworkers’ and négociants’ 
satisfaction, complaints and discourses vis-à-vis iTSCi, the trading houses and the 
cooperatives. 
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Playing football was one aspect of the participant observation that turned out to be 
especially valuable for collecting data for this thesis. In Kisengo, for example, after 
joining Kivu Sports, a local football team, I participated in two tournaments organised by 
MMR at the ‘Stadium Coltan’. Many Kivu Sports team members were local traders and 
creuseurs from South Kivu. The team was managed by Divin Wasolela, a Kahendwa-
based négociant. He was from South Kivu, my native province. In my leisure time, I also 
watched football (including the 2014 World Cup) with miners in local cinemas (for 
instance Chez Mayanga in Kisengo or Chez Diedo in Mai-Baridi). 
Sport, like nothing else, was useful in many respects. It allowed me to temporarily 
suspend the social differences between myself as an academic researcher and the local 
people in the study areas. It also enabled me to build camaraderie, which was a very good 
way to gain access to useful or hidden information and develop the level of trust required 
for interviews, including with people from institutions like trading houses and 
cooperatives and with civil servants, who normally highly distrust interviewers. Thus, 
joining Kivu Sports had the advantage of enabling my participation in the local 
‘information economy’ (Goodhand, 2000: 12) in that players became familiar with me 
and were then more outspoken about their activities. All of these things contributed to me 
feeling more at ease with miners and négociants and added pleasure to the fieldwork by 
making me feel more accepted. 
1.10.4. Secondary sources of data  
Secondary data in the form of unpublished reports by state agencies on artisanal mining 
in the Tanganyika province were also used in this study. The reports were collected in 
Kalemie, Nyunzu and the mining areas. I also drew upon policy documents and published 
NGO reports about mining in Katanga and South Kivu. It was important to review these 
documents, because many of them highlight issues of militarisation (De Koning, 2011), 
the earlier organisation of mining, the coltan trade and the smuggling of minerals 
between northern Katanga and South Kivu (Spittaels, 2010), and the challenges facing 
the ongoing reforms (Johnson, 2013; Jorns and Cishugi, 2015). 
1.11. Data process and presentation 
Again, this thesis incorporates data from individual and group interviews and 
observations of events and processes. Most of these materials were transcribed and coded 
using NVivo qualitative software. As the study was exploratory in nature, I opted for a 
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descriptive analytical approach. Interviews were directly quoted from my field notes. 
Interviews were most often held in Kiswahili and sometimes in French or a mix of the 
two languages. The interview excerpts presented in quotations are direct translations of 
the informants’ statements and stories into English. During each visit to the mining areas, 
I carried a new notebook in which the names and positions of the interviewees were 
coded. This prevented data that had been collected previously in the same mining areas 
from falling into the hands of a third party (Silverman 2009). At the time of writing, I have 
chosen to reveal the names or positions of some informants, as they agreed with the 
objectives of this study and granted consent during the fieldwork to use their names. 
1.12. ‘These are our saucepan’: my positioning as a researcher  
1.12.1. Negotiating trust 
Broadly speaking, positionality and field relations with people matter in ethnographic 
work (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). These refer to the relationships with participants 
and how they form, change and evolve during the study, determining whether an 
ethnographer is seen as an insider or an outsider. 
In the study area, positioning myself and negotiating trust varied from one category of 
participant to another. Heemskerk (2005: 84) has argued that ‘because of their lack of 
confidence in the good intentions of the government and researchers, miners may not 
reveal that they employ clandestine labourers, sell their product outside legal channels, 
and violate national labour, environmental, and other regulations’. However, I believe 
that this depends on the strategies developed by the researcher when negotiating and 
trying to gain trust. 
During my fieldwork, I developed various strategies that influenced perceptions of me as 
an independent researcher. As was mentioned above, I joined Kivu Sports, a Kisengo-
based football team. In addition, my social ties with miners and négociants also opened 
doors in terms of gathering detailed information on their activities. In the selected mining 
areas, many of the miners and négociants belong to the Bakalanga, Bangubangu or 
Hemba ethnic groups, who traditionally consider all people of Lega ethnicity, such as 
myself, as their ‘uncles’. Thus, for the majority among creuseurs and négociants, I was 
an insider. 
For the iTSCi field staff members, I developed trustworthy relations as an insider. At the 
onset of my fieldwork in March 2013, the Katanga ITRI/iTSCi project manager (Gilbert 
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Leya Wa Nkulu) introduced me to the iTSCi staff as his friend because I knew him a 
decade ago. This personal relation allowed me to travel frequently with staff members to 
the mining areas where they monitored the iTSCi ‘tagging and bagging’. There, they 
introduced me as an independent researcher to the personnel of mining cooperatives and 
trading houses with whom they interacted. I was therefore able to visit mineral depots and 
to observe how minerals were marketed, ‘tagged and bagged’ at the selling points held by 
the cooperatives. Over the course of the fieldwork, the iTSCi staff members became 
candid when talking with me and provided crucial documents, such as the rapports 
d’incidents (incidents reports), which were confidential.22 
1.12.2. Challenges  
My fieldwork was also shaped by many challenges. In Kalemie, the most striking 
challenge related to obtaining reports by the Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du 
Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM, Assistance and Training Service for Small-Scale 
Mining) and the Division des Mines (mining service). One SAESSCAM civil servant 
noted that ‘les rapports et statistiques sont notre casserole’ [reports and statistics are our 
saucepan].
23
 His words communicate the idea that he was not willing to offer these 
reports unless I paid for them. After I complained about this attitude to the head office of 
SAESSCAM in Kalemie, the head office asked the civil servant to offer me the reports. I 
then gained access to them, confirming what Trefon (2011: 89) has highlighted in the 
statement that the ‘Congolese have a bizarre love–hate relationship with the state and its 
administrative machine’. 
 
Insecurity also shaped the data collection. At the start of my fieldwork, fights between the 
M23
24
 and the Congolese army were raging in North Kivu. On 16 May 2013, a 
policeman—drunk on Kampiongo (a local alcohol)—arrested me in Nyunzu because he 
saw me typing on my computer. He said, ‘You are from the Kivus where there are many 
rebel movements [...]. Computers are the devices used to communicate with the rebels of 
M23’. On our way to the Nyunzu police station—and then probably to the prison as he 
                                                 
22
 The reports document and denounce inimical practices to the reforms and iTSCi 
implementation (e.g. corruption or smuggling of minerals).   
23
 Interview with SAESSCAM civil servant, Kalemie, April 2013.  
24
 M23 (or March 23 military movement) is a rebel movement created by insurgent soldiers of the 
Congolese national army in April 2012. It was defeated in November 2013. See Stearns J. From 
CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo. London: Rift Valley 
Institute, 2012.  
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was promising me—I was lucky to meet the Administrator of Finances of Nyunzu (Pierre 
Mukamba Kaseya), who released me.  
 
Following this incident, I learned two things. Computers, like any device, are not only 
equipment for data recording and saving time (Kumar, 2005: 245); they can also become 
a source of threat for a researcher in conflict and post-conflict settings. Where a 
researcher is situated and when he/she uses his/her computer or any other equipment 
matters for security. The incident also reminded me of the volatile contexts I encountered 
during my previous research in eastern DRC.
25
 I could therefore draw upon lessons that 
reminded me that, in such volatile environments, my research could be politicised, and I 
should be cautious about protecting the data and not ‘doing harm’ to my informants (Lee, 
1995; Van der Haar et al., 2013: 523). Crucially, even being Congolese, I was not safe 
from insecurity, which worsened in the study areas in May 2015, when ethnic conflicts 
broke out between the Bantu and the Pygmy, causing 200 deaths and displacing 12,000 
persons (Radio Okapi, 2015a). At that time, I had already left the study area. 
 
With MMR and mining cooperatives, I was introduced by the Katanga ITRI/iTSCi 
project manager as an independent student researcher. However, one question that was 
often raised by MMR staff members reminded me that I was an outsider for the company: 
‘Why did you opt to undertake your fieldwork in northern Katanga when many coltan 
mining areas are also found in South Kivu, where you are from?’26 Based on this 
question, I suspected that the MMR staff members feared that I would be too nosy in 
collecting detailed information on the activities of the company. These activities were 
sometimes characterised by tensions between MMR and the mineworkers. My suspicion 
was confirmed when MMR’s office in Kalemie stalled for months without approving the 
ordre de mission that would allow me to enter into MMR’s concessions. As a solution to 
this challenge, the head office of the Division des Mines for northern Katanga (Simon-
Pierre Kambi) approved my ordre de mission and added, ‘As a Congolese researcher, no 
                                                 
25
 Earlier research includes my work experience with the Life & Peace Institute in eastern DRC 
on conflict transformation involving local communities and armed groups and the following two  
published. See Dijkzeul D. and Wakenge C.I.  (2010). Doing good but looking bad? Local 
perceptions of two humanitarian organisations in the eastern DRC. Disaster Studies, 34(4):1140–
1170 and Dijkzeul D. and Wakenge C.I. (2014). Proselytizing peacekeepers? Comparing 
proselytizing by UN peacekeepers in the Sudan and the DR Congo. Journal of International 
Organisations Studies. 5(1):39–57. 
26
 Interviews with MMR administrators, Kalemie and Mai-Baridi, April 2013. 
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one can prevent you from conducting your fieldwork in any artisanal mining area’.27 This 
also implied that in case that I encountered an administrative problem, he was able to 
mediate. 
This administrative issue with MMR reminded me that I had to develop strategic 
relationships, not only with this company but also with many other locally based trading 
houses and mining cooperatives. Their activities were probably shaped by the ‘darkness’ 
mentioned through the metaphor that introduces this chapter to such an extent that one 
who tries to shed light on this ‘darkness’ crosses a kind of red line. I felt suspected of 
attempting to break open the black boxes of trading houses and mining cooperatives 
when I visited the mining areas. Their field staff members often asked me to stay with 
them in their compounds. I suspected that these invitations were strategic attempts to 
control my fieldwork activities. Additionally, I thought that staying with them would be 
misconstrued by many miners and négociants with whom I interacted, who would 
perceive me as being part of those entities. I therefore opted to stay instead in small hotels 
held by négociants or in private houses of inhabitants as a way of keeping my 
independence. 
1.13. Thesis outline 
To study the micro-dynamics of changes after the reforms following the implementation 
of iTSCi at three coltan mining sites in northern Katanga, this thesis aims to understand 
these changes both at the contextual and institutional levels and from the perspective of 
individuals. Following this introduction, the thesis is composed of six chapters. 
Chapter 2 explores the evolution of the mineral sector in the former Katanga province. It 
analyses the history of mining, the initiation of artisanal mining and how the ongoing 
reforms have been informed by this history. 
Chapter 3 focuses on mining cooperatives as newly introduced institutions aimed at 
governing the artisanal mining sites. Through a single case study, the chapter analyses 
how these cooperatives were introduced into the mining areas and how they interacted 
and blended with pre-existing miners’ organisations. 
In Chapter 4, I provide a different perspective on ‘conflict minerals’. I thus introduce the 
notion of ‘reform conflicts’ to emphasise that, although ongoing reforms aim to sever the 
                                                 
27
 Informal conversation in Kalemie, April 2013.   
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supposed linkages between the artisanal mining business and violent conflicts, these 
reforms have become a driving force behind the emergence of new conflicts. 
Chapter 5 is about livelihoods. It analyses how the reforms have influenced the 
livelihoods and socioeconomic position of négociants. This chapter also explores what 
kind of opportunities the reforms have offered to this group of mineral brokers often 
considered powerful in the mineral supply chain, and explains what kind of constraints 
they have confronted and why they have opted to diversify their livelihood portfolios. 
Chapter 6 analyses the responses of creuseurs and négociants to iTSCi. Although the 
mining sites where iTSCi is in force appear to be ‘enclaves of regulations’, I explore the 
strategies of creuseurs and négociants to bypass iTSCi and the reforms, especially around 
the coltan trade. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. 
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Photo 1.1. The iTSCi billboard at the Kahendwa office of Division des Mines  
 
Photo 1.2. The comité des creuseurs of Kisengo celebrating Congolese Independence Day on 
30 June 2014 
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Abstract 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), there has been a series of reforms that aim at 
breaking through cycles of violence linked to mineral exploitation. Based on both 
published and unpublished documents about mining in eastern DRC (especially in the 
former Katanga province) and drawing on debates about the post-conflict introduction of 
externally driven policy and institutions, this chapter highlights two issues. It first argues 
that the ongoing mining reforms do not seem to have a sense of history before the wars. 
Second, the chapter shows that Katanga has been acquainted with mining for centuries. The 
chapter thus demonstrates that, although the reforms are framed as a measure against 
conflict minerals, they represent a historical continuity of favouring international 
companies, turning the mineral sector into an increasingly privatised sector. It is therefore 
crucial to reconstruct the historical organisation of mining to better understand how this 
organisation informs current reforms. 
1. Introduction  
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has seen nearly 20 years of armed conflicts, 
beginning with the outbreak of the first war in 1996. Since then, the country has evolved 
into a ‘continuously evolving network of crises’ (Dijkzeul and Wakenge, 2014: 45). 
Although minerals often appear to be central in these conflicts, they are not themselves 
the cause of the conflicts (Autesserre, 2012). Many of the conflicts stem from unresolved 
historical tensions pitting communities against each other over territory, authority or 
resources, combined with the governance weaknesses of the Congolese state (Vlassenroot 
et al., 2016). Despite a wide-ranging peace deal agreed in 2002, the organisation of 
general elections in 2006 and 2011, and tensions around the upcoming presidential 
elections (Congo Research Group, 2016)
28
, it has been reported that more than 70 armed 
groups continue to operate in eastern DRC (Verweijen and Wakenge, 2015; Stearns and 
Vogel, 2015). Many of these groups reap benefits from the mining business (Stearns et 
al., 2013: 36). 
This chapter has three objectives. Given the importance of the conflict minerals discourse 
in the policy agenda and how this has influenced the ongoing reforms of the mineral 
sector, it is worth understanding the context of how artisanal mining came into being, its 
development and its relationship with the so-called conflict minerals. Related to this, the 
second aim of the chapter is to introduce the context of the reforms to 3T (tantalum or 
                                                 
28
 These elections have been postponed until the end of 2017.  
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coltan, tin and tungsten) mining. Special attention is dedicated to coltan, a mineral that 
has recently contributed to making the northern part of Katanga economically important. 
The third objective of the chapter is to introduce in detail one conflict mineral policy: the 
International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) that designed the Tin Supply Chain Initiative 
(iTSCi). Already implemented at the 3T mining sites where this study was undertaken 
(Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi), iTSCi has been the only reform initiative carried 
out in Kalemie and Nyunzu. It is also the most widely implemented reform initiative in 
eastern DRC. 
This chapter argues that the ongoing reforms—the iTSCi policy in particular—and the 
institutions they bring about do not enter into a country without a past. Understanding 
how policy and institutions are introduced and how they interact with pre-established 
institutions and actors in the mining areas is a key to grasp how the reforms are co-shaped 
at the grassroots level. 
The remainder of this chapter consists of seven sections. In the next two sections, I 
briefly explain the theoretical framework and the methods. After providing the historical 
background for how mining came into being in the former Katanga province, I focus on 
the initiation of artisanal mining in the northern part of this province. Then, the chapter 
outlines how northern Katanga witnessed the phenomenon of conflict minerals and how 
these were addressed. The next section explores the functioning of the iTSCi policy. The 
final section provides an analysis and concludes the chapter. 
2. Post-conflict introduction of externally driven policies and institutions 
 
The concepts of policy and institutions are central to this chapter. Policy is understood as 
the pursuit of goals, or what we want to achieve (Colebatch, 1998: 42). It is usually put 
into practice through institutions that provide the framework for human behaviour and 
social interactions (Soysa and Jutting, 2006). 
This chapter centres on the historical context of mining and the iTSCi programme. It 
starts from the idea that it is important to understand the relationships between mining 
and reforms through an institutional lens because crises (e.g. conflict minerals) and the 
responses to these crises (e.g. the ongoing mining reforms) are usually acted upon 
through policy and institutions (Hilhorst, 2013). 
In post-conflict settings, institutions and policy are in constant flux. Institutional design 
and change result from the interactions between structures, practices and policy 
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interventions. This change is both an incremental and a discontinuous process (Scott, 
2001: 50). Thus, the idea that institutions cease to exist during conflict and that post-
conflict reconstruction can start from a blank slate—what Cramer (2006) refers to as the 
‘great post-conflict makeover fantasy’—has been questioned (Hilhorst et al., 2010). This 
means that, in the course of its implementation, policy gets reinterpreted, contested and 
constructed through human interactions (Hyden, 2008). 
The role of institutions has been extensively debated in the context of the reforms taking 
place in the Congolese mineral sector. It is widely assumed that state reconstruction 
should be more centred on reforming and strengthening state institutions, because these 
institutions are too weak to control the management of the mining sector. The World 
Bank (2008: 72) and Garrett and Mitchell (2009: 48), for instance, argue that, to improve 
the ability of the government to effectively and efficiently supervise, monitor, and 
evaluate activities in the mining sector, government institutions should be strengthened. 
Moreover, some scholars (Rackley, 2006; Trefon, 2011) contend that the main obstacle 
facing reforms in DRC is the fact that ‘disorder is associated with Congolese institutions’ 
(Trefon, 2011: 101). Along the same line of reasoning, it has been suggested that the 
‘creation of institutions’ (Garrett and Mitchell, 2009: 12) and the implementation of 
effective policy regarding mining (e.g. iTSCi) are the keys to improving the mineral 
sector governance. However, these policy recommendations formed around institution-
building tend to overlook the nature of institutional arrangements that co-existed or 
competed before the reforms. 
 
This chapter aims to show that the idea of introducing externally driven policy and 
institutions for mining governance adds a new layer to what already existed. The chapter 
thus addresses the questions of how the history and historical organisation of mining have 
informed the current reforms and of what influence these historical trends have had on 
mining reform policy. In writing this chapter, I want to contribute to the debate about the 
role of institutions in a context of reforms, beginning with the assumption that the 
reforms do not enter into a tabula rasa situation. Externally driven policy and institutions 
thus rest on the evidence that they are both informed and co-shaped by past experience 
and everyday realities regarding mining. 
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3. Methods 
 
This chapter is based mainly on a review of available documents and several in-depth 
interviews undertaken from March 2013 to October 2014. The interview data were 
collected in Kalemie (capital city of the Tanganyika province), Nyunzu (territorial city of 
Nyunzu territory) and at three mining sites (Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi). In 
total, 16 reports by state agencies, NGOs and the iTSCi programme about mining in 
Katanga were reviewed, and 21 in-depth interviews were conducted. The interview 
participants included state officials and civil servants of the Service d’Assistance et 
d’Encadrement du Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM, Assistance and Training Service 
for Small-Scale Mining) and of the Division des Mines (the mining service), miners, 
members of the comités des creuseurs, middlemen (so-called négociants) and other 
community members in the mining areas. 
4. Mining from a historical perspective  
 
4.1. Mining in the former Katanga province  
Although industrial activities dominated in the southern part of Katanga, artisanal mining, 
especially of copper, predated colonisation. Copper production and trade have a long 
history in the Katangese region and contributed to the development of indigenous 
metallurgical techniques. Copper production also played an important role in the regional 
trade (De Hemptinne, 1926; Herbert, 1984; Hönke, 2013: 135). 
 
The former province of Katanga, especially the southern part, is the wealthiest Congolese 
province in terms of mineral deposits. The region has an area of 496,965 km² and was 
home to approximately 5,600,000 inhabitants in 2010. It is known for very rich soil 
(Garrett and Lintzer, 2010). Thought to contribute highly to the view that DRC is a 
‘geological scandal’, an expression coined by the Belgian geologist Jules Cornet (Turner, 
2007: 47), Katangese soil is believed to contain almost half of the world’s cobalt reserves 
and 10% of world’s reserve of copper (Rubbers, 2004: 3)29. Additionally, at the 
beginning of the 1970s, the Katangese mining industry contributed around 50% of the 
                                                 
29
 See also United States Geological Survey. Cobalt – for Strength and Color, USGS Mineral 
Resources Program Fact Sheet 2011-3081 (July 2011), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3081/pdf/fs2011-3081.pdf. 
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Congolese national budget (Young and Turner, 1985: 289). This economic contribution, 
combined with an abundant presence of minerals, explains why industrial exploitation 
was initially concentrated in the southern part of Katanga. According to Rubbers (2006: 
115), southern Katanga was the poumon économique (the economic lung) of the 
province, conveying that this region was the most valued economic area. In 2014, 
exported coltan was estimated at 1,004.53 tonnes for the whole of Katanga (Diemel and 
Cuvelier, 2015: 158). 
 
The Katangese mining sector has been managed by several entities. Before Katanga came 
to be industrially exploited at the beginning of the 20th century, it was administrated by 
the Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK), which was created on 19 June 1900 by the 
Belgian King Leopold II. However, CSK did not cease to exist in 1906. Until Congolese 
independence in 1960, CSK was one of the three major mixed economy corporations that 
continued to share concessionary authority over land and mineral rights with the state. 
 
On 28 October 1906, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) was established. 
This became the biggest large-scale mining corporation in Katanga during the first half of 
the 20th century (Cuvelier, 2011b: 12–24; Hönke, 2013: 135–136). In 1967, UMHK was 
taken over by the Zairian Mobutu regime with the intention of severing the Zairian 
mining business from the dominance of foreign corporations (Cuvelier, 2011b: 13). 
UMHK was first renamed Générale Congolaise des Minerais (Gécomines) and then 
Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines), under the management of the Société 
Générale des Minerais, a branch of the Société Générale de Belgique. However, the years 
that followed, especially at the end of the 1970s, witnessed the bankruptcy of Gécamines 
as the result of a combination of several factors, including corruption, political 
interference and a drop in mineral prices (Garrett and Lintzer, 2010: 403–405; Rubbers, 
2006). 
 
After the Congolese independence in 1960, the expansion of artisanal mining was also 
observed in Katanga. In 1982, in response to a growing economic crisis, President 
Mobutu liberalised the artisanal mining of gold and diamonds. Importantly, this measure 
affected many concessions that belonged to and were managed by Gécamines in the form 
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of ‘fortress protection’ (Hönke, 2013: 54)30, because artisanal mining also took place 
within these concessions. To respond to the economic crisis and to make ends meet, 
many creuseurs started to extract minerals either in abandoned shafts or encroached on 
Gécamines’ concessions (Kennes, 2000: 319)31. According to Rubbers (2004: 8), some 
creuseurs worked legally in areas conceded by the Congolese government, while others 
entered illegally into Gécamines’ concessions. In 1997, following a presidential decree by 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila that formalised artisanal mining, southern Katanga witnessed an 
increase in the numbers of creuseurs and négociants involved in copper and cobalt 
mining and trade. To date, artisanal mining continues in many parts of southern Katanga, 
and the mining sector is sometimes shaped by tensions between creuseurs and large-scale 
companies (Cuvelier, 2011a; Geenen, 2014; Radio Okapi, 2015b). 
 
4.2. Mining in northern Katanga  
The last decade has seen a considerable expansion of coltan mining in northern Katanga, 
particularly in Kalemie and Nyunzu. This section examines the rise of mining in northern 
Katanga, especially in terms of how coltan mining has made utile (useful) the northern 
part of Katanga, which was traditionally known as an agrarian region (Omasombo, 2014: 
257). 
4.2.1.  Before mining: farming 
Kalemie and Nyunzu have a long tradition of farming. With respective areas of 30,000 
and 17,275 km² and respective populations of approximately 400,000 and 300,000 
inhabitants, Kalemie and Nyunzu territories were once considered the breadbasket of the 
Katanga province (Mwanyimi-Mbomba, 1988: 220). More than 11 farming enterprises 
were established in Kalemie during the colonial era (Omasombo, 2014: 258), and, until 
the end of the 1980s, Kalemie and Nyunzu nourished the southern part of Katanga, which 
was dominated by industrial mining. In the 1980s, Abdoul Sahel, a Greek trader 
established in Kalemie, created Domaine Agriculture et Elevage. Until the mid-1990s, 
                                                 
30
 Hönke (2013: 54) defines ‘fortress protection’ as a series of security techniques of deterrence, 
coercion and control that concentrates on the fortress of the mine. 
31
 This phenomenon was also observed in other Congolese regions (including the provinces of 
North and South Kivu, Maniema, Kasai and Orientale) where artisanal mining has been a direct 
source of livelihood for about two million Congolese people. See, for instance, Geenen & 
Claessens (2013) for more detail. 
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this enterprise was the largest company marketing food products located in the territories 
of Kalemie or Nyunzu
32
. 
The products supplied by farms in Kalemie and Nyunzu varied. Many farmers harvested 
great quantities of maize, cassava and cotton. Some of these crops, such as cassava and 
cotton, as well as rice and peanuts, were even compulsory (cultures obligatoires) during 
the Belgian colonial period. These crops were first produced in rural areas to increase the 
volume of exportation, with the objective of building rural capacity by improving 
production techniques. After Congolese independence in 1960, the policy regarding 
cultures obligatoires was abandoned. 
4.2.2.  Local history of mining 
In Kalemie and Nyunzu, gold has been extracted using artisanal methods since the 1920s 
(Weyn, 2010), alongside the farming activity in the region. In 1928, the Belgian colonial 
administration created the Syndicat de la Luama, later renamed the Société Minière de la 
Luama. At that time, gold was extracted from the alluvial deposits in the beds of a 
number of rivers, especially Kimbi and Mudjale in the northern part of Kalemie near the 
border between Tanganyika district and the province of South Kivu. Gold production is 
estimated to have reached 344 kg in 1941 (Weyn, 2010: 130). In Nyunzu, no mining 
company was locally established. However, creuseurs supervised by the colonial 
administration extracted gold at several mining sites in northern Nyunzu, including 
Mulungui, Kakulumaziba, Lunga, and Mamba. Many of these sites are still operational 
today. However, compared with a buoyant mining sector in southern Katanga (1906–
1967), mining in Kalemie and Nyunzu can be seen as relatively marginal. 
In 1932, several deposits of tin were discovered in Manono territory. Until 1967, 
Géomines was the only company to exploit tin through artisanal and semi-industrial 
methods. In 1967, Géomines was replaced by the Société Géologique et Minière du 
Congo, which became Congo-Etain in 1968, then Zaire-Etain in 1971. Zaire-Etain was in 
operation until 1996, when it ceased operations because of the outbreak of the first 
Congolese war (De Koning, 2010). After Zaire-Etain had stopped working in the region, 
many creuseurs began to extract tin in the company’s abandoned concessions. 
 
                                                 
32
 Interview with the administrator of Nyunzu, September 2013. See also Omasombo (2014: 287–
288).  
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In 2007, northern Katanga gained an increased economic importance because of the 
initiation of artisanal coltan mining. The shift in the region was characterised by one 
Division des Mines civil servant as the transformation of this part of Katanga from 
useless (‘inutile’) to useful (‘utile’)33. The change resulted from two main factors. First, 
mining began in Kalemie and Nyunzu after several deposits of coltan were found. Since 
2007, the most promising coltan mining sites in Katanga have been Kisengo (115 km 
northeast of Nyunzu), Mai-Baridi (170 km west of Kalemie) and Kahendwa (115 km east 
of Nyunzu) mined since September 2011. The second factor making Kalemie and 
Nyunzu utile is the popularity of coltan. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the coltan trade 
has become increasingly important in the international market, following a high demand 
for the mineral in electronics manufacturing (De Failly, 2001: 13). This demand also 
signalled the importance of coltan mining and the trade of coltan from the mining areas 
located in Kalemie and Nyunzu to other Congolese regions, especially North and South 
Kivu (Spittaels, 2010), and between these regions and neighbouring countries (i.e. 
Rwanda and Burundi). 
 
Before the reforms, coltan extraction was artisanal, and the trade was predominantly 
informal. Neither mining cooperatives nor trading houses were established at the mining 
sites. Instead, the creuseurs were organised in teams of 2–10 workers assembled around 
various forms of local structures (e.g. comités des creuseurs and syndicats). These 
structures were set up by the miners themselves or were led by local powerholders such 
as customary chiefs. These chiefs also provided plots of land to the creuseurs. The 
organisation of the trade of coltan from the mining areas to urban-based trading houses 
(known as comptoirs or maisons d’achat) was led by négociants. In addition, elements of 
the Congolese army and of armed groups and state agencies, including the Division des 
Mines
34
 and SAESSCAM
35
, were also present in or around the mining areas. 
Representatives of these groups were involved in artisanal mining activities or levied 
                                                 
33
 Interview in Kalemie, June 2013.  
34
 The Division des Mines is DRC’s mining administration service. Like SAESSCAM, the 
Division des Mines plays an official role in the iTSCi initiative. It is responsible for weighing and 
tagging mineral bags and documenting mineral production in iTSCi log books at mine sites and 
mineral depots.  
35
 SAESSCAM is a Congolese mining authority responsible for supporting artisanal miners and 
for the development of small-scale mining. SAESSCAM plays an official role in the iTSCi 
initiative, weighing and tagging mineral bags and documenting mineral production and trade at 
the level of the mining site. 
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various kinds of taxes over the creuseurs, négociants and local traders (De Koning, 
2011). 
 
Table 2. Coltan mining sites and creuseurs in Kalemie and Nyunzu (May 2014) 
Territory  Mining site Year of 
discovery 
Number of 
creuseurs 
Kalemie Mai-Baridi  2007 300 
Sango Mutonshia  2012 60 
Nyunzu Kahendwa  2011 230 
Kisengo 2007 1,500 
Kilunga  2008 50 
Lengwe  2007 50 
Luba  2006 200 
Lububu Kitoke (1) -  -  
Mbale (1)
36
 -  -  
TOTAL   2,390 
 
Sources: Primary data collected in 2013–2014, iTSCi master mines list of 18 April 2013, 2014 
annual report of the Division des Mines/Nyunzu. 
 
As Table 2 displays, the latest available data when the study was carried out show eight 
coltan artisanal exploitation zones (AEZ) in Kalemie and Nyunzu. According to the 2002 
Congolese Mining Law (T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 109), AEZ are demarcated by ministerial decree 
as areas where ‘the technological and economic factors are not suited for the site to be 
industrially exploited and which are exclusively reserved for artisanal mining 
activities’37. In the eight AEZ found in Kalemie and Nyunzu, there were approximately 
2,500 creuseurs
38
. One of the mining areas listed in Table 1 (Kisengo) is a private 
concession of Mining Mineral Resources (MMR). The other mining areas are AEZ 
granted to the Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC), which was the 
                                                 
36
 For both Lubuku Kitoke and Mbale, the data were not available.  
37
 However, the law (Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 110) also provides a possibility for closing 
down the AEZ if ‘the factors justifying its creation ceased to exist’ or if a ‘new deposit 
necessitating large-scale exploitation has been discovered’. 
38
 In March 2015, iTSCi estimated the number of 3T creuseurs in Katanga to be approximately 
26,489. See iTSCi general overview, 9
th
 OECD meeting, Paris, May 2015.  
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largest cooperative in the study area. The two mines at the bottom of the table (Lububu 
Kitoke and Mbale) were not operational when this study was carried out. These mining 
sites were inactive because of conflicts over property rights between MMR and Minserve, 
another trading house
39
. It is important to bear in mind that, in eastern DRC, artisanal 
mining activities are not restricted to the AEZ. Rather, these activities often occur in 
other areas as well, even where it is not officially allowed or where it is unclear who 
owns the property rights. 
5. Experiencing conflict minerals 
From 1998 to 2003, conflict minerals entered the mineral sector in Kalemie and Nyunzu. 
According to International Peace Information Service (2012: 10), the term ‘conflict 
minerals’ is applied to define the extraction and trade of minerals from conflict-affected 
areas where human rights abuses take place. These minerals were thought to fund local 
and foreign armed groups committing atrocities against the population (Autesserre, 2012: 
9), and it has been reported that coltan ore played a crucial role in the trade of conflict 
minerals in DRC (Nest, 2011; Smith, 2011; UN, 2001). 
Indeed, revenues from coltan mining contributed to the funding of conflicts and human 
rights abuses in DRC. Many coltan (and gold) mining sites in Kalemie and Nyunzu were 
characterised by the presence of armed actors, including Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo soldiers and Mai-Mai militias (IPIS, 2007)
40
 such as the Mai-
Mai groups of Captain Kafuku Numbi and Kabeja Tango Fort. These groups were 
involved in extractive activities (IPIS, 2007; De Koning, 2011) and found lucrative 
means to finance their military operations through mining activities (Johnson, 2013). 
Additionally, from 1998 to 2003, Kalemie and Nyunzu were controlled by the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy), which 
was also involved in the mining business through the establishment of control over the 
mining areas (De Koning, 2010: 10). 
The militarisation of coltan mines took various shapes. In Kisengo, for instance, the 
soldiers of the Kongolo-based 69th brigade of the FARDC regularly visited the coltan 
mining areas in 2009–2011. These soldiers demanded various forms of rents, taxes and 
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 Interview with the chief office of the Division des Mines, Kalemie, December 2013. 
40
 The term ‘Mai-Mai’ refers to local militias in eastern DRC. For further details, see, for instance 
Stearns et al. (2013). Mai-Mai Yakotumba. Violence and racketeering in Fizi, South-Kivu. 
London: Rift Valley Institute. 
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mine royalties from the creuseurs, négociants and local traders, as well as occasional 
forced labour from the artisanal miners. The militarisation also increased the already 
established practice of coltan smuggling in which many négociants who collaborated 
with military officials were involved (Spittaels, 2010). These officials intervened when 
the smugglers were arrested by civil servants of the Agence Nationale des 
Renseignements, allowing the smugglers to continue their activities. Militarisation also 
took the form of the direct looting and plundering of coltan
41
 at the mining sites and 
sometimes included negotiating arrangements whereby soldiers provided ‘security’ in 
return for a share of the mining profits (De Koning, 2011: 21; Garrett et al., 2009). 
6. Formalising responses to conflict minerals 
 
6.1. International and domestic responses 
Addressing conflict minerals aligns with a series of measures taken to formalise artisanal 
mining. Formalisation is understood in this chapter as a ‘process of registering, 
organising, and tracking mining activity in the field’ (Siegel and Veiga, 2009: 52). Taken 
by different entities at various periods and in various locations, this series of 
formalisation measures aimed at ‘cleaning up’ the state of affairs in the Congolese mining 
sector, improving the governance of mining and making the state’s control of artisanal 
mining effective. Before explaining in detail how iTSCi was implemented at the mining 
sites, a close look needs to be taken at the most important measures regarding mining 
reform in DRC as a whole. 
Attempts to reform the artisanal mining sector have been made concrete through a series 
of measures. The first measure was the promulgation of the 2002–2003 Mining Law and 
its regulations. This law provides the regulatory framework for mining activities in DRC. 
More specifically, the law laid out the demarcation of the AEZ and specified that 
creuseurs who wanted to extract coltan or other minerals within the AEZ—including 
those who already extracted minerals in these locations—must purchase a carte 
d’exploitant artisanal, a kind of official authorisation to mine, which has to be renewed 
yearly. 
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 Interview with Michel Ngongo-Lutete, the president of the diggers’ committee of Kahendwa, 
August 2013.  
  
66 
Another series of measures targeted conflict minerals directly. This followed a call by the 
UN Panel of Experts
42
, and later by Belgian NGOs working on natural resource issues in 
Central Africa, for a temporary embargo and sanctions against individuals or companies 
involved in arms trafficking or the illegal trade of Congolese minerals. However, this 
embargo was ineffective because of political unwillingness and had limited effects on the 
illegal trafficking of minerals (Geenen and Custers, 2010: 231–233). 
Additionally, from September 2010 to March 2011, in reaction to the militarisation of 
artisanal mining, President Kabila banned the exploitation and trade of minerals in the 
provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema. Although the ban was only in force 
in these provinces, it also had effects in other provinces. For instance, the ban encouraged 
all artisanal miners to create (from their groupement des exploitants artsanaux, pre-
existing informal miners’ organisations) or join mining cooperatives that had to be 
established within the AEZ (Decree № 0706/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2010). 
Another type of measures addressing conflict minerals was taken by international 
organisations, foreign governments or NGOs, or came into being at the instigation of the 
mining industry (Nest, 2010: 105–160). These measures differed from each other in 
nature and in shape (Verbruggen et al., 2011). Measures taken by foreign governments 
include the Dodd–Frank Act. Passed in 2010, section 1502 of this act addresses conflict 
minerals by requiring companies listed on the United States stock exchange to provide 
specific assurances that any products that they have manufactured or contracted to 
manufacture do not contain minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed 
groups in DRC or neighbouring countries
43
. Another example of this approach is the 
Paris-formulated voluntary due diligence guidance on responsible mineral sourcing from 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
44
. Interestingly, 
                                                 
42
 The Panel of Experts was set up by the UN in 1999 to monitor and document the illegal 
exploitation of minerals in the Great Lakes Region, especially eastern DRC. 
43
 Actually, the US President Donald Trump is poised to issue a new executive order suspending 
section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which regulates conflict-free minerals. See Freudenthal E. 
(2017). Who pays the hidden price for Congo’s conflict-free minerals? IRIN special report on the 
effects of US conflict-free mineral regulations on mining communities in eastern Congo, 
www.irinnews.org, accessed on 28 February 2017.  
44 OECD. (2013). OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, Second Edition. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
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this guidance has become a global standard for responsible business conduct for mining 
companies operating in conflict and conflict-affected areas.  
Domestically, at the end of 2014, eastern DRC counted 13 reform initiatives in total. 
Among these initiatives, 10 focused on 3T, whereas only three targeted gold (Cuvelier et 
al., 2014: 5–6). Their main objective has been to control the trade of minerals by making 
their supply chains more transparent. As was mentioned above, iTSCi, which is discussed 
in more depth in Section to come, is one of the initiatives that was designed by the 
mining industry. 
6.2. The arrival of MMR 
In Kalemie and Nyunzu, measures to formalise artisanal mining and to address conflict 
minerals were undertaken in many ways. These measures first aligned with a decision 
(Circular Note № 2631 of 26 November 2008) taken by the governor of the former 
Katanga province (Moise Katumbi Chapwe), who, in 2008, urged all unauthorised 
forces—e.g. FARDC—including public services to leave the artisanal mining areas. 
In 2009, the national Mining Ministry began to demarcate a number of AEZ. By 2012, 
there were an estimated eight AEZ in these territories
45
. Importantly, around the same 
period, MMR first arrived in Kalemie and Nyunzu. MMR had its head office in 
Lubumbashi (capital city of former Katanga) and was a subsidiary of the Société Minière 
du Katanga
46
. MMR signed a five-year contract (№ 06/1331/CABMIN/MAF/KAT/2009) 
with the provincial Katangese government, through which the company obtained the 
exclusive buying rights for minerals extracted in four mining sites of northern Katanga, 
namely Katonge (coltan, Manono), Lunga (gold, Nyunzu), Kisengo (coltan, Nyunzu) and 
Mai-Baridi (coltan, Kalemie)
47
. MMR purchased minerals together with the mining 
cooperative CDMC. Over the next few years, the rights of MMR (and of CDMC) were 
expanded to other mining sites, and MMR enjoyed a privileged position as a mineral 
trader in the Katangese mining business (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015: 155–156). 
 
                                                 
45
 Annual report 2014 of the Division des Mines/Kalemie.  
46
 The Société Minière du Katanga (SOMIKA) is a Mining and Mineral Processing Company 
based in Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. It has set benchmarks in the mining and 
mineral processing industry by producing Copper and Cobalt.  
47
 Contract № 06/1331/CABMIN/MAF/KAT/2009.  
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In addition to MMR, other mining companies were also established in northern 
Katanga
48
. However, some of these companies, such as Minserve earlier mentioned, did 
not manage to set up operations for a combination of reasons, including disputes over 
mineral rights with MMR (Ken and Montejano, 2013: 31). In addition to CDMC, other 
mining cooperatives operating in the study area with the aim of improving the 
governance of artisanal mining were the Cooperative Minière Maendeleo based in 
Kahendwa, the Coopérative Minière Tuungane in Kisengo, and Vimated in Sango 
Mutosha and Lengwe—two artisanal mines located in Kalemie and Nyunzu, respectively. 
 
The approach to addressing conflict minerals in the region took shape following the 
arrival of the iTSCi programme. The presence of all of the entities described above 
indicates the extent to which artisanal mining in the area became increasingly privatised. 
 
6.3. The iTSCi programme 
 
In eastern DRC, the iTSCi programme has three components: traceability (the so-called 
‘tagging and bagging’), risk assessments and third-party audits. This chapter—and the 
whole PhD thesis of which it is part—focuses only on the ‘tagging and bagging’, because 
this component was the one to be implemented on a permanent basis at the level of the 
mining sites. 
 
The iTSCi has been implemented in several waves. In July 2009, iTSCi was tested and 
started at the Kalimbi mine in Nyabibwe (South Kivu). However, from September 2010 
to March 2011, iTSCi was suspended because of President Kabila’s ban, which was 
discussed above. Although the ban has been severely criticised for its adverse impact on 
the livelihoods of mining communities, its inability to stop the illegal trade of minerals 
and the fact that it paralysed the regional economy (Geenen, 2012), it did offer an 
opportunity to expand the iTSCi programme to other provinces, including Katanga 
(Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015: 152). 
 
To this point, iTSCi is the only conflict minerals policy that has been carried out in 
mining areas located in Kalemie and Nyunzu at the time of writing. After establishing its 
                                                 
48
 At the end of 2014, there were about 13 mining companies holding mining research permits in 
the Tanganyika province. For further details, see Omasombo (2014: 352). 
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Katangese head office in Kalemie in early 2011 and two field coordination offices in 
Manono and Mitwaba, iTSCi began in Kisengo and Mai-Baridi in April 2011 and in 
Kahendwa in January 2012. The iTSCi programme has also been implemented in the 
Congolese provinces of Maniema (starting in December 2012) and North Kivu (starting 
in March 2014), as well as being resumed in South Kivu (in October 2012). In 2014, 
iTSCi was in operation at 471 mining sites in eastern DRC, 232 of which were located in 
the former province of Katanga
49
. 
 
6.3.1. iTSCi’s governance structure 
The iTSCi programme involves many entities in its governance structure. These can be 
situated from the national level to the level of the mining sites. This section explains how 
iTSCi was organised and how it collaborated with these entities, including its partners. 
Figure 2. The iTSCi governance structure  
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 See the general overview of the iTSCi programme presentation of ITRI delegates at the 9
th
 
OECD meeting in Paris, May 2015. iTSCi is also implemented in Rwanda and Burundi, where, in 
March 2015, it covered 815 mining sites in Rwanda and 40 in Burundi. 
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As Figure 2 shows, iTSCi partners form four categories. The first category is composed 
of state agencies. These include the national and provincial Mining Ministries in 
Kinshasa or Lubumbashi. In Kinshasa, ITRI and Pact (a United States-based non-
governmental organisation that is the ITRI implementing agency in DRC) sign a yearly 
contract with the national Mining Ministry. This contract (protocole d’accord) renewed 
every year outlines the terms of reference of iTSCi’s implementation in DRC50. Also in 
Kinshasa, there is a groupe thématique, a kind of think tank gathering together a number 
of stakeholders who are directly involved or have economic interests in the mining 
business. Participants in the groupe thématique discussing how the mining reforms are 
undertaken on the ground include representatives of iTSCi and Pact, state agencies 
(especially SAESSCAM, the Division des Mines and the national Ministry of Mines), the 
Chambre des Mines (mining chamber), trading houses, mining cooperatives and 
extractive companies.  
 
At the provincial level (in Lubumbashi, before the restructuring of the Katanga province), 
the provincial Mining Ministry, along with other state agencies including SAESSCAM, 
the Division des Mines and the Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de Certification des 
Substances Minérales Précieuses et Semi-précieuses (CEEC, Centre for Evaluation, 
Expertise and Certification of Precious and Semi-precious Mineral Substances)
51
 
performed a number of tasks. These tasks included, for instance, the taxation of exported 
minerals. Other tasks were administrative and revolved around controlling the trade and 
export of minerals undertaken by trading houses, mining companies and cooperatives. 
The Comité Provincial de Pilotage (CPP), which was created along with iTSCi, also 
functioned in Lubumbashi. Presided over by the provincial Minister of Mines, the CPP 
met yearly, gathering together several mining stakeholders based in the Katanga 
province. In the Katanga province, iTSCi collaborated with the Association Régionale 
pour le Développement Rural Intégré (ARDERI), a Congolese NGO with its head office 
in Kolwezi. Although I was unable to determine why iTSCi made this choice, it was 
                                                 
50
 In 2012, this contract comprised a number of points explaining, for example, the objectives of 
the iTSCi, the provinces where iTSCi was to be implemented, the participants in and frequency of 
assessment meetings, and the management strategy of data and statistics on minerals. See 
Protocole d’accord entre le ministere des mines de la République Démocratique du Congo et 
ITRI LTD sur l’Initiative d’ITRI sur la chaine d’Approvisionnement de l’étain, Kinshasa, Janvier 
2012.  
51
 CEEC is a Congolese mining authority responsible for assessing the economic value of 
minerals. CEEC also plays a role in setting prices, along with trading houses and mining 
cooperatives. 
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remarkable because ARDERI was specialised in rural development, while there were 
other NGOs in Katanga that specialised in mining. ARDERI employees—who were also 
iTSCi field staff members—monitored iTSCi’s ‘tagging and bagging’ at the mining sites 
where the programme was in force. 
  
The Comité Local de Suivi (CLS) functions at the territorial level (in Kalemie and 
Nyunzu). Chaired by the administrator of the territory, the CLS held discussions about 
the progress and the challenges faced by the iTSCi programme—and the whole reform 
process—in the course of its implementation. CLS meeting participants were 
representatives of local and international NGOs working in the area, members of the 
comités des creuseurs, négociants, staff members of mining companies or cooperatives, 
and, sometimes, customary chiefs of areas where mining activities took place. 
 
Finally, at the mining sites, iTSCi field staff (superviseurs de sites) collaborated with 
staff members of trading houses and mining cooperatives, for example when the iTSCi 
staff inspected their mineral depots or elaborated the rapports d’incidents (incident 
reports)
52
. 
 
 6.3.2. The functioning of iTSCi’s ‘tagging and bagging’ 
 
This section outlines the everyday working of iTSCi at the mining sites. It starts by 
explaining that, with iTSCi’s ‘tagging and bagging’, the coltan supply chain functioned 
as a ‘closed pipe’. According to Jorns and Cishugi (2015: 13), ‘a closed pipe supply chain 
involves a limited and pre-determined number of actors with direct relations to each 
other, i.e. a single mine, a single exporter, a single trader where the material is sold to a 
pre-determined customer at a given price’. 
 
The iTSCi closed-pipe technically functions as follows: Creuseurs sell coltan to a very 
limited number of well-known négociants recruited and appointed by mining 
cooperatives at fixed postes d’achat (buying stations or selling points). All of these postes 
d’achat were installed near mineworkers’ tunnels. In September 2014, 28 négociants 
(including four women) were working at Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi. At each of 
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 Incident reports aimed to denounce practices that undermined iTSCi’s implementation, such as 
corruption and the smuggling of minerals. 
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these postes d’achat, coltan loads were weighed, given iTSCi tags, so-called mine tags 
and put into bags. Finally, each cooperative handed over its loads of tagged and bagged 
minerals to the trading house’s counting office (comptoirs), before the minerals were 
exported to the international market. 
 
Table 3. Landmark events related to mining in northern Katanga and DRC as a 
whole 
Year Event 
1906 Creation of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, renamed 
Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) in 1967. 
1932 The Compagnie géologique et minière des ingénieurs 
et industriels belges (Géomines) started exploiting tin 
(cassiterite) in Manono  
1996 Start of artisanal mining of tin in Manono 
2002 Publication of the Mining Law  
2003 Publication of the mining regulations  
March 2007 Coltan exploitation was initiated in Kisengo and Mai-Baridi 
26 November 2008 The governor of Katanga asked all unauthorised forces to leave 
artisanal mining areas (Circular Note № 2631 of 26 November 
2008) 
July 2009 iTSCi was launched in Kalimbi/Nyabibwe (South Kivu) 
September 2010–March 
2011 
President Kabila banned mining activities in the provinces of 
North and South Kivu and Maniema (Decree № 
0705/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2010 of 20 September 2010) 
April 2011  iTSCi began implementation in the former Katanga province  
September 2011 Coltan exploitation started in Kahendwa 
9 March 2009  The Katanga government granted Mining Mineral Resources 
(MMR) and Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo 
(CDMC) the mines of Katonge, Lunga, Mai-Baridi and Kisengo  
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7. Analysis and conclusions 
 
The aim of this chapter was to provide historical background for artisanal mining and the 
mining reforms in the Congolese region of Katanga, especially in the northern part of the 
region. The chapter has drawn on debates concerning externally driven policy and 
institutions in post-conflict settings. Explaining how artisanal mining came into being in 
DRC, the chapter elaborated on how the mining business has been shaped by conflict 
minerals. It then introduced a series of measures designed to deal with these conflicts, 
which have been implemented along with measures related to the formalisation of 
artisanal mining. The chapter introduced one conflict minerals policy, the iTSCi 
programme, in detail. 
One major finding presented in this chapter is that artisanal mining has a long historical 
organisation in the Katanga region. For instance, before the reforms, artisanal miners 
were organised around the comités des creuseurs. Customary chiefs provided mining 
shafts to the creuseurs, and the trade of minerals was organised around and by the 
négociants, albeit in an informal way and through smuggling patterns (Spittaels, 2010: 
17). This means that the reforms did not enter into an arena of anarchy or an institutional 
void. To be better understood, the reforms should therefore be considered in light of the 
past, because these reforms have added a layer to the forms of organisation that already 
existed. 
This chapter also has also pointed out an important historical continuity involving the 
demarcation of AEZ. Establishing a number of AEZ was part of a broad policy reform 
initiative adopted to formalise artisanal mining and to address the problems of conflict 
minerals (e.g. smuggling), which hindered the governance of mining activities. This 
chapter has shown that, in the southern part of Katanga, the Belgian colonial powers, and 
later the Congolese state, allocated vast mining concessions to private large-scale 
extractive industries, predominantly Gécamines. These entities managed their 
concessions as ‘enclaves’, in other words, in the form of closed and isolated territories. In 
the wake of ongoing reforms, the Congolese state has enforced a similar policy through 
the establishment of AEZ. By entitling trading houses and mining cooperatives to manage 
these AEZ, the state has favoured the operations of these entities, turning the artisanal 
mining sector into an increasingly privatised sector. 
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Moreover, it was shown in this chapter that trading houses and cooperatives working 
under the iTSCi programme provide a new repertoire of practices for creuseurs and 
négociants. These practices relate, for example, to where creuseurs sell minerals (the 
buying stations) and to whom they do so (appointed négociants). These changes are 
organised around the iTSCi ‘tagging and bagging’ system. The introduction of these new 
practices leads us to conclude that the mining reforms, alongside externally driven policy 
interventions and institutions, bring new challenges. These challenges result from 
tensions between the newly introduced policy (iTSCi) and institutions (cooperatives and 
trading houses) and the pre-existing stakeholders (creuseurs and négociants, or other 
local powerholders, such as customary chiefs) who extracted minerals or managed the 
AEZ prior to the reforms. Thus, the interactions among all of these actors signal that ‘it’s 
here [in the field of intervention] that we see most clearly the emergence of various kinds 
of negotiated orders, accommodations, oppositions, separations and contradictions’ (Long 
2004: 15).  
Finally, the present chapter has shown that artisanal mining has become an important 
livelihood activity for people in the northern Katanga region, which was historically 
predominantly agrarian. Considering that creuseurs and négociants who were previously 
established in the mines relied on coltan mining and trade for their livelihoods, examining 
how the mining reforms have changed this situation is an interesting and important line of 
enquiry. Such a topic can best be explored in the ethnographic tradition, which involves 
studying people’s practices in their own settings and grounded in their own historical or 
current experiences and perspectives (Reimer, 2009). 
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Photo 2.1. Benz village, located 8 km from Mai-Baridi (formerly known as 100 kg) 
where the CDMC was established 
 
Photo 2.2. Billboard that signals the Kahendwa AEZ  
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Abstract 
In an attempt to break the linkages between mining and violent conflicts in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Congolese government and the international community have 
embarked on organising the informal mining sector. One measure has been the creation of 
mining cooperatives that represent the interests of miners and ensure the transparency of 
the mineral trade. This study examined how the cooperatives function in practice. We 
especially focused on how these new institutions interact with existing institutions, paying 
attention to the role of ‘big men’ with large economic interests in artisanal mining in both 
old and new institutions. Data were collected through an ethnographic study carried out 
between 2013 and 2014 in northern Katanga. We found that cooperatives were top-down 
creations that by-passed the institutions already established by the mineworkers. They 
overlooked the influence of elites in the process of institutional formation, to the detriment 
of miners. The study cautions against the view that the creation of new institutions 
(cooperatives) will lead to the improvement of miners’ working conditions. New initiatives 
like the mining cooperatives should be based on knowledge of the actual situation and 
grounded in existing institutions.   
1. Introduction  
 
‘Cooperatives are etiquette, appendix, wrap, skeleton […] We are not informed 
when mineral’s price increases but only when it collapses.’ (Interviews with 
miners in Kisengo, September 2013). 
 
This chapter studies institutional change by zooming in on what happens when new 
institutions created by policymakers interact with existing local institutions. It focuses on 
the creation of mining cooperatives in the Congolese region of northern Katanga, and 
examines the working of these new institutions and the implications these have had for 
the artisanal miners in the area.  
 
During the 2000s, the international community has supported a series of reforms in the 
Congolese mining sector. These reforms were meant to break through cycles of conflict 
in which mineral resources are perceived to play a major role (Autesserre, 2012). In 
addition, the reforms were meant to formalise the informal mining sector in DRC. The 
mining sector is, up to now, predominantly organised through artisanal mining where 
small teams of miners dig and exploit their own tunnels, and the DRC government views 
the reforms as a means of bringing artisanal mining under control and improving its 
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management. The reforms are also meant to improve the conditions of miners. In order to 
address the appalling poverty among miners and their exploitation by power holders 
(which are referred to as ‘big men’ in this chapter, following Utas (2012)), the 2003 
Mining Law encourages miners to create or become members of cooperatives in order to 
protect their interests. According to the law (Art. 234), the cooperatives should emanate 
from ‘groupements d’exploitants artisanaux’, that is, from the pre-existing informal 
miners’ organisations. The initiative to form new cooperatives with a formal role in the 
resource chain can be seen as an attempt to ‘rectify an institutional deficit’ (Cleaver, 
2012: 2), as it is meant to refashion these ‘groupements’ while improving the living and 
working conditions of miners (World Bank, 2008: 5). This chapter examines how these 
cooperatives worked in practice, and raises the question whether they really represented 
the interests of the miners (as they claim to do).  
 
By definition, cooperatives are ‘autonomous associations of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned 
and controlled enterprise’ (Birchall, 2003: 3). In Africa, however, there is a long tradition 
of cooperatives that have been instigated by the state (especially by the colonial powers). 
Barry concluded that ‘attempts to form cooperatives have usually failed’ (1996: 8) 
because of the top-down format in which they were created and a lack of know-how 
among the policymakers designing the initiatives. Nonetheless, scholars and 
policymakers were convinced that mining cooperatives in sub-Saharan Africa can make 
artisanal mining economically viable and have the potential to contribute to poverty 
alleviation (Hoadley and Limpitlaw, 2004; World Bank, 2008). 
This optimistic take on the potential working of cooperatives in the mining sector has not 
been underpinned by large bodies of evidence. Sinding (2005: 8) observed that, apart 
from a very limited number of studies documenting the establishment of mining 
cooperatives as examples of successful policy interventions, hardly any research has been 
done on the role of mining cooperatives in reform of the artisanal mining sector. Anuarite 
and Geenen (2014) in their seminal research on cooperatives, found no evidence of the 
effectiveness of the cooperatives.  
This chapter focuses on mining cooperatives in the northern part of Katanga. It is based 
on two years of qualitative research in 2013/2014, with eight months spent in the mining 
site of Kisengo. Since 2007, Kisengo has been the most populated and productive coltan 
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mining site of this region. From the beginning, miners were represented by a local 
miners’ association, the Association des Creuseurs de Kisengo (ACK). In 2009, Kisengo 
was granted to Mining Mineral Resources (MMR, see Chapter 2, Table 3), an Indian 
buying house that has its Congolese head office in Lubumbashi (capital of Haut-Katanga 
province). MMR closely collaborates with Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo 
(CDMC), a mining cooperative created in Lubumbashi on 10 April 2010. The takeover 
by MMR of the mining site of Kisengo thus also signalled the introduction of CDMC into 
the area. 
This chapter analyses the interactions between the formal CDMC mining cooperative and 
the pre-existing miners’ association ACK, with special attention to the issue of the role of 
elites and the way in which miners’ interests, in particular through negotiating the price 
of minerals, have been represented. According to Cleaver (2002), it is important to 
understand the interactions between newly introduced and socially embedded institutions 
when aiming to improve resource management.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. We first introduce the conceptual framework. Then, 
a background is provided on cooperatives in Africa, in DRC and in Katanga, followed by 
a discussion of the methodology. The fourth and fifth parts present the case study. The 
final section concludes the chapter. 
2. Conceptual framework: institutions, policy and ‘big men’ 
 
This chapter centres on the everyday interactions between cooperatives and local 
organisations and examines the institutional approach to crises in post-conflict areas. This 
approach draws on the idea that institutional processes of formation and deformation 
continue during, and are partly shaped by, the dynamics of the crises and the responses to 
the crises (Hilhorst, 2013: 9; Meagher et al., 2014). Thus, in cases of institutional 
engineering, such as the formation of mining cooperatives, it is important to realise that 
new structures in post-conflict settings never start with blank slates (Cramer, 2006), but 
interact with local institutions and various forms of operating authorities (Hilhorst et al., 
2010). 
Institutions are never static. Change can occur in various ways, through conflicts, internal 
development or external (policy) interventions. During such processes, new institutions, 
norms and rules are introduced and are negotiated, contested and constructed through 
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human interactions (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009; Hyden, 2008). In many ways, 
including formal and informal interactions, coercive violence, gossip or writings, social 
actors interpret and give meaning to institutional rules and norms (Hilhorst and Serrano, 
2010; Jutting et al., 2010). Policy processes and the institutions they bring about cannot 
be considered as fixed and planned. They are best conceived of as emergent and 
negotiated. Institutions are shaped through the blending of the old and the new, customs 
and inventions, and the multiple strategies of social actors that each bring their own 
interpretation and interests to the ‘arena’ of institutions. Institutions are shaped through 
the interactions of all these actors and factors (Colebatch, 2009).  
In this chapter, we especially focus on the role of so-called big men, meaning people 
endowed with the ability and power to command (Utas, 2012: 8). The big men can also 
be seen as ‘elites’ (Platteau, 2004). Irrespective of the scope and nature of their power, 
big men are recognised to shape policy outcomes in many ways. They can be, overtly or 
covertly, a barrier to social change, embodying the phenomenon of elite capture (Blair, 
2000). This is particularly important in crisis settings where formal institutions tend to be 
weak in enforcing regulations. As a result, big men often emerge and vie for power and 
control of resources, and are often seen to be instrumental in breeding conflict. On the 
other hand, the presence of big men can also be favourable to local people, who may find 
room for negotiation arrangements for their protection (Garrett et al., 2009). Big men can 
couple their personal interests with extending protection and services to the poor in their 
communities. In this vein, Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst (2015) found elites leveraging 
their position and strengthening their power base by shaping policy processes for positive 
development outcomes. The position and influence of big men can thus not be assumed 
but needs to be established empirically.  
 
In the mineral sector, big men have indeed been observed striving for personal gain at the 
expense of those less powerful. Fischer (2007: 747), for instance, has observed that 
formalisation in the Tanzanian mining sector has been beneficial to wealthier individuals 
capable of acquiring mining titles, while it has led to the exclusion and/or marginalisation 
of individuals lacking the necessary financial means and connections. Similarly, Geenen 
has noted that, in DRC, mining reforms are likely to favour powerful and well-informed 
participants in the mining business (Geenen, 2012). Finally, in Ghana, Machonachie and 
Hilson (2011b) have pointed out that the leaders of mining cooperatives have had an 
easier time obtaining mining licences than ordinary artisanal miners. 
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This chapter follows up the discussion on the role of big men and the representation of 
miners’ interest, by focusing on what happens in the transition from informal local 
miners’ associations to government-induced formal miners’ cooperatives in the wake of 
mineral reform in Katanga. It looks into the relationships between cooperatives and pre-
established miners’ organisations, and observes how the changes they have brought about 
also allowed big men to consolidate their powerful positions. 
 
3. Cooperatives in a historical perspective   
3.1. Cooperatives in Sub-Saharan Africa 
In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, cooperatives came into existence in the 1920s 
during colonial times. They were introduced as modern organisations that would replace 
traditional forms of cooperation between Africans, mainly in the agricultural sector. 
Through the creation of cooperatives, colonial governments wanted to increase crop 
production and give farmers the opportunity to protect their interests (Schwettmann, 
1997). In reality, cooperatives ended up controlling economic activities in rural areas. As 
Develtere (1994) explains, rather than serving the interests of their members, 
cooperatives became instruments of control in the hands of the colonial administration.  
 
In the 1960s, the early independence period, cooperatives continued to be state-
controlled. Wanyama et al. (2009) found that cooperatives in those days had little 
autonomy. Similarly, Holmen (1990) observed that cooperatives did not originate from 
below, but their development was planned by government departments. As a result, most 
cooperatives ‘served as instruments for implementing government socio-economic 
policies' (Wanyama et al., 2009: 1). Ultimately, they failed to satisfy members’ needs and 
many of them disappeared as they were sponsored by the state and ‘had become a heavy 
burden on the state budget’ (Schwettmann, 1997: 5). 
 
In the 1990s, cooperatives were restructured and liberalised with support from the World 
Bank. Since then, we have seen cooperatives being established in various domains of 
development and poverty alleviation (Birchall, 2003). Most of them are active in the 
agricultural sector and in financial services (Allen and Maghimbi, 2009). However, 
mineral-rich countries have also witnessed the creation of mining cooperatives. In Mali, 
mining cooperatives have been set up with the aim of improving efficiency in the mines 
(Keita, 2001: 13). In Tanzania, mining associations have been legally recognised since 
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1987. Yet, according to Fischer (2007: 752), the government officials who encouraged 
their creation have tended to exclude miners from decision-making processes, thereby 
negatively affecting their lives and livelihoods. Finally, Hilson et al. (2007: 422) examine 
how the Ghanaian state was eager, yet unsuccessful, to curb illegal mining through the 
creation of cooperatives. 
3.2. Cooperatives in DRC 
The Belgian colonial government started encouraging the creation of cooperatives in 
1921. In the agricultural sector, they were structured around the so-called paysannat 
indigenes, which were areas created to test the efficiency of modern farming techniques. 
In the 1960s, paysannats disappeared due to economic constraints and mismanagement 
(Mandjumba Mwanyimi-Mbomba, 1988). Although some cooperatives survived, Masudi 
(2014) points out that the lack of financial support from the state compounded their 
problems.  
In the 1970s and later on, other forms of cooperatives emerged. In contrast to the colonial 
model, a 1972 ministerial decree (№ 72/004 of 4 January 1972) stipulated that they were 
to be run as a kind of alternative banking system. As in other African countries, this 
policy switch occurred as part of a poverty reduction strategy supported by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Birchall, 2003: 17–19). In 2001, another 
decree (№ 004/2001 of 20 July 2001) was promulgated in DRC, constituting, up to now, 
the legal framework for cooperatives and other non-profit organisations.  
Current policy on mining cooperatives stems from the 2002/2003 Mining Law and 
regulations. The latter provide two procedures for creating cooperatives. First, the 
demarcation of an AEZ (Artisanal Exploitation Zone). AEZs are areas exclusively 
designated for artisanal mining activities. The formation of an AEZ is restricted to areas 
where ‘the technological and economic factors are not suited for industrial exploitation’ 
(Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 109). The law recognises that there may be informal 
organisations in these areas, and states that these so-called Groupements d’Exploitants 
Artisanaux (Groups of Artisanal Miners) can ask to become mining cooperatives (mining 
regulations, Art. 235-236). Secondly, once the cooperatives have been legally recognised 
by ministerial decree, miners can request a research permit (permis de recherche), valid 
for four or five years (regulations, Art. 103-1010) or obtain an exploitation permit 
(permis d’exploitation). This process requires a total amount of 3,500 USD for 
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administrative costs paid by the group of miners (decree № 0458 and 304 of 14 March 
2011).  
In the eastern DRC, cooperatives have mushroomed since September 2010, following a 
temporary presidential ban on artisanal mining activities in North Kivu, South Kivu and 
Maniema (Geenen, 2012) that was meant to create political space to address the dynamics 
of poverty, exploitation, and conflict in the mines. After the ban was lifted, the 
government made it clear that only recognised cooperatives could continue to work in the 
artisanal mines. Although it only concerned these three provinces, the ban served as 
wake-up call to other provinces where people promptly created cooperatives. In most 
cases, some individuals took advantage of their position to create cooperatives or to 
reinforce their political and economic influence while claiming to represent miners’ 
interests (Cuvelier, 2013; Geenen and Radley, 2014: 61).  
3.3. Cooperatives in Katanga 
Cooperatives have existed in Katanga since the colonial era. In the study area, one 
cooperative was founded by craftsmen in Nyunzu as early as 1937. Another was formed 
by local traders and was based in Kalemie (capital of former Tanganyika district) since 
1947. Today, these cooperatives no longer exist and none of them operated in the mineral 
sector (Mandjumba Mwanyimi-Mbomba, 1988). 
The first cooperative that appeared on the Katangese mining scene was EMAK 
(Exploitants Miniers Artisanaux du Katanga). It preceded the 2003 Mining Law and was 
created in 1999. According to Global Witness (2006: 22), EMAK was ‘like an informal 
state structure’ because it was officially independent but acted like a government body. It 
was followed by Coopérative Minière Madini Kwa Kilimo (CMKK) in 2004. Global 
Witness (2006) reported that EMAK and CMKK extorted miners and middlemen (the 
négociants) by imposing illegal taxation on them. 
 
In Katanga, the number of cooperatives has exploded since 2010. Today, there are more 
than fifty registered cooperatives in the province. Several factors played a role in this. 
First, there was the mining ban mentioned above. Secondly, there was a large reform 
project, iTSCi (ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative), which operated in South Kivu but was 
transferred to Katanga after the ban. The objective of the iTSCi project is to avoid the 
sales on the international market of minerals originating from conflict zones through a 
‘tagging and bagging system’. In this system, cooperatives play a key role in organising 
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the purchases of minerals at the mining sites, thus working at the interface between 
mineworkers and trading houses. Thirdly, in the wake of reforms, the Katangese 
provincial government took several steps on the minerals’ trade. In November 2008, 
Moise Katumbi, the Governor of Katanga, urged all unauthorised state agencies to leave 
the mining areas (Circular Note № 263). This was followed by other regulations on 3T 
trade (tantalum, tin and tungsten) from Katanga to other provinces. Moreover, some 
AEZs were demarcated and granted to cooperatives. Finally, the Katangese government 
allocated mining concessions to private companies or signed contracts on minerals’ trade 
with others. On 9 March 2010, MMR was granted (decree № 
06/1331/CABMIN/MAF/KAT/2009) exclusive rights to buy minerals, in collaboration 
with the cooperative CDMC, in four artisanal mines located in northern Katanga, namely 
Katonge, Kisengo, Mai-Baridi and Lunga. The vast majority of all these cooperatives 
were therefore not initiated by mineworkers, as was foreseen in the Mining Law, but 
came about through different outside forces, including the state, the iTSCi project, buying 
houses and mining companies. 
 
 4. Research area and methods  
 
This chapter focuses on the local dynamics of cooperatives through a single case study. 
Such an in-depth case study enabled the gauging of different layers of local realities. It 
concerned the interactions between the cooperative CDMC and ACK, the local 
association of mineworkers in Kisengo, a coltan mining site located at the northeast of the 
territory of Nyunzu. This case was selected for various reasons. The first author had a 
long immersion in the area: He carried out his PhD fieldwork there, which fostered the 
development of trust with many of the actors involved. Preliminary research revealed that 
whereas this case resembled many other cases, many aspects were more pronounced in 
the CDMC/ACK case than in the others. The case stood out, in particular, because related 
unrest led to open disagreement, which, in turn, allowed different actors to speak out 
about their views while at the same time facilitating access to the complex reality on the 
ground. This was important because normally processes of conflict, co-optation, 
corruption and conflict are, at the very least, partly hidden. 
Empirical data were collected in Kisengo with some additional interviews in Kalemie. 
Kisengo can be reached by road and is 115 km from Nyunzu-centre. Coltan was 
discovered in Kisengo in March 2007. Since then, it has become a burgeoning mining site 
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with approximately 17,000 inhabitants, including 1500 mineworkers. Most of the 
inhabitants belong to the Bakalanga ethnic group. In Katanga, Kisengo was the first mine 
to host the iTSCi project in April 2011. It is also the most productive coltan mine of 
northern Katanga. In 2014, 284 tonnes of coltan were extracted by mineworkers 
(creuseurs) and through semi-industrial methods that were set up by the Indian mining 
company, MMR. Since 2007, various actors have been involved in resource governance 
in and around the Kisengo mining site. 
Over a period of eight months, data were collected for this case study (and more broadly 
for a PhD project of which this chapter is part) through participant observation, semi-
structured interviews and informal conversations. In total, 166 persons were interviewed 
either in groups or individually. They included representatives of CDMC and MMR, 
former members of ACK and the Comité des Creuseurs, local authorities, miners, 
négociants and shaft owners. The first author attended several meetings held by the state 
agency that supports the artisanal mining sector, Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement 
du Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM) and the Division des Mines. Observations took 
place during several visits to the mines. On some of these occasions, the first author had 
the witnessed riots involving artisanal miners. Finally, he accessed and analysed letters 
expressing the concerns of the Comité des Creuseurs’ members against CDMC and 
MMR.
53
 
5. Organisation of mining    
 
In Kisengo, miners were organised in teams of four to ten workers, so-called 
mercenaires. These groups did not work independently because they usually lacked the 
finances to purchase a pit or to support digging operations. Therefore, they worked, 
through manual labour, for shaft owners who provided food rations and basic equipment. 
Between 2007 and 2009, pits were mainly located near the surface, in alluvial deposits, 
which made access to minerals easier than today. At that time, digging operations went 
on from two to three weeks while shaft owners spent around 500 USD in support of 
digging operations. Once production became available, the revenue was equally 
distributed between shaft owners and mercenaires. Yet, when the shaft was unproductive, 
people agreed that: ‘he [the pit owner] lost money and mercenaires their energy’.   
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 Letters of March 3rd and 29th, 2014 concerning ‘demande de la hausse du prix du coltan’ and 
‘demande des accords de la découverture’.  
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5.1. The evolution of ACK: 2007–2010 
The association of artisanal miners, ACK, was created at the end of 2007 by the chef de 
groupement of Kisengo. It was structured around a steering committee called the Comité 
de Base (CB), which was composed of twelve members and led by a President, four 
counsellors and seven members. Among members of this CB, nine were of the Bakalanga 
ethnic group and the others were people from Maniema and South Kivu. Although it 
proved difficult to find exact and reliable figures, it is estimated that, by the end of 2009, 
Kisengo was home to about 3,000 to 5, 000 creuseurs (mineworkers) and more than a 
hundred négociants (middlemen). They came from different places. Most of the 
creuseurs originated from Nyunzu-centre, Kalemie, surrounding villages, Maniema and 
South Kivu while négociants were mostly from North and South Kivu provinces.  
The chef de groupement, a member of the Bakalanga ethnic group, was very influential in 
the daily activities of ACK. Although the main objective of ACK was to organise 
creuseurs around digging activities in Kisengo, he appointed members of the Comité de 
Base, many of them being his relatives. As one pit owner said during an interview in 
Kisengo, on 15 May 2014: ‘when ACK was created, the collaboration between 
autochthons [the population of Bakalanga] and other people was difficult. The former 
had precedence to access the mines’. This statement reveals that members of the Comité 
de Base had higher entitlements in controlling mining activities. They allocated shafts to 
people at 60 to 100 USD/shaft, depending on its size, location and potential of 
production. Besides, they also levied customary royalties, the so-called tozo [a Bakalanga 
term used to refer to this customary tax]. Creuseurs paid tozo in cash, the equivalent of 2 
USD twice a month. They were then granted a voucher that allowed them to mine. For 
their part, shaft owners paid the so-called koroboi ya chef at the production phase. This 
usually was a payment in kind, valued at approximately 50 USD. It was said to prevent 
bad luck in the shaft [Koroboi is a tomato can of approximately 25 gr]. 
When they arranged for the transportation of the minerals to buying houses, négociants 
paid 3 USD/kg to the Comité de Base. Similarly, all local traders also paid, on a monthly 
basis, a tozo either in Kisengo-village or when they opted to trade in the mines. The tozo 
varied proportionally to the type and value of commodities. A final issue that illustrated 
the strong influence of the chef de groupement, during the mining boom in Kisengo, was 
that he was upgraded in April 2009 when the acting District Commissioner of 
Tanganyika promoted him from chef de village to the position of chef de groupement. 
  
87 
The ACK was thus an association initiated by a big man, the local chief, steered by a 
group of people closely related to him, and the main objective appeared to be the 
collection of informal taxes and levies from mineworkers and traders for the personal 
benefit of this elite group. The ACK also had a function in conflict management in the 
mining area. When conflicts arose between shaft owners and miners, or shaft owners and 
traders, ACK mediated and imposed penalties.  
5.2. ACK and state actors 
Between 2007 and 2010, ACK exerted direct control over mining activities, yet there 
were also some government offices regulating mining. In particular, the offices of 
SAESSCAM and the Division des Mines were established in July 2007. SAESSCAM 
collaborated with the Comité de Base in allocating shafts. It was also involved, along 
with agents of the Division des Mines, in levying tax from miners and négociants. In the 
eyes of local peoples, most of these taxes were illegal as these agents had the habit of not 
delivering receipts.  
ACK interfered very much in the daily activities of SAESSCAM. Although being a 
public service, SAESSCAM was managed by the son of the chef de groupement who was 
said to have created SAESSCAM in Kisengo. Later, in December 2010, he left 
SAESSCAM after being appointed chef de village. Finally, five to ten soldiers of the 
national army (69th brigade) were also located in Kisengo between 2008/2009. They also 
interfered in the mining business through ‘coercive governance’, meaning that they 
robbed people and imposed illicit fees and taxes (De Koning, 2010: 12). One Kisengo 
négociant said that this situation, which went on until mid-2010 was, to some extent, 
condoned by ACK members who feared being abused by the military.  
The next section describes how reform impacted on the evolution of ACK and on mining 
activities in Kisengo.  
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5.3. CDMC: From Lubumbashi to Kisengo 
CDMC came into existence on 10 April 2010 in Lubumbashi, the capital city of Haut-
Katanga and far removed from the actual mining sites. Its objective was to ‘promote the 
economic and cultural interests of its members’ (CDMC statute, Section 2, Art. 4). Its 
board consisted of seven members: five lived in Lubumbashi, and two in Likasi and 
Kinshasa respectively. One of the board members was the brother of the national Minister 
of Mines, Martin Kabwelulu. The Chairman of the board was not a miner but Serge 
Mulumba, a communication professional, who had previously headed several radio and 
television companies. He was still heading CDMC at the time of the fieldwork. In 
northern Katanga, CDMC has become the largest cooperative, claiming to represent up to 
13,000 miners.
54
  
CDMC expanded its activities to Kalemie and Nyunzu in June 2010. The cooperative 
made a strategic decision in appointing a former catholic priest, Abbé Arnold Champo 
Mumba as their representative. Abbé Champo is a man in his 50s of the same ethnic 
group (Babemba) of Moise Katumbi Chapwe, the provincial governor. As a former priest, 
Champo had the visibility and capacity to mobilise the communities. Because of his 
‘celebrity’ status, the miners nicknamed him Ronaldinho, after the famous Brazilian 
football player. Nevertheless, the same miners believed that Champo used several 
strategies to deceive them. 
5.4. Reshuffling old and new decks of cards 
Mining Mineral Resources (MMR) arrived in January 2010, and CDMC and Champo 
came to Kisengo six months later. Because his arrival followed MMR, many miners 
assumed Champo was working for the company. Whereas CDMC formally represented 
the mineworkers and their interests in negotiating prices and facilities with MMR, miners 
used to speak about the two entities as belonging together and often referred to 
CDMC/MMR.  
When MMR staff arrived in Kisengo, they used various strategies to gain acceptance by 
people. They first had talks with the chef de groupement. As the MMR representative 
said: ‘I informed him that MMR planned to construct bridges, schools and hospitals, etc. 
He was very enthusiastic. But, in the end, the chef de groupement asked me: so, what are 
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 Interview with CDMC representative/Kalemie May 2013.  
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you planning for me?’55 This remark conveys that the chef de groupement had vested 
interests in the mineral business, and despite the intention of MMR to trade minerals and 
carry out social projects for the mining communities, he would not collaborate unless 
personally compensated for these interests. After his initial reluctance, the chef agreed 
with MMR for a payment in exchange for his redevance coutumiere (customary tribute). 
The amount was kept secret but it was believed to be 3,000 USD per month.  
ACK members were also involved in the talks to introduce CDMC and MMR in the area. 
Most of them were reluctant to collaborate with MMR. However, the company promised 
an improvement of their social conditions through a number of social projects, and setting 
up food canteens, restaurant and bars at cheaper prices. A first canteen called Mwayiseni 
opened in April 2010. It was followed, in October 2010, by the bar and restaurant, Serata. 
When ACK members also heard that MMR planned to buy minerals at a fair price, 
people became enthusiastic in supporting their activities. CDMC further fostered 
acceptance by incorporating many of the committee members of the ACK into their 
organisational structure. By the end of 2013, CDMC consisted of nine Chiefs de sites, 47 
Gardes de Sites and 21 négociants, among whom people from the local community.  
Finally, MMR and CDMC relied on political support to facilitate their acceptance in 
Kisengo. A national parliamentarian, Bienvenu Kalunga Mawazo, visited Kisengo 
several times during his election campaign in 2011. During his visits, he called upon 
people to support MMR and CDMC.  
While CDMC was able to gain the confidence of many actors in the area by, amongst 
other things, incorporating eight of the twelve members of the Comité de Base, the 
remaining members decided to form a new and independent Comité des Creuseurs in 
August 2010. It was led by the former President of the Comité de Base. People 
interviewed in Kisengo actually believed that this alternative committee was formed at 
the instigation of the chef de groupement who wanted to maintain control over mining 
activities. This chef gave evidence of this when he said: ‘we need more oversight over 
our richness’.56 The existence of these multiple organisations thus signalled intra-elite 
contestation over control of mining. 
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 Interview with CDMC representative, Kisengo, February 2014.  
56
 Interview with chef de groupement, Kisengo, June 2014. 
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6. Organising miners and feeding claims   
 
6.1. Mining activities and the coltan trade  
The presence of MMR and CDMC influenced the organisation of mining activities. 
Kisengo has now been subdivided into sectors, sub-sectors and shafts. Each sector had 
two to five chief of sites and gardes de sites and could be reached only after crossing 
MMR’s check points. This organisation also allowed MMR and CDMC to provide 
technical support to creuseurs, for instance water supply and découverture, a shovelling 
job where the top layer of the pits is removed to facilitate access to minerals’ deposits.  
MMR and CDMC were also instrumental in creating different categories of miners. Some 
miners were able to obtain a permit, called a carte de creuseurs from CDMC, which 
allowed them to mine. Officers (encadreurs) of SAESSCAM distributed plots of land 
(calendres) of 10 to 20m² to these miners. In order to prevent accidents, they regularly 
inspected digging operations in and around the shafts. 
In spite of this advanced technical organisation that could allow creuseurs to produce 
more, disputes often arose between encadreurs and chefs de sites appointed by CDMC. 
As one chef de site explained, ‘We belong to CDMC and we need increased production. 
When encadreurs inspect the shafts and put a red flag to prevent accidents, this 
prohibition prevents our miners from working’57. These type of disputes happened on a 
regular basis.  
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 Interview with chef de site, Kisengo, July 2014. 
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Figure 3. The 3T mineral supply chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork (2013/2014). 
 
In Kisengo, the trade of minerals became more formalised as a result of regulations of 
MMR, CDMC and iTSCi. As Figure 3 shows, the mineral supply chain was organised as 
follows. At Step 1, miners and shaft owners extracted minerals from tunnels. They were 
now technically supported by the CDMC, MMR and SAESSCAM agents. At Step 2, 
miners sold coltan to 21 négociants at fixed trading centres (11 in total). At each of these 
centres, a fixed purchase price was given. However, in most cases, négociants delegated 
their associate so-called sous-couverts who bought coltan at the centres. After being 
‘tagged and bagged’ by civil servants of SAESSCAM, all the transactions were recorded 
by agents of the Division des Mines on an iTSCi form (Fiche de site minier) and in 
logbooks. Then, CDMC staff collected mineral loads and proceeded to the ‘remise’ (Step 
3). This operation consisted of handing over the mineral loads to MMR’s counting office 
where they were processed and bagged again. Finally, coltan was processed and exported 
at Step 4. However, at this stage, other states agencies were involved in administrative 
procedures. These were respectively the Centre for Evaluation, Expertise and 
Certification of Precious and Semi-Precious Mineral Substances (CEEC), OFIDA 
(Revenue Authority) and the Congolese Office of Control (OCC). The organisation of the 
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supply chain appeared successful at a technical level, but underneath different tensions 
were found at the local level. 
 
6.2. Growing unrest 
In the above, we explained how the Comité des Creuseurs was formed in opposition to 
the incorporation of ACK members in the CDMC cooperative. However, in the course of 
time, it turned out that this Comité des Creuseurs became increasingly co-opted by 
CDMC. The Comité found some recognition and the President was for example involved 
in the allocation of shafts to the miners. In the eyes of miners, the Comité also 
increasingly favoured the decisions of MMR and CDMC on the price of the minerals and 
other issues. They felt that the CDMC had overtaken their own organisation, the ACK. 
Conveying that the ACK did not cease to exist, one interviewee declared ‘We were 
almost legally recognised when CDMC arrived. But, today we feel marginalised’.58 
A telling example happened on 29 September 2013, in a meeting convened by the CDMC 
staff and the MMR chief engineer. They informed the gathered miners that they planned 
to substantially reduce the price of coltan from 37.7 to 28.8 USD per kilo. They promised 
miners who would help in convincing the other miners to accept this deal, that they 
would receive cartes de creuseurs free of charge. Although the miners vehemently 
opposed the price cut, the Comité appeared to be supportive of CDMC/MMR. After 
intense discussion, some shaft owners were heard saying that: ‘comité balishalambula 
chunvi’, which means “the Comité des Creuseurs has already eaten salt”, meaning that 
the Comité des Creuseurs had been corrupted. The meeting ended with the CDMC staff 
and the MMR chief engineer at loggerheads with the miners. 
The president of the Comité des Creuseurs later stated that he would be convinced that 
the miners would eventually accept the set price, ‘Miners cannot support one day without 
eating. They will be inclined to sell minerals at any price’.59 He also mentioned that he 
personally possessed 17 pits and planned to travel to Dubai on the financial proceeds of 
the pits. He did not deny having been bought off, which further confirmed the notion that 
he was co-opted by the CDMC and MMR. 
Another event that made miners and shaft owners believe that the Comité des Creuseurs 
was bankrolled by CDMC/MMR was their eviction from Bovu, in February 2014. Bovu 
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 Interview with former ACK member, Kisengo, February 2014. 
59
 Interview with President of diggers’ committee, Kisengo, June 2014.  
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was the most productive quarry of Kisengo with nearly 250kg of coltan extracted per day. 
It had approximately 43 shaft owners and 450 miners. In December 2013, MMR and 
CDMC convinced the Comité des Creuseurs to initiate a campaign for evicting miners 
and shaft owners from Bovu where MMR planned to set up semi-industrial methods of 
exploitation. After resistance from the miners, MMR imposed a payment of 400 USD for 
each shaft and, ultimately, called in the police to evict them in February, 2014.  
By this time, many miners perceived of the Comité des Creuseurs, CDMC and MMR as 
one entity united by personal interests and gain. Their anger against this bloc took 
different forms. Miners were most angry about the conditions under which prices were 
fixed and how the opening of new shafts, découverture, was organised. In interviews, 
they used expressions like ‘CDMC is an etiquette, an appendix of MMR’ or ‘we are 
slaves’; ‘the president of the Comité des Creuseurs is a ghost’ and finally, ‘no one 
informs us when mineral’s price is up at the international market but only when it 
collapses’. On 3 December 2013, a group of miners burnt down one poste d’achat of the 
CDMC and destroyed two others. When the demonstration came close to the offices of 
MMR, SAESSCAM and the Division des Mines, 16 miners were arrested, and taken to 
Nyunzu-centre where they were jailed for a month. They were released in exchange for 
500 USD, after an intervention by the Diocesan Committee for Justice and Peace (CDJP, 
Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix).
60
 When the Comité des Creuseurs wrote a letter 
to protest against découverture and the ways in which prices were fixed, miners and shaft 
owners interpreted this as an empty gesture. 
The protest of miners found further expression in the circumvention of the compulsory 
selling system. In many ways, miners managed to boycott the price monopoly set by 
MMR and condoned by CDMC. Some miners explained to the first author that they hid 
their minerals and sold it to clandestine négociants, so-called hiboux (locally known as 
owls, see Chapter 6).  
The protest, finally, led to an initiative in July 2014 to organise yet another organisation 
for the miners. This was called the Cadre de Concertation (CDC). It was a local branch 
of the Diocesan Committee for Justice and Peace (CDJP) and was led by a former 
influential ACK member. He was a man in his 50s who was also the president of the 
influential mutuality (a self-help association) of the Bakalanga group of Kisengo. The 
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 Interview  with CDJP member, Kisengo, April 2014. 
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objective of the CDC was to create another mining cooperative, in competition with the 
CDMC.  
7. Discussion and conclusions  
This ethnographic research followed the introduction of MMR (an Indian mining 
company) and of the cooperative CDMC into Kisengo, a coltan mining area of northern 
Katanga. The CDMC was meant to represent the miners in their negotiations over 
exploitation and pricing of the coltan. The research focused on the interaction between 
these institutions (MMR and CDMC) and the pre-existing self-created miners’ 
organisation, namely ACK.  
In DRC, mining cooperatives are currently formed with the objective of improving the 
bargaining positions of miners. In part, they are meant to be an answer to the dominance 
of big men in pre-existing governance arrangements in artisanal mining. However, the 
formation of new cooperatives is done without much sensitivity to existing institutions 
and realities. CDMC did draw on ACK for its initial membership. Soon enough, it turned 
out that CDMC acted on behalf of MMR and was, in the eyes of the miners, part of the 
company. A number of ACK members formed an alternative organisation, the comité de 
creuseurs. However, the comité de creuseurs likewise failed to defend the entitlements of 
the miners. Created at the instigation of the chef de groupement, the comité de creuseurs 
was co-opted or bribed into collaborating with the company. The result was that miners 
had no bargaining power, but were forced to accept fixed prices in exchange of the 
facilitation of their mining operations. One of their frustrations in this respect was that 
these prices went down with world-market prices but never up when the market 
recovered. In the end, miners expressed their frustration by setting a buying station 
(trading centre) on fire. They also massively tried to circumvent the company rules by 
keeping some ore to sell clandestinely, at a higher price. Finally, a former ACK member 
set out to organise yet another organisation to defend the miners’ entitlements, this time 
linked to the Diocesan Committee for Justice and Peace (CDJP). 
A major finding of the study is that all the organisations of the miners, created before and 
during reforms, are dominated by ‘big men’. These may have interests of miners in their 
mind, but their own interests always come first and foremost. In Kisengo, the pre-existing 
ACK was dominated by the chef de groupement. It predominantly served as a vehicle for 
informal taxation, although it was also seen to represent miners’ interest to some extent. 
The new cooperative of CDMC was also controlled by elites. It was initiated and led by 
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elite members at the provincial level. In Kisengo, the CDMC found access by buying off 
the chef de groupement with a monthly allowance, believed to amount to 3,000 USD. The 
first CDMC representative was a clergyman from outside of the area, who was part of the 
political elite. Lastly, the president of the comité de creuseurs was closely related to the 
chef de groupement, who was believed to be the driving force behind the formation of 
this committee in order to retain his control over artisanal mining. Thus, if new 
cooperatives were meant to break away from big men politics, they failed from the start. 
If there were power changes, they did not mean that mineworkers were empowered. 
Instead, power was partially shifted from local to provincial elites.   
As the case of CDMC illustrates, the cooperative was neither created nor led by miners 
and could be seen as a ‘bureaucratic institution’, meaning an institution based on 
contracts or introduced by the government (Cleaver, 2002: 13) that consequently fell prey 
to elite politics. The cooperative failed to meet miners’ needs and expectations. In this 
situation, miners had no other choice but to riot, to comply with ‘imposed’ regulations or 
to circumvent them.  
The chapter thus reveals that cooperatives are not an effective and durable solution to 
miners’ problems. The case of the CDMC, its interactions with MMR, ACK and artisanal 
miners confirms the general observation that, in many developing countries, miners often 
experience marginalisation and exclusion in their dealings with mining corporations 
(Ballard and Banks, 2003: 301). The policy reforms addressing the governance of the 
artisanal mining sector have focused on establishing security in the artisanal mining 
sector (away from ‘blood minerals’) and on rationalising mining processes. The interests 
of lower-class miners, their economic position and labour conditions, have not been 
sufficiently taken into account in these reforms. The formation of cooperatives that were 
meant to provide miners with bargaining power, are instead turned into vehicles to 
control miners and protect the interests of mining companies and local elites. 
In eastern DRC, there seems to be an ongoing process of new institution-building around 
mining cooperatives. This will serve to move from emergent solutions to designing a 
more efficient policy frame for artisanal mining.  
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Abstract  
This chapter offers ethnographic insights into how reforms of artisanal mining have 
triggered conflicts regarding property rights and access to minerals (coltan) in eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The study was inspired by the literature on access control. 
Based on fieldwork undertaken in 2013 and 2014 at the Kisengo and Kahendwa mining 
sites (Nyunzu territory, northern Katanga), the study found that, although ongoing reforms 
aimed to sever the supposed linkages between the mining business and violent conflicts, 
these reforms have become a driving force behind the emergence of new conflicts, labelled 
here as ‘reform conflicts’. These conflicts result from an instrumentalisation of reform 
policy by the Katangese state authorities. Providing an in-depth understanding of the 
narratives, strategies and practices of the key players, this chapter argues that the 
widespread concern about ‘conflict-free minerals’ tends to obfuscate the nature and effects 
of ‘reform conflicts’. Unless these conflicts are revealed, better understood and adequately 
addressed, mining reforms will fail to improve the living conditions of people living in 
artisanal mining areas. 
1. Introduction   
 
The Katangese mining business can be compared to a football team. 
However, during the game, it is not the competitors—but the referees—
who are the players on the pitch. [Interview with civil servant from the 
Division des Mines, Nyunzu, May 2014] 
Following national, regional and international policies aimed at ending the supposed 
linkages between the mining business and violent conflicts, artisanal mining in the 
Congolese region of northern Katanga is undergoing reform. Inspired by international 
discourse on ‘conflict-free minerals’, ongoing mining reforms in the region follow a 
complex conflict landscape (Autesserre, 2012; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004) and 
take many forms, including certification schemes, legislative measures and specific 
interventions promoting transparent models of resource governance (Verbruggen et al.; 
Vogel and Radley, 2015).  
Recently, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has become a testing ground for 
many reform initiatives. In 2014, 13 initiatives were active in this region: 10 focusing on 
3T and three on gold (Cuvelier et al., 2014). In addition, in 2009, the Congolese 
government began to demarcate a number of artisanal exploitation zones (AEZ)
61
, which 
were granted to mining cooperatives with the aims of governing artisanal mines and 
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 According to Congolese law (Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 109), AEZ are areas where ‘the 
technological and economical factors are not suited for the site to be industrially exploited’. 
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stopping minerals from falling into the hands of armed groups or other unknown mining 
entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, vast mining concessions were allocated to private mining 
companies and, in rare cases—as in the Nyunzu territory—to trading houses. 
In several parts of sub-Saharan Africa, many scholars are convinced that the mineral 
sector reforms have been predominantly top-down, externally driven and biased in favour 
of large-scale extractive companies (Hilson and Potter, 2005). This has led to tensions 
between these companies and artisanal miners (creuseurs), as well as other local 
stakeholders such as customary chiefs (Campbell, 2010; Cuvelier, 2011a; Geenen and 
Claessens, 2013; Machonachie and Hilson, 2011a; Mazalto, 2009). Adding to this body 
of work, the present study examined how ongoing reforms have fuelled conflicts over 
property rights and access to coltan in the Congolese region of northern Katanga. These 
conflicts have been between mining cooperatives and trading houses, and between both 
of these entities and mineworkers. 
Policymakers (UN, 2015), advocacy-oriented NGOs (Global Witness, 2009) and other 
well-informed observers (Garrett and Mitchell, 2009; De Koning, 2010) are convinced 
that ‘cleaning’ the mineral trade through reforms can end the armed conflicts obstructing 
the mineral sector in eastern DRC. This conviction—inspired by the ‘greed 
hypothesis’62—has been analysed as an explanatory factor for armed conflicts (Le Billon, 
2010; Ross, 2006), but little research has examined the nature of the interactions between 
actors and entities engaged in the reform process (trading houses, mining cooperatives 
and mineworkers) or how these interactions create new conflicts. By analysing how the 
ongoing reforms engender new conflicts, this study aimed to contribute to debates on the 
governance of artisanal mines in post-conflict eastern DRC. This chapter argues that the 
widespread concern regarding ‘conflict-free minerals’ as a way of making the mineral 
market transparent and addressing the appalling poverty of people tends to obfuscate the 
nature and effects of ‘reform conflicts’. For the mining reforms to yield positive change, 
these conflicts need to be unmasked and adequately addressed. 
 
This chapter is based on fieldwork undertaken at two coltan mining sites in the Nyunzu 
territory (Kahendwa and Kisengo) from March 2013 to September 2014 and additional 
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 This hypothesis puts forward the idea that armed actors’ greed for natural resource revenues is 
a key factor in explaining the onset and persistence of armed conflicts. See, for instance, Collier, 
P. and Hoeffler, A., Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Paper 56, The World 
Bank, Washington, DC, 2001; Berdal, M. and Malone, D. (eds.) 2000. Greed and Grievance: 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
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data gathered in October 2014 in Lubumbashi. In both Kahendwa and Kisengo, the 
reforms basically aim to trade coltan through a ‘closed-pipe’ supply chain organised by 
and around the International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) Tin Supply Chain Initiative 
(iTSCi). The reforms involve the mining cooperatives, trading houses, middlemen 
(négociants) and artisanal mineworkers. The ‘closed-pipe’ supply chain is organised so 
that the coltan flow is tracked from miners’ tunnels to the point of exportation in Kalemie 
(the capital city of Tanganyika Province). 
  
In the remainder of this chapter, I begin by outlining the theoretical framework. After 
introducing the study areas and the research methods, the next section discusses how 
property and access to mining areas has evolved in eastern DRC, particularly in northern 
Katanga. I then describe the findings from the two case studies. Briefly, the first of these 
centres on conflicts over access to coltan in Kisengo, and the second focuses on conflicts 
following the entitlements to the mines of Kahendwa being granted to several 
cooperatives and trading houses. The final section discusses the findings and puts forward 
the main conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical perspective on property and access  
 
The present study approached conflicts over property rights and access to minerals 
(coltan) from a property rights perspective. As the mining reforms have mainly revolved 
around granting entitlements of AEZ to mining cooperatives or trading houses, a property 
rights lens allows for a fruitful analysis of these entitlements and the related conflicts. 
 
Debates on property and access have been informed by the field of legal pluralism, which 
studies the coexistence of different normative systems in the same social space (Griffiths, 
1986). Drawing on theoretical understandings from legal pluralism, von Benda-
Beckmann (1981), for instance, developed the notion of ‘forum shopping’ to describe 
how people use multiple legal orders and different institutional frameworks to foster their 
claims or to protect their interests. Being traditionally focused on dispute resolution, 
public service delivery and hybrid governance, legal pluralism also provides relevant 
insights for studying how social actors are able to further their property claims by 
drawing on various legal systems to access resources (Geenen, 2016). 
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Broadly speaking, property is about relationships among social actors with regard to 
objects of value (von Benda-Beckman et al., 2006, quoted in Sikor and Lund, 2009: 4). In 
other words, property is a relation not between people and things, but rather between 
people about things. As Sikor and Lund (2009: 4) assert, property encompasses any 
enforceable claim to the use and benefit of something. Such a claim may derive from 
conventions, customary rules or state law. From this legal perspective, property 
contributes to maintaining order within society and entails the regulation of entitlements 
and the distribution of wealth among social actors (Peluso and Lund, 2011; Singer, 2000). 
However, property can also produce conflicts between people. Blomley (2003) contends 
that such conflicts may be shaped by overt or hidden violence and processes of exclusion. 
 
Access is distinct from property in many ways. Indeed, having property rights does not 
necessarily mean that one has the ‘ability to benefit from things’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 
153). Thus, Ribot and Peluso (2003: 160) define access as all ‘means, processes and 
relations by which actors are enabled to gain, control and maintain access to resources’. 
They conceptualise the notion of property as a ‘bundle of powers’ instead of a ‘bundle of 
rights’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 173). Additionally, understanding access relations helps 
in analysing who actually benefits from things and through which processes people are 
able to do so. In their study on access theory, Ribot and Peluso (2003: 161–172) identify 
three access mechanisms, namely rights-based access (legal or illegal), structural 
mechanisms of access and relational mechanisms of access. These mechanisms mediate, 
condition or constrain people’s access to resources and benefits. Structural and relational 
mechanisms include access to technology, capital, markets, labour and labour 
opportunities, knowledge and authority, as well as access through social identities and 
access via the negotiation of other social relations. 
 
Sikor and Lund (2009) see property and access as closely linked to power and authority. 
They argue that, when people try to further their claims or to turn these into ‘recognized 
property’, power and authority are closely related (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 9). Power 
legitimises the authorised institutions underpinning such a property claim, and authority 
gives the power to grant or deny legitimacy to the claim. As Sikor and Lund (2009: 2) 
emphasise, ‘struggles over property are as much about the scope and constitution of 
authority as about access to resources’. This argument is relevant to the present study 
because, following the mining reforms, granting AEZ entitlements to mining 
cooperatives and trading houses has not only legitimised these organisations’ claims over 
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property, but this legitimisation has also led to the denial of property rights to local 
resource users, especially the creuseurs. 
 
Access and property are dynamic, with changes over time being shaped by various 
factors, which determine ‘the nature of power and forms of access to resources’ (Ribot 
and Peluso, 2009: 154) and position individuals and institutions vis-à-vis access to 
property. These factors include shifts in authority, competition among different 
powerholders (Van Acker, 2005), changes in political circumstances, new economic 
opportunities and shifts of ideas and of ideologies, policy, politics and the environment 
(Lund and Peluso, 2011: 673–676). All of these factors affect the conditions under which 
access processes take place and influence how individuals (e.g. state authorities and 
mineworkers) or interest groups (e.g. mining cooperatives and trading houses) develop 
different strategies to benefit from resources. The case studies discussed in this chapter 
concern the changes in access patterns introduced by mining reforms that have fostered 
new economic opportunities for state authorities. 
 
The literature outlined above is mostly concerned with property rights and access in 
relation to state formation, emphasising the coexistence of norm-producing authority, 
institutional legitimisation, access processes and the contestation of claims. However, 
although social actors use various strategies and mechanisms of access to advance their 
claims, as described in the idea of ‘forum shopping’, existing work does not tell us much 
about how, why or under which circumstances access mechanisms can be 
instrumentalised by those in authority or about how this affects people’s access to 
resources. In other words, authority does more than granting the power to produce norms 
and to authorise, deny or legitimise peoples’ claims to property (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 
10). Under circumstances where the state is ineffective in enforcing regulations, it is 
possible that some state authorities will instrumentalise the laws and policy for private 
ends. As Lund (2006: 699) argues, ‘while formalization is often propelled by government 
institutions and reform, formal rules and regulations are also negotiated and undone by 
corruption, political networks and powerful alliances’. 
 
Thus, this chapter closely explores the relationships between two mechanisms of access, 
namely access to technology and access to authority. The first of these refers to the idea 
that while tools and technology are used in resources’ exploitation, it has been evidenced 
that more advanced technology benefits those who have access to them (Ribot and 
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Peluso, 2003: 165). The second mechanism of access is about having ‘privileged access 
to the individuals or institutions with the authority to make and implement the laws 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 179). 
 
3. Study areas and methods  
 
3.1. Study areas 
This study was based on data collected at two coltan mining sites, namely Kahendwa and 
Kisengo. Both sites are located in the chiefdom of Ntengu, at a distance of 49 km from 
each other. Kahendwa and Kisengo are roughly 115 km from Nyunzu-centre (the 
territorial capital). Mining activities started in Kisengo in March 2007 and in Kahendwa 
in September 2011. The majority of the population belong to the Bakalanga ethnic group. 
The selected mining sites share both similarities and differences. Kahendwa and Kisengo 
are the most productive of the seven coltan mines in Nyunzu territory
63
, accounting 
together for 286 tonnes of coltan in 2014, according to the 2014 annual report of the 
Nyunzu-based Division des Mines. In both mining sites, creuseurs extract coltan in 
sedimentary deposits, open shafts or deep tunnels. The coltan extracted from both sites is 
sold to Mining Mineral Resources (MMR)
64
, the only trading house established in the 
area. 
Kisengo has a larger population than does Kahendwa. At the end of 2014, Kisengo hosted 
17,000 inhabitants, including 1,500 creuseurs and 21 négociants. The population of 
Kahendwa declined dramatically from 10,000 in 2012 to about 230 in May 2014
65
. This 
decline was caused by a decrease in coltan production and by the ban of mining activities 
by the national Ministry of Mines in May 2014 because of mineworkers’ use of 
dangerous extractive techniques. 
Kahendwa and Kisengo were also interesting cases for the analysis because of differences 
between the two sites in the methods of coltan production. In Kisengo, MMR began using 
semi-industrial methods of coltan extraction at Bovu, the most populated and productive 
of the 11 Kisengo quarries, in February 2014. Additionally, MMR initiated the 
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 The other coltan mines in the territory are Kilunga, Lengwe, Luba, Mbale and Lububu-Kitoke.  
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 MMR is an Indian trading house with its Congolese head office in Lubumbashi. 
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 Interview with the chief office of the Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small-Scale 
Mining in Kahendwa, June 2014.  
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découverture—shovelling away of the top layer of the pits to facilitate access to mineral 
deposits—at many other quarries. MMR also installed a lavérie (a kind of processing 
machine) at Bovu. Interestingly, the lavérie operated alongside artisanal mining. In 
Kahendwa, where only three coltan quarries were operational, most creuseurs used 
pickaxes and shovels. 
Kahendwa and Kisengo also differed in terms of entitlements. Kisengo is a private MMR 
mining concession and has never been demarcated as an AEZ. Conversely, Kahendwa 
has been established as an AEZ since early October 2011, but the site was disputed 
among various trading houses and mining cooperatives. 
3.2. Methods 
This study drew upon qualitative methods, with data collected through nearly 19 months 
of ethnographic field research. From March 2013 to September 2014, I paid regular visits 
to Kahendwa and Kisengo. These visits allowed me to observe at regular intervals how 
access to the mining quarries changed over time, how trading houses and mining 
cooperatives provided technical support to the mineworkers and what this entailed in 
terms of interactions between these actors. In total, 204 creuseurs and shaft owners were 
involved in group interviews. Additionally, 36 individuals, including 12 creuseurs, 
participated in in-depth interviews and informal conversations. In-depth individual 
interviews and informal conversations were held with creuseurs and shaft owners at eight 
coltan quarries (six in Kisengo and two in Kahendwa, of a total of 14 quarries found in 
both mining sites). I also conducted participant observation at nine meetings gathering 
representatives of miners’ committees (comités des creuseurs), shaft owners, and 
representatives of MMR, the Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC) and 
Cooperative Minière Maendeleo (CMMA). 
Individual interviews were also conducted with five staff members of MMR, the 
administrator of finance of Nyunzu, and seven civil servants from the Service 
d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM, Small-scale 
Mining Assistance and Training Service) and the Division des Mines (mining service). 
Moreover, in October 2014, I conducted additional individual interviews with two staff 
members of the CDMC and CMMA in Lubumbashi (the provincial capital of what was 
then Katanga province). Lastly, to gain an overview of the evolution of property rights 
and access regarding mining areas in eastern DRC, I reviewed several documents, 
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including letters written by representatives of the comités des creuseurs, official reports 
and memos, ministerial decrees and NGO reports on mining activities in the study areas. 
4. Property and access to DRC’s mining areas  
 
4.1. General situation 
Geenen and Claessens (2013), in their study of access to gold sites in eastern DRC, 
discuss the evolution of access to mining property. From the Belgian colonial times 
(1885–1960) to 1982 and after Congolese independence in 1960, the mineral sector was 
largely dominated by private and state-owned large-scale extractive companies that were 
granted vast concessions by the colonial administration. These companies managed their 
concessions through private modes of governance, allowing them to provide social 
services and security to their employees, while restricting outsiders’ access to their 
‘mining domains’ (Hönke, 2013). In 1982, following the intensification of the financial 
and socioeconomic crisis, President Mobutu liberalised artisanal mining, especially the 
exploitation and trade of precious minerals (mainly gold and diamonds) (Tshibanza, 
1985). Subsequently, artisanal mining has grown to sustain the livelihoods of 
approximately 200,000–550,000 mineworkers and their 1–4 million dependants (PACT, 
2010). 
Liberalising artisanal mining brought changes in property rights and in access to mining 
areas. This introduced a dual system of resource governance. Traditional chiefs (mwami) 
were allowed to exert considerable influence over the mining activities on the basis of 
customary rights over the land and its resources. The mwami also provided plots of land 
to creuseurs and levied various taxes and fees on the creuseurs, as well as négociants and 
local traders. However, at the same time, the state controlled these mining areas on the 
basis of the General Property Law introduced in 1973. This law declared all land and its 
resources to be the property of the state, regardless of occupancy status (Van Acker, 
2005). In the 1990s, this dual system of resource governance became more problematic 
because of several factors, including population growth, the manipulation of land issues 
by political elites and increased militarisation and competition over mineral-rich areas 
following political change and instability (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005). 
 
In the first decade of the 2000s, interest grew around reforming the entire Congolese 
mining sector. In 2002–2003, a new Mining Law was passed. This law was seen as a 
strategy to attract foreign capital (Mazalto, 2009), as it favoured multinational large-scale 
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extractive companies by granting them vast concessions. The law also demarcated a 
number of AEZ, stipulating that an AEZ could be closed down if ‘the factors justifying 
its creation ceased to exist’ or if ‘a new deposit necessitating large-scale exploitation has 
been discovered’ (Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 110). Moreover, the law required 
artisanal miners to obtain a carte d’exploitation artisanale, a special authorisation to mine 
within an AEZ’s boundaries (Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 111/112). All of these 
measures meant that creuseurs were increasingly confronted with multiple restrictions. 
 
4.2. Accessing mining areas and coltan in northern Katanga 
In northern Katanga, mining reforms changed pre-existing patterns of accessing the 
mining areas and coltan ore. Before the reforms, artisanal miners were already extracting 
coltan in these areas. At the end of 2009, the national Mining Ministry demarcated many 
of these areas as AEZ, and the provincial Katangese government granted these AEZ to 
mining cooperatives or, occasionally, to trading houses. In 2014, 77 AEZ existed in what 
was then the province of Katanga. These were granted to 34 mining cooperatives. To be 
allowed to mine, artisanal miners were encouraged by the Mining Ministry to join these 
cooperatives (Wakenge and Hilhorst, 2017). Clearly, these entitlements and requirements 
suggest the introduction of new power relations between cooperatives, trading houses and 
mineworkers, for instance, in terms of which mineworkers were qualified to mine coltan, 
and how, where and to whom they were allowed to sell it. 
Additionally, the mining reforms strongly changed pre-existing mechanisms of land 
allocation and the ways in which mineworkers paid the itulo or tozo (Bakalanga
66
 terms 
used to refer to customary taxes). Before the reforms, customary chiefs provided plots of 
land (calendres or shafts) to mineworkers, who paid tozo in cash—the equivalent of 2 
USD twice a month. These mineworkers were then granted a voucher allowing them to 
mine. Likewise, shaft owners paid the koroboi ya chef (a tomato can for the chief)
 67
 at 
the production phase—a payment usually made in kind, valued at approximately 50 USD. 
This payment was said to prevent bad luck in the mining shafts
68
. 
 
Following the reforms, the calendres are given to creuseurs by the SAESSCAM, a state 
agency supporting creuseurs. In the study areas, SAESSCAM staff members maintained 
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 Bakalanga is the ethnic group of the majority of the population of Nyunzu. 
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 Koroboi is a tomato can of approximately 25 gr.  
68
 Interviews with the president of the comités des creuseurs, Kisengo and Kahendwa, January 
and April 2014. 
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that the calendres are allocated without payment
69
. In reality, mineworkers are charged 
15–30 USD to obtain a calendre. Importantly, instead of levying the tozo against 
individual mineworkers, many mwami are paid a monthly sum by mining cooperatives or 
trading houses. These payments vary proportionally to the mineral production of the 
mining site, the degree of legitimacy of the mwami and how successful the mwami 
negotiated this payment with the cooperative or trading house representatives. In 
Kisengo, the trading house MMR and CDMC paid an estimated 3,000 USD/month to the 
acting mwami (chef de groupement) of Kisengo (Joseph Kisengo). In Kahendwa, CMMA 
paid around 250 USD/month to the chef de village of Kahendwa (Lwamba Kataki). 
 
The above changes in access to mining areas and coltan, the allocation of calendres and 
the payment of the tozo suggest a reconfiguration of the economic interests of many 
actors in the local coltan business. 
 
5. Conflicts over accessing coltan in Kisengo and Kahendwa  
 
5.1. Case 1: Kisengo 
In Nyunzu, Kisengo is an iconic mine. It was the first mine where coltan was discovered 
(in March 2007). Early in 2010, Kisengo hosted the first trading house (MMR). After 
signing a five-year contract with the Katangese provincial government on 9 March 2009, 
MMR arrived in Kisengo in early January 2010, followed by CDMC in June 2010. 
Subsequently, MMR and CDMC have collaborated in purchasing coltan. Kisengo was 
also the first iTSCi pilot site
70
 in Katanga, beginning 1 April 2011. Perhaps more 
interestingly, Kisengo is a rare artisanal mine using a hybrid mode of mineral extraction. 
As was noted above, alongside MMR’s introduction of semi-industrial methods (lavérie) 
of coltan extraction at Bovu, many creuseurs extract coltan manually in other local 
quarries. 
Bovu is the most productive, populated and disputed coltan quarry in Kisengo. In June 
2013, it harboured approximately 43 shaft owners and 450 creuseurs, extracting around 
250 kg of coltan daily
71
. With a 30% tantalum concentration, Bovu’s coltan has the 
highest ore grade found in Nyunzu. Bovu is also rife with conflicts between MMR and 
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 Interviews with the chief office of SAESSCAM, Kisengo, May 2013. 
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 In December 2014, iTSCi covered 471 mining sites, of which 232 were located in the province 
of Katanga (iTSCi overview, March 2015).  
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 Group interview with civil servants from the Division des Mines, Kisengo, July 2013.  
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the creuseurs regarding, for instance, the découverture and the fact that MMR set up 
semi-industrial methods of coltan exploitation (Chapter 3). In June 2013, MMR started 
the construction of a processing centre (laverie) for coltan extraction, changing the 
patterns of accessing and processing coltan. 
Starting semi-industrialised methods at Bovu occurred for two reasons. The first was a 
legal reason. On 7 May 2013, MMR acquired a 30-year exploitation permit, transforming 
the entire Kisengo mining site into its private concession. In addition, the Mining Law 
stipulates that a mining company may transform an AEZ into an industrial concession if 
it finds it suitable for industrial exploitation (Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 110). 
Although Bovu has never been declared an AEZ, this legal provision enabled MMR to 
semi-industrialise this quarry because it was part of its concession. The law is silent 
regarding what happens to the mineworkers in such a concession after the extraction 
methods change from purely artisanal to industrial. 
The second reason pushing MMR to introduce semi-industrialised methods at Bovu was 
economic. On a daily basis, MMR and CDMC pre-financed 21 négociants an amount 
ranging from 160 to 1,500 USD per négociant, allowing them to purchase 5–50 kg of 
coltan. Although the pre-financing system allowed MMR/CDMC to obtain coltan, this 
system also created a managerial dilemma. The system increased MMR/CDMC’s 
management expenses, because they paid each négociant an incentive of 2.2 USD per kg 
of coltan purchased from the creuseurs. In addition, MMR/CDMC provided technical 
support to the creuseurs, including motor pumps and découverture. From June 2012 to 
May 2013, perhaps the most important constraint for MMR/CDMC’s activities occurred 
when, following the coltan price went down from 48.8 to 28.8 USD/kg, coltan production 
in Kisengo dropped from 20 tonnes to approximately 12 tonnes per month after many 
creuseurs reacted to this price drop by moving to gold mines (such as Musebe in northern 
Nyunzu), abandoning their mining activities in Kisengo. The chief office of MMR in 
Kalemie explained this constraint as follows:  
Our business depends on artisanal mining. We provide various kinds of 
support to creuseurs, for instance by installing motor pumps at almost 
every quarry in Kisengo. This allows them to easily access and use the 
water needed for washing mineral sands. However, our support does not 
work as expected, because we cannot control everything. Not only do 
MMR/CDMC suspect creuseurs and négociants of stealing coltan, but, 
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recently, the number of creuseurs has dropped from 1,500 to around 
800, making it hard for our business to flourish
72
. 
 
This statement conveys the idea that there was initially cooperation, mutual dependency 
and reciprocity among MMR/CDMC, creuseurs and négociants. However, this 
relationship gave way to growing suspicion and dissatisfaction. Coltan production 
entailed high costs for MMR throughout the process—for instance through the pre-
financing system mentioned above—and the company found it difficult to control this 
production fully. At the very least, coltan production depended upon creuseurs’ 
willingness to stay in the mines or to sell coltan to négociants. Creuseurs were able to 
hide part of the coltan, and they often complained that, because of the monopoly of MMR 
and CDMC and their frequently imposed price cuts, they were tempted to steal or conceal 
part of the coltan production (see also Chapters 3 and 6)
73
. 
Ribot and Peluso (2003: 157) contend that some actors have the ability to select the 
aspects of law, custom or convention that favour their objectives. In the same vein, 
MMR/CDMC, confronted with the challenges described above and inspired by certain 
provisions of the Mining Law (e.g. the possibility of changing the extractive methods 
used), developed various strategies to take over Bovu
74
. When MMR/CDMC initiated the 
découverture, it was free of charge and not legally sanctioned. As such, the découverture 
was a mutual and verbal convention between MMR/CDMC and the comité des creuseurs. 
However, in June 2013, MMR/CDMC began charging creuseurs to obtain the mineral 
sands (remblais). As one MMR staff member reported, charging creuseurs helped to 
offset the financial costs of the découverture
75
. Following this idea, MMR/CDMC agreed 
with the comité des creuseurs that half of the remblais belonged to MMR/CDMC and the 
other half to the creuseurs. After three months, this convention changed again in October 
2013, when MMR/CDMC decided that the creuseurs had a right to only one-fifth of the 
remblais, with the rest to be processed by MMR/CDMC’s shayeurs (daily workers). In 
reaction to this decision, a member of the comité des creuseurs made the following 
complaint:  
The decision taken by MMR/CDMC has gone beyond the pale, 
violating the terms of our earlier convention. Incidentally, when they 
shared the remblais with us, we were given the marouge or bibembele, 
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 Interview with the head office of MMR, Kalemie, July 2014.  
73
 Informal conversation with creuseurs, Bovu (Kisengo), December 2013.  
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 See also Geenen and Claessens (2013) for similar accounts in South Kivu.  
75
 Interview with one MMR staff member, Kisengo, July 2014.  
  
109 
in other words the poorest and worthless part of the remblais. They 
[MMR and CDMC] keep the richest and most promising mineral sand. 
Iyi ni uvamizi tu ya coltan yetu na hatuta itika tena [This is just 
confiscating our coltan and we will no longer tolerate it]
76
. 
This complaint implies that, although technically organised, the découverture, which 
should allow the creuseurs to improve their working conditions, became a new burden. In 
fact, the organisation of the découverture and the advantages it provided for 
MMR/CDMC confirm the notion that ‘many resources cannot be extracted without the 
use of tools and technology, more advanced technology benefits those who have access to 
them’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 165). Many creuseurs felt profoundly dissatisfied with 
the procedure of sharing the remblais. One shaft owner reported a similar dissatisfaction: 
Compared with our last convention for sharing the remblais with 
MMR/CDMC, our income has diminished dramatically. Before this 
new convention, we were able to produce 10–12 kg of coltan per 
dumpster of remblais, yielding around 350 USD for the team. Today, 
we only produce around 5 kg [worth around 150 USD], making it 
difficult to make ends meet
77
. 
In December 2013, MMR/CDMC developed a new strategy to take over Bovu quarry. 
After an unsuccessful round of negotiations with the comité des creuseurs and 
SAESSCAM/Kisengo, MMR/CDMC decided to buy all of the miners’ shafts. A price of 
400 USD was given for each shaft. However, in the eyes of many creuseurs, this decision 
and the price set were one-sided. Consequently, they violently protested by erecting 
roadblocks on the roads leading to the mines and by setting fire to a selling station
78
. In 
addition, although SAESSCAM promised the creuseurs that they would be allocated new 
shafts elsewhere, this promise was not kept, leading many creuseurs to believe that 
SAESSCAM and their comité had been corrupted by MMR/CDMC. 
In February 2014, MMR/CDMC resorted to a radical strategy combining the destruction 
of miners’ camps and the support of this operation by state authorities. Before this 
destruction—probably fearing protest—MMR/CDMC called in the support of the acting 
administrator of the territory of Nyunzu (Etienne Mwamba Kamasonga). On several 
occasions, he visited Kisengo and held meetings with the comité des creuseurs and civil 
servants from SAESSCAM and the Division des Mines, asking them to convince the 
creuseurs to leave Bovu. The administrator promised to initiate development projects for 
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 Group interview with shaft owners at Bovu, November 2013.  
77
 Interview in Kisengo, November 2013.  
78
 Interviews with the comité des creuseurs in Kisengo, March 2014.  
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these people once they were permanently established in villages outside of Bovu. 
Arguably, asking the creuseurs to leave Bovu followed an administrative decision (№ 
3072/418/BUR/CDD/DT/2013) issued on 10 May 2013 by Maurice Kyoni Ngoie, the 
acting Tanganyika district commissioner. The decision declared that Bovu was a zone 
interdite—in other words, an area where people were not allowed to live or carry out 
mining activities for reasons of their own safety (Mining Law, T. 1, Ch. 1, Art. 6). As the 
creuseurs were not convinced by this explanation, on 7 February 2014, MMR/CDMC 
called in the Police des Mines et Hydraucarbures (Mining Police/Kisengo), who 
destroyed a total of nine miners’ camps and expelled 526 miners’ households. As 
compensation, MMR/CDMC allocated two canvas sheets and 50 USD per household. 
However, in Kisengo, rumours gained currency that the administrator of Nyunzu 
embezzled part of the funds intended to provide this compensation. In the end, some of 
the people who were displaced did not receive their compensation.
79
 
Two elements of the Mining Law are relevant here. First, the Mining Law (T. 1, Ch. 1, 
Art. 6) states that zones interdites can be declared only by presidential decree and not by 
a district commissioner such as Maurice Kyoni Ngoie. Second, in such zones, the Mining 
Law (T. 1, Ch. 3, Art. 17) stipulates that no mining activities can take place. However, 
mining activities continued in Bovu. Although I was unable to find evidence that 
MMR/CDMC bought off the state authorities (the Tanganyika district commissioner or 
the administrator of Nyunzu), the acting administrator of finance of Nyunzu, a man in his 
60s who had occupied this administrative position since 2002, expressed related 
suspicions: 
No one knows what happens regarding mining activities in Nyunzu. 
Someone who wants to find out more about what happened, for instance 
at Bovu, like in many other similar cases where conflicts occurred 
between trading houses, cooperatives and creuseurs, faces intimidation 
from high-ranking state authorities based in Lubumbashi or Kalemie. 
This statement reveals that, even though practices of corruption are often hidden, some 
people in positions of authority were suspected to manipulate the law covertly because 
they had vested interests in the mining business. Regarding the case of Bovu discussed 
here, this statement also means that some authorities were suspected of supporting 
MMR/CDMC’s operations there, while probably benefitting financially from this deal. 
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 Interview with MMR’s administrator, Kisengo, May 2014.  
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However, the conflicts over access to coltan that caused the eviction of miners from Bovu 
yielded some economic advantages. For MMR/CDMC, the change in coltan production 
methods from artisanal to semi-industrial increased production. In 2014, production in 
Kisengo was estimated at 127 tonnes for the Bovu lavérie alone—this nearly equals 
miners’ production of 157 tonnes in the other quarries combined. Thus, Kisengo can be 
seen as an interesting example where semi-industrial methods of mineral extraction 
coexist with artisanal mining. This coexistence contributed to professionalising around 40 
shayeurs hired by MMR/CDMC at Bovu, and these workers are regularly paid 100 USD 
per month, promoting them from casual workers to paid employees.  
Many shayeurs said that they were experiencing better working conditions than when 
they worked as independent miners
80
. Lastly, increased coltan production in Kisengo 
meant that MMR/CDMC had to pay more taxes to state agencies
81
. 
 
5.2. Case 2: Kahendwa 
Kahendwa is an artisanal mine located to the east of the territory of Nyunzu. When coltan 
was discovered here in September 2011, people from different areas came to Kahendwa, 
increasing its size from a village of approximately 200 to more than 10,000 inhabitants, 
of whom 6,000 were creuseurs. During the heyday of mining productivity, creuseurs 
extracted around 300 kg of coltan per day
82
. Extraction took place in three main 
quarries—maendeleo 1, 2 and 3. Of the 3T mining sites in Nyunzu territory, Kahendwa 
was among the most productive. From January 2011 to December 2013, this site 
produced 227 tonnes of coltan ore
83
. 
The entitlements to Kahendwa changed on several occasions. Following a ministerial 
decision (№ 10.7/00418) signed on 1 October 2011 by the acting Katangese provincial 
Minister of Mines (Therese Lukenge Kapwibwe), Kahendwa was granted to Volcano 
Mining, a trading house based in Lubumbashi. However, for unknown reasons, Volcano 
Mining conducted no activity in Kahendwa. Later, on 3 January 2012, the same Minister 
granted four artisanal mines, namely Kankwala, Kampulu, Maende and Mungaza, to 
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 Group interview with shayeurs, Kisengo, July 2014. 
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 For instance, the autorisation de sortie carrière, a tax paid 1% of the actual coltan price in the 
mines. 
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 Interview with the SAESSCAM’s head office, Kahendwa, June 2014 
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 Division des Mines, Kahendwa, report 2013.  
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Minserve, another trading house, which has its Congolese head office in Kalemie
84
. In 
February 2012, a group of Minserve’s staff members arrived in Kahendwa, although this 
site was not among the mines granted to the company. Minserve’s staff began the 
construction of several facilities, including their office and a mineral depot. They also 
promised the creuseurs that they would buy coltan at higher prices (around 60 USD per 
kg) than the price of 30 USD set by MMR/CDMC in Kisengo. 
As could be expected, the presence of Minserve in Kahendwa sparked controversy. 
According to Minserve’s staff members, the maende mine that had been granted to 
Minserve was short for maendeleo (the name of the three coltan quarries of Kahendwa). 
However, Nyunzu-based territorial authorities were convinced that maende had never 
existed in Nyunzu and that Minserve, as an entité de traitement (processing plant) could 
not be established within an AEZ like Kahendwa. According to the Mining Law (T. 1, 
Ch. 2, Art. 81), an entité de traitement can only process mineral ore and cannot be 
involved in extractive activities. Thus, the Nyunzu-based authorities worried about the 
fact that the ministerial decree (0562/CAB.MINES/01/2012) that legally allowed Minserve 
to be established in the Katangese province was too ambiguous. In their eyes, it did not 
clearly indicate where exactly Minserve could conduct its activities
85
. However, despite 
these controversial interpretations, Minserve’s staff members remained in Kahendwa for 
seven months, until September 2012. 
Importantly, there have also been disputes regarding Kahendwa among mining 
cooperatives. CDMC, the first cooperative in Kahendwa, arrived in October 2011. Even 
though CDMC was based in Kisengo (49 km from Kahendwa) and had no entitlement 
over Kahendwa, CDMC’s presence was condoned by the provincial and the Nyunzu state 
authorities. A representative of CDMC in Kisengo confirmed this:  
CDMC had no property rights but arrived in Kahendwa following a 
request by the provincial Katangese government and the administrator 
of Nyunzu. Because CDMC was based in Kisengo, near Kahendwa, the 
authorities asked CDMC to help them control the trade of coltan 
extracted in Kahendwa because this was undertaken informally
86
. 
Although a request by state authorities asking CDMC to purchase coltan from Kahendwa 
mines was plausible, no further evidence was found to substantiate this claim. CDMC 
also had economic reasons to engage in purchasing coltan from Kahendwa. In contrast to 
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 Decree 107/00504/CAB/MIN.PROV./MINESJ.GEF/KAT/2011.  
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 Interview with the administrator of finances of Nyunzu, April 2014.  
86
 Interview with CDMC staff, Kisengo, April 2014.  
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Kisengo, where iTSCi, CDMC and MMR monitored the coltan trade, the situation was 
largely informal in Kahendwa, where many independent négociants where established. 
Thus, for CDMC staff members, the coltan business of Kahendwa was likely carried out 
concurrently with their activities in Kisengo. For instance, in early October 2011, 
Kahendwa négociants purchased coltan at 65 USD per kg, while it cost 35 USD in 
Kisengo
87
. Price variations between Kisengo and Kahendwa led CDMC staff members to 
believe that coltan mined in Kisengo was smuggled to the market in Kahendwa for sale. 
CDMC’s attempts to become permanently established in Kahendwa—from September 
2011 through early 2012—were not successful. On several occasions, for instance on 25 
October 2011, artisanal miners violently protested against CDMC’s presence. The fact 
that Kahendwa was already proclaimed as an AEZ also made it difficult for CDMC to 
claim or justify any property rights over this mining site
88
. 
In February 2012, further confusion over Kahendwa’s entitlements developed. Minserve 
was already present at the site and considered the series of maende (the local quarries) to 
be its property. However, Therese Lukenge Kapwibwe (the provincial minister of mines) 
signed another note (№ 10.7/00651/CAB/MIN.PROV.MINES/KAT/2012) stipulating 
that both Kahendwa and Kankwala were granted to CMMA. This new entitlement meant 
that the rights of Minserve over Kankwala and its claim over Kahendwa were totally 
denied. Creating further tensions between CMMA and Minserve, granting the ‘disputed’ 
mines of Kahendwa and Kankwala to CMMA led people to believe that CMMA was a 
cooperative intentionally created by the Minister as a strategy to control the mining and 
to gain economic benefits from it
89
. After CMMA staff members arrived in Kahendwa at 
the beginning of February 2012, tensions increased between them, the Minserve staff and 
the Nyunzu-based authorities. One civil servant from the Division des Mines interviewed 
in Nyunzu on 13 April 2014 suspected state authorities of manipulating such tensions: 
In Nyunzu, our agency is never informed of when and how trading 
houses like Minserve have been granted an AEZ. In many cases, we see 
their staff members arriving from Lubumbashi or Kalemie. Then, they 
talk to the Nyunzu-based administrator and go into the mining areas to 
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 Interview with the president of the comité des creuseurs, Kahendwa, September 2013. 
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 Kahendwa was demarcated as an AEZ (decree № 238), on 10 October 2011 by Martin 
Kabwelulu, the national Minister of Mines. However, this decree became effective only in early 
2012, when the CMMA team arrived in Kahendwa. 
89
 Interviews with staff members from the Division des Mines and creuseurs, Kahendwa, April 
2014.  
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start their activities. It is when disputes have occurred between them 
and artisanal miners that the authorities have asked us to mediate. 
This statement shows that some high-ranking state officials, such as the Nyunzu-based 
administrator and the provincial Minister of Mines, used their power positions to favour 
the installation of a certain trading house or mining cooperative. In other words, these 
officials were also able to obstruct the activities of other entities. Another example 
provides further evidence of this situation. Although the acting Katangese Minister of 
Mines (Therese Lukenge Kapibwe) created a commission of enquiry in charge of 
investigating the existence and exact location of the contested maende or maendeleo 
mines in March 2012, unsurprisingly, this commission confirmed the exclusive rights of 
CMMA over the mines of Kahendwa
90
. 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
 
Following the reforms introduced in 3T mining in DRC, this study examined how these 
reforms have been a driving force behind new conflicts over property rights and access to 
minerals (coltan). In northern Katanga, the mining reforms were meant to organise 
artisanal mining and the coltan trade around transparent models of resource governance. 
They aimed especially at breaking the supposed linkages between violent conflicts, 
mineral exploitation and trade. Concretely, the Congolese government allocated artisanal 
mining areas—AEZ—to mining cooperatives and trading houses for the purpose of 
organising artisanal mining. However, these entitlements also introduced changes in 
patterns of mining property rights and access to coltan. 
 
This study built on evidence that property theory is very useful in explaining processes of 
state formation, which provides a better understanding of how people access and benefit 
from resources and of the mechanisms they use in doing so. However, the theory does not 
tell us much about how, in the course of policy implementation (such as that of the 
ongoing mining reforms), social actors may leverage their power positions in 
instrumentalising specific policy on mining property. The present study revealed that 
such an instrumentalisation can occur in various ways and take different shapes from the 
grassroots to the Katangese provincial level. While power exercised by the authorities 
serves as a vehicle for personal interests, such an instrumentalisation can also be seen as 
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 Interview with a CMMA member, Lubumbashi, October 2014. 
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‘elite capture’, meaning that power may be exercised for individual interests rather than 
for community interests (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). 
 
One major finding of this study is that, at different levels, state authorities took advantage 
of their power positions to influence policy on mining property. As Hilhorst (2013: 8) 
argues about policy interventions in post-conflict settings, ‘policy is the result of 
interaction between different stakeholders, who try to make policy fit their own 
perspectives and goals […] according to their own understanding, interests and ambition’. 
For various reasons, the national Ministry of Mines in Kinshasa, the Katangese provincial 
Ministry of Mines in Lubumbashi, the Tanganyika district commissioner in Kalemie and 
the Nyunzu-based territorial authorities decreed, changed or condoned policy decisions 
taken to entitle certain entities to mining property rights or to deny the rights of other 
entities in both Kahendwa and Kisengo. The involvement of the Katangese officials in 
‘local resource politics’ confirms the existence of an intimate connection between 
property and authority (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 7).   
Although state authorities intended to organise artisanal mining, they were also endowed 
with a ‘bundle of power’ to deny or legitimise actors’ claims over mining property, and it 
was found that they were able to influence the micro-politics of property rights and 
access to coltan at the grassroots level. For example, Kisengo was not officially declared 
an AEZ despite the fact that it was actually an artisanal mine. Although MMR/CDMC 
introduced semi-industrial methods at Bovu (Kisengo), artisanal methods of coltan 
production prevailed. Thus, granting Kisengo to a trading house (MMR) can be seen as 
the Katangese provincial authorities bestowing a privilege upon this company (Diemel 
and Cuvelier, 2015: 156). This entitlement gave MMR room to exercise more freedom 
than the creuseurs in enforcing its property claims over Kisengo, especially in the most 
productive coltan quarry of Bovu. 
A series of instrumentalised policy decisions illustrate the influence of state authorities 
over mining property. In Kisengo, the Tanganyika district commissioner declared Bovu 
to be a zone interdite despite the fact that this decision should be taken only by the 
Congolese President through a decree. Then, instead of stopping the mining activities, as 
is clearly stipulated in the Mining Law for a zone interdite, mining at Bovu continued—
conducted by MMR/CDMC instead of the creuseurs. The state authorities did not 
sanction MMR/CDMC for continuing with these activities. Additionally, following 
mounting disputes between creuseurs and MMR/CDMC, the Nyunzu-based territorial 
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authorities condoned (and seemed to appreciate) the demolition of miners’ camps and the 
eviction of people from them. Authorities said that this would have positive effects on the 
sedentarisation of the mining populations. However, it was also reported that the 
administrator of Nyunzu embezzled part of the funds intended for compensating the 
evicted households. In Kahendwa, state authorities also leveraged their power positions. 
Through entitlements, supports, approvals and denials of property claims of several 
trading houses and mining cooperatives, they pitted one against another. All of these 
elements lead to the conclusion that the mining reforms have become an arena for 
conflict. 
The study has also demonstrated that mining reforms inspired by the ‘conflict-free 
minerals’ discourse and fixed ideas about how the artisanal mining business should be 
organised have led to a renewal of ‘conflict minerals’. These conflicts saw mining 
cooperatives, trading houses and creuseurs in oppositional positions. Comparing the two 
case studies presented here reveals important similarities in how conflicts around 
property rights negatively affected miners’ access to minerals. In Kisengo (Bovu), 
MMR/CDMC used various strategies to gain access to mineral resources, to the detriment 
of artisanal miners. Over time, MMR/CDMC’s strategies to take over Bovu gradually 
came to include sharing extracted mineral sands (remblais) with creuseurs. Initially, the 
share was equal, but this ultimately evolved into MMR/CDMC buying the miners’ 
tunnels and evicting them. MMR/CDMC’s access to the authorities played a crucial role 
in this regard, as the authorities condoned the eviction of miners from Bovu. This 
supports the idea that, in developing countries, violence is increasingly becoming a 
practice used by governments and private investors to consolidate access to and control of 
land and resources (Ballard and Banks, 2003; Geenen and Claessens, 2013; Lund and 
Peluso, 2011: 675–676). In Kahendwa, the cooperative CMMA also succeeded in 
establishing nearly monopolistic control over local resources. Although no massive 
eviction occurred, conflicts involving creuseurs persisted between trading houses and 
cooperatives in their attempts to govern the mines of Kahendwa. 
 
In short, ‘conflict minerals’ have given rise to new types of conflicts, labelled here 
‘reform conflicts’. It can therefore be concluded that, although ‘greed’ over mineral 
resources is central to the persistence, intensity and duration of conflicts because it offers 
economic opportunities for armed groups (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003), addressing 
‘conflict minerals’ through reforms also offers economic opportunities for people, 
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including the Katangese state authorities. This finding lends support to the observations 
of some authors who are convinced that African elites view post-conflict 
reconstruction—in which mining reforms play an integral part—as an opportunity to 
maximise their political fortunes and compete for resources through new means 
(Englebert and Tull, 2008; Trefon, 2011).  
 
The struggle against ‘conflict minerals’ cannot be unidimensional (Vogel and Radley, 
2015: 407). It would be worthwhile for policymakers to pay attention to ‘reform 
conflicts’, which have thus far been ancillary to debates on reforming Congolese mining. 
Taking ‘reform conflicts’ seriously will help in understanding the micro-dynamics and 
implications of these new types of conflicts for the vulnerable position of artisanal 
miners. 
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Photo 4.1. Miners extracting coltan at site 4 (Kisengo) 
 
Photo 4.2. Coltan being sold to négociants at a poste d’achat (selling point) in Mai-
Baridi 
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Abstract 
 
This chapter examines the implications of reforms of tantalum (coltan) mining for the 
livelihoods and socioeconomic position of middlemen (négociants)
91
 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The research explores how and why négociants diversified their 
livelihood portfolios following mining reforms in artisanal mining areas of northern 
Katanga. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2014 in Kalemie and Nyunzu 
territories, this chapter argues that, contrary to the widespread opinion that négociants 
abuse their position as brokers in the mineral production and commodity chain, mining 
reforms have affected their livelihoods in different ways. While some négociants are 
relatively well off, others have been pushed out of the commodity chain or have become 
trapped in indebtedness. Négociants predominantly relied on their social networks in their 
efforts to diversify their livelihood portfolios. There is a need to move beyond 
policymakers’ aim of improving transparency in the coltan market to also consider 
mining reforms as an opportunity to make the livelihoods of people, including 
négociants, more sustainable. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Repeatedly, négociants do not pay mineworkers like me in cash. 
When coupures de fond [cash flow problems] happen, they give us 
vouchers. However, we cannot eat vouchers. We then wait for one or 
two weeks before being paid, but we understand this problem, 
because négociants also complain about depending on cash 
availability from trading houses and mining cooperatives. The issue 
is that, when we complain about these payment delays, we are seen 
rebelling against the mining reforms and become suspected of 
collaboration with coltan smugglers.  
[Mwamba’s story, Kisengo, June 2014] 
 
Beginning in the early 2000s, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) embarked upon 
a series of reforms of the mineral sector. In 2002–2003, a new mining code was passed 
(Mazalto, 2005). These reforms broadly align with the so-called ‘conflict-free minerals’ 
narrative, following the idea that minerals have fuelled violence and conflict (Autesserre, 
2012) and that the good governance of mining has the potential to cut the ties between 
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 The literature distinguishes various types of négociants, ranging from ‘petit négociant’ to 
‘négociant principal’ (Garrett, 2008: 44; De Failly, 2001: 15–16). In some studies, négociants are 
also referred to as ‘traders’ (Geenen, 2011a). In this chapter, négociants are mine-based mineral 
buyers purchasing coltan from mineworkers and working at the interface between these workers 
and the mining cooperatives.    
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resource exploitation and conflict (Verbruggen et al.; World Bank, 2008). To reach this 
policy objective, special attention has been paid to enforcing international due diligence 
standards, which are a series of regulations requiring mining companies sourcing 
minerals (including coltan) to respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict 
(OECD, 2013). The goal of boosting the Congolese economy while improving 
governance and transparency in the trade of minerals lies at the core of the mining 
reforms in DRC (World Bank, 2008: 29). In addition, these reforms may contribute to 
sustaining the livelihood of millions of people (Garrett and Mitchell, 2009: 12). The 
reforms also aim to have more economic oversight over the trading activities of 
intermediaries in the mineral commodity chain (OECD, 2013: 59), including négociants, 
individuals recruited by trading houses and mining cooperatives to act as middlemen, 
purchasing coltan from the mineworkers. 
 
Based mainly on nineteen months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in three coltan 
mines in the northern Katanga, this study aims to provide an in-depth understanding of 
how reforms of artisanal mining have affected the livelihoods and socioeconomic 
position of négociants. It also examines how mineworkers have experienced négociants. 
This is very important, because négociants are key actors in the mining business. 
Although they play a crucial role in trading coltan (De Failly, 2001: 20; Kilosho, 2011), 
their experiences with the reforms and efforts to diversify their livelihood portfolios have 
often been sketched in superficial ways or simply left out of many studies. This oversight 
has resulted from a tendency to treat négociants’ livelihood activities in isolation from 
those of mineworkers (Geenen, 2011b; Maconachie and Hilson, 2011b).  
  
Négociants are frequently portrayed as economically powerful actors who abuse and dupe 
mineworkers and enjoy a brokering position in the mineral market. For example, in 2008, 
the World Bank (2008: 8) concluded that ‘the artisan is frequently indentured to 
middlemen and financiers who, while playing a legitimate and valuable role in the sector, 
often charge usurious rates or fail to give full market value for the minerals produced’. 
Likewise, in his Master dissertation on the position of artisanal mineworkers in eastern 
DRC in the global cassiterite (or tin) chain, Kilosho (2011: 15) argued that the 
commercial trade of tin is domestically dominated by ‘big traders’ who give orders. This 
portrait aligns with Global Witness’s (2006: 20) assertion that, in the Katangese copper 
and cobalt sectors, although négociants are also exploited by trading companies, they 
make a reasonable living and pay the mineworkers ‘very low prices’. A similar 
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observation was made in the gold sector in Western Africa, where Maconachie and 
Hilson (2011b: 296) observed that middlemen abused artisanal mineworkers and 
‘neglected their welfare’. 
 
Thus, there appears to be a widespread conviction that négociants occupy a powerful 
economic position. Little attention has been paid to how economic constraints introduced 
by the reforms have reshuffled this position and affected the livelihoods of both 
négociants and mineworkers. It is this gap that the present study aimed to fill. This 
chapter addresses the question of how reforms of coltan mining and trade have altered the 
relationships between trading houses, mining cooperatives,
92
 négociants and 
mineworkers, and explores what effects these changes have had on négociants’ livelihood 
assets. The findings indicate that, in northern Katanga, the reforms have left many 
négociants exposed to ‘external and internal threats to livelihood security’ (Ellis, 2000: 
298). In response, they have used their social networks as strategies to diversify their 
livelihood portfolios, which has also affected mineworkers through their experiences and 
dealings with négociants. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section of this chapter 
presents the theoretical framework, followed by a description of the role of négociants in 
the informal mining business before the reforms. The study methods are then described in 
brief, before moving into the present findings. The presentation of the findings focuses on 
how the reforms shaped the socioeconomic position of négociants, implications of this 
change for their activities and livelihoods, and how they opted for diversification. The 
last section presents final analyses and conclusions. 
 
2. Conceptualising livelihood 
 
Since the 1990s, academic debates on the livelihood framework have evolved 
significantly. As a response to the conventional approach to development, which mainly 
explained poverty in terms of low income, this framework has generally been used as a 
holistic, people-centred development approach to poverty eradication (Chambers and 
Conway, 1992). It is based on the assumption that a livelihood is broader than monetary 
income (De Haan, 2000) and that formal or informal institutions can enable people’s 
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 This is referred to as ‘mining cooperatives’ or simply ‘cooperatives’ in this chapter.  
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pursuit of their livelihoods (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009). Thus, Ellis (2000: 291) has 
asserted that one should analyse livelihood issues in terms of assets (natural, human, 
financial, social and physical), activities and how people access to these assets, through 
‘social relationships and institutions that mediate people’s access to different assets and 
income streams’.  
The notion of ‘social relationships’ is theoretically important for understanding how 
négociants diversify their livelihood portfolios. Bebbington (1999) and Krantz (2001) 
have both argued that livelihoods are shaped by non-economic elements, such as cultural 
aspects or ‘informal structures of social dominance and power within the communities 
themselves’ (Krantz, 2001: 4). Likewise, in their book on conflict dynamics in eastern 
DRC, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004: 17) have put forth the idea that ‘social bonds’ 
are vital in enabling people’s access to resources and markets. Clearly, it is important to 
examine how, in addition to using the ‘formalised’ coltan market93, négociants may also 
rely on their social spheres for diversifying their livelihood portfolios. 
Many authors have drawn on a political economy perspective to discuss the livelihoods 
and economic position of négociants. For instance, Maconachie and Hilson (2011b: 296) 
reported, in their study on the formalisation of artisanal mining in West Africa, that the 
middlemen of the gold trade abused artisanal mineworkers, leaving them ‘in desperate 
poverty’. Similarly, in their study of the artisanal mining of tin in Nigeria, Mallo et al. 
(2011) concluded that mineworkers were exploited by middlemen because they lacked 
information on mineral prices. Other studies, undertaken in eastern DRC, have arrived at 
similar conclusions. De Failly (2001: 20) considered négociants to be the ‘vainqueurs’ 
(winners) during the 2001 coltan boom in South Kivu. Additionally, D’Souza (2007: 6) 
has argued that négociants have a vested interest in controlling vulnerable mineworkers 
through the various types of négociant-created organisations, such as cooperatives. In her 
seminal study on the gold trade in Kamituga (South Kivu), Geenen (2011: 431) similarly 
reported that négociants’ access to information about prices ‘has dramatically 
strengthened their position when they have to bargain over gold price’, resulting in a 
particular set of power relations between négociants and mineworkers.  
In the present analysis, the use of a livelihood perspective provided two main advantages. 
First, following Mallett and Slater’s (2012: 61) contention that ‘government policies have 
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 The formalisation of the coltan market further discussed is a set of policy measures to make the 
trade of coltan more transparent.  
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the potential to both constrain and enable people’s pursuit of effective livelihood 
strategies’, this chapter analyses the factors influencing négociants’ choices in 
diversifying their livelihood portfolios in a context where the government has taken a 
series of policy measures to reform artisanal mining and to organise the coltan trade. The 
study examines whether négociants’ decisions to diversity their livelihood portfolios 
were influenced by these measures, beyond necessity (involuntary and desperation 
reasons) and choice (voluntary and proactive reasons) as Ellis (2000: 291) suggests.   
Second, taking a livelihood approach also facilitated the analysis of how négociants, 
when confronted with economic constraints, risks and uncertainties, relied on their 
informal social relationships in their efforts to diversify their activities. It is especially 
crucial to take into account the social aspects of livelihood activities in a context where 
mining reforms tend to privilege a ‘formalised’ coltan trade instead of paying attention to 
understanding the social relations between mineworkers and négociants. Much of the past 
work described above has lacked an in-depth analysis of négociants’ livelihood activities. 
By incorporating a careful analysis of this, the present study aims to contribute to the 
body of literature on livelihood diversification in artisanal mining areas in a context of 
ongoing reforms, asking why and how négociants engage in livelihood diversification, as 
well as about the implications of the reforms for mineworkers.  
3. Methods  
 
This study primarily used ethnographic methods, which involve studying people’s 
practices from their own perspectives and in their own settings (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). The data for this study were collected during seven months (February–
August 2014) of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in three coltan mines—Kahendwa, 
Kisengo and Mai-Baridi—located in Kalemie and Nyunzu territories, roughly 200 km to 
the west of Kalemie, the capital city of Tanganyika province.  
The data collection for this study combined observation, individual and group interviews, 
life histories and a survey questionnaire. These multiple methods were used to check the 
accuracy of the data collected, cross-checking and validating the findings (Reimer, 2009). 
Observation is a key method in ethnographic research (Campbell and Gregor, 2010). I 
first observed how négociants purchased coltan from mineworkers and their interactions 
with trading houses and cooperatives. I conducted in-depth interviews with 20 out of 28 
négociants and collected their life histories, based on their long-term experience in the 
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mining activities. I also conducted interviews with 133 individual mineworkers and 16 
members of their committees, collecting 12 life histories from these groups. Additionally, 
I conducted 14 interviews with the staff of trading houses and mining cooperatives. The 
interviews with mineworkers and institution staff members helped in gaining an 
understanding of how they experienced and interacted with the négociants.  
The survey questionnaire was primarily geared towards assessing the activities of the 
négociants living in Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi. The survey, which concerned 
25 of the 28 négociants living in the study area, was structured around various themes at 
the level of négociants’ households. It collected information about their areas of origin, 
length of experience in mining and trading coltan, the types of livelihood activities they 
engaged in other than purchasing coltan, and the actors with whom they engaged in these 
activities. The survey allowed us to identify the key activities undertaken by these 
négociants when seeking to diversify their livelihood portfolios. 
Among the négociants studied, only four were women, given the fact that women’s 
activities in artisanal mining are often blamed for their social status and this reflects the 
typical gender division in mining communities (Bashwira et al., 2013). Likewise other 
négociants, two were recruited in 2012 in Kisengo by representatives of the Coopérative 
des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC), and the two were recruited in 2013 in 
Kahendwa by Coopérative Minière Maendeleo (CMMA). The analysis of the négociants’ 
activities was not based on the amount of income generated, which is beyond the scope of 
this study. Instead, the analysis focused on explaining the nature of the activities, 
exploring what they meant for the négociants and for mineworkers’ households, as well 
as why négociants opted for this kind of diversification. All of the data were transcribed, 
organised electronically and coded using NVivo qualitative data analysis software. 
4. Coltan mining and négociants in Kalemie and Nyunzu (2007–2009)  
 
Prior to coltan mining, the rural economy of Kalemie and Nyunzu was predominantly 
agrarian (Mwanyimi Mbomba, 2011; Omasombo, 2014). Many farmers cultivated plots 
of land of around one acre for local consumption. Land was held through customary 
tenure and lineage, as has been observed in other regions of DRC, such as North and 
South Kivu (Van Acker, 2005: 81–82). Additionally, customary tenure arrangements 
were managed by local traditional chiefs (Bami, singular Mwami), who allocated land as 
it passed from one generation to another. 
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In 2007, this situation changed dramatically, following the discovery of several coltan 
deposits, mainly in Kisengo and Mai-Baridi (2007) and in Kahendwa (2011). In response 
to the impoverishment of the population after the collapse of the agriculture sector in the 
1990s, coltan mining has provided people with opportunities to seek new livelihood 
options and income (Omasombo, 2014)
94
. Mining has become an important source for the 
flow of cash into local communities. 
 
Until 2010, coltan trading was controlled by négociants. Some were independent traders 
who neither belonged to the mining cooperatives nor received pre-financing through them 
(Table 1), and others purchased coltan for urban-based trading houses (comptoirs). These 
négociants organised their activities through small groups known as ‘committees of 
négociants’ (‘comités des négociants’), which were made up of 5–10 persons. The 
‘comités’ helped négociants to collect information on price setting and fluctuations in 
towns (Kalemie, Uvira and Bukavu in South Kivu and Goma in North Kivu). Besides 
organising the ‘expédition’ (transportation/dispatching) of coltan to comptoirs, the 
‘comités’ also conveyed cash to the mines. According to many négociants,95 ‘coupures de 
fond’ (cash flow problems) were rare given the high number of négociants, which 
approached 100, and the competitive nature of their activities. Competition among 
négociants allowed mineworkers to negotiate on prices and to choose the highest bidders. 
 
During this period, in the absence of efficient economic markets and given the weakness 
of the governance structures, coltan trading was based on informal networks. This made it 
difficult to control this trade and encouraged smuggling (Spittaels, 2010). Trading coltan 
was organised as follows: Many négociants collaborated with intermediaries (known as 
convoyeurs). These convoyeurs either stored and transported coltan for the négociants or 
provided cash to other lower-level intermediaries in the mining areas. To make additional 
profits, many négociants combined purchasing minerals with delivering consumer goods 
that were hard to find in the mining communities to the mineworkers and community 
members. Négociants also relied on a barter economy, exchanging these goods for in-
kind payments of coltan, a practice that Garrett (2008) also observed in North Kivu 
province.  
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 The decline of the agriculture sector resulted from a series of factors, including the collapse of 
basic infrastructure (rural roads and railways), the two congolese wars (1996; 1998–2003) and 
armed conflicts, which caused serious slump in crops production and access to markets. 
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 Interviews with négociants, Kahendwa and Mai-Baridi, August 2014.  
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Many coltan négociants belonged to the Bashi and Nande ethnic groups, originating from 
South and North Kivu. They had been established in northern Katanga (mostly in 
Kalemie) since the beginning of the 2000s, before the discovery of coltan, and they were 
mostly involved in gold trade. At that time, they collaborated with politico-military 
entrepreneurs belonging to the Rally for Congolese Democracy (Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie), a Kivu-based rebel movement that took over northern 
Katanga and ruled the area between 1998 and 2003 (Spittaels 2010: 17). According to 
one well-informed source, these entrepreneurs offered start-up capital or provided 
‘security protection’ for the négociants’ activities.96 Since this time, mining reforms have 
introduced significant changes to the economic position of négociants, as the following 
section will show.  
 
5. Reforming coltan mining  
 
5.1 Policy measures  
Beginning in 2009, 3T mining (tin, tantalum and tungsten) in DRC was affected by a 
series of policy measures. These measures targeted all of the participants in the mining 
business, including négociants. Measures were taken at both the national and the 
Katangese provincial government levels following international pressure put on the DRC 
government to enforce clear guidelines concerning the exploitation and trade of 3T 
(Vogel and Radley, 2015) and other mineral resources.  
 
In 2009, the Congolese government demarcated eight artisanal exploitation zones (AEZs) 
for 3T in Kalemie and Nyunzu territories.
97
 According to the 2002 DRC Mining Law (T. 
4, Ch. 1, Art. 109), the AEZs are areas where ‘the technological and economic factors are 
not suited for the site to be industrially exploited and which are exclusively reserved for 
artisanal mining activities’. The AEZs were granted to mining cooperatives, 
predominantly the Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC)
98
.  
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 Interview with Boniface Kyungu, chief office mining service/Kalemie, June 2014. 
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 Two among these AEZs were located in Kalemie (Mai-Baridi and Sango-Mutonshia) and six in 
Nyunzu (Kahendwa, Kilunga, Lengwe, Luba, Lububu-Kitoke and Mbale).  
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 CDMC came into existence on 10 April 2010 in Lubumbashi, the capital city of Haut-Katanga. 
It has become the largest cooperative in northern Katanga, claiming to represent up to 13,000 
miners (see Chapter 3).  
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In addition, the Katangese government took its first measure targeting coltan mining in 
northern Katanga. On 9 March 2009, the Katangese government granted a 3T-buying 
monopoly in four mining areas of northern Katanga
99
 to Mining Mineral Resources 
(MMR), an Indian trading house headquartered in Lubumbashi (the former capital city of 
Katanga). This entitlement was confirmed after MMR acquired official rights from the 
mining cadastre in December 2011 (CAMI, 2012). The above decision and MMR’s 
entitlement led many négociants of coltan to abandon their activities amidst tensions with 
MMR. Some négociants were arrested. Spittaels (2010: 20) noted that, in Kisengo, ‘three 
protesting South Kivu traders […] were detained until they agreed to sell MMR the 11 
tonnes [of coltan] they had planned to transport to Bukavu’. The arrival of MMR also 
coincided with the establishment of mining cooperatives in northern Katanga (see 
Chapter 3).  
 
The Katangese provincial government also decided to stop the flow of coltan to other 
provinces, especially North and South Kivu. After observing that, since 2007, minerals 
systematically escaped administrative, economic and tax control by the authorities 
(Spittaels, 2010: 17), in October 2009, the then Katangese governor, Moise Katumbi 
Chapwe, raised administrative charges for transporting cassiterite and coltan 
significantly, from 0.10 USD to 5 USD per kilogramme on all transit of tin, its by-
products and coltan from Katanga province to any other province.
100
  
 
Alongside these measures, the Katanga policy network
101
 played a pivotal role in 
concentrating conflict mineral policy in Katanga (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015). This 
encouraged the implementation of the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (or iTSCi) in 
most of the Katangese 3T areas. As already mentioned, the iTSCi was designed by the 
International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) in 2009 and has been providing a means of 
determining the origins of 3T and documenting the trading chain of these minerals, by 
‘tagging and bagging’ 3T loads at the mining sites or postes d’achat, counting offices 
(trading posts or comptoirs) and mineral depots. The iTSCi presence has had the effect of 
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 In Nyunzu territory (Kisengo [coltan]) and Lunga [gold], in Kalemie territory (Mayi Baridi 
[coltan]) and in Manono territory (Katonge [coltan]). 
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 Provincial decree № 2009/0035/KATANGA du 9 Octobre 2009.  
101
 It is defined by Diemel and Cuvelier (2015: 152) as ‘a network of influential private and 
public actors involved in the reform of Katanga's 3T mining sector governance between 2009 and 
2011’. 
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introducing new patterns of organising the coltan trade in cooperation with trading houses 
and cooperatives. 
 
5.2 Organising the coltan trade  
 
In the wake of the reforms, trading coltan has involved five actors in coltan mining areas: 
the iTSCi, trading houses, mining cooperatives, négociants and mineworkers. The iTSCi 
programme encouraged trading houses to collaborate with mining cooperatives. With rare 
exceptions, such as Manono in central Katanga, where some négociants continued to 
purchase coltan independently, trading houses and cooperatives reduced the number of 
négociants they found operating in mining areas, recruited some of them (see Table 1) 
and pushed out others from the commodity chain. This was meant to organise the coltan 
trade more efficiently. 
 
5.2.1. Recruiting négociants 
 
The size of the mining areas, their potential of production, the number of mineworkers 
working in the mines and the number of postes d’achat available all had a bearing on the 
recruitment of négociants. Trading houses and cooperatives considered four main sets of 
factors in recruiting négociants. 
 
The first négociants to be recruited were those who had lived in the mining areas for a 
long period of time approaching four years. It was believed that they had a good 
knowledge of coltan ore. Second, trading houses and cooperatives selected négociants on 
the basis of their own management politics. In Kahendwa, for instance, representatives of 
the CMMA
102
, the only cooperative established there, charged in 2012 a 500–1,500 USD 
to négociants who wanted to work with CMMA. This amount was seen as illegal by 
many of the négociants.
103
 In addition, trading houses and cooperatives recruited 
négociants who either had houses in mining areas or had invested in these areas. 
Although material assets such as houses did not serve as ‘security deposits’ as such, they 
were seen as proof that those négociants would not be tempted to abandon their activities 
or run away with the funds that cooperatives provided to them. Nevertheless, the fact that 
                                                 
102
 The Coopérative Minière Maendeleo (CMMA) arrived in Kahendwa in February 2012.   
103
 Interview with négociants, Kahendwa, May 2014. 
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négociants abandoned their activities occurred several times, mainly because of debts 
owed to the cooperatives.  
 
Other négociants were recruited on the basis of their social connections, networks of 
patronage within the cooperatives and roles in the local mining business. Finally, some 
négociants were people from the local communities (‘batoto ya mungini’). These people 
were mostly from the Bakalanga ethnic group and were either recommended or had social 
ties with the mwami of the areas where the coltan extraction took place. For the mwami, 
having community-based négociants was a strategy to reinforce their power positions 
among the local constituencies while maintaining an influence over the mining business 
in their areas (see also Chapter 4).
104
  
 
Finally, according to these cooperatives’ representatives, female négociants, like 
masculine négociants, were recruited based on their experience, moral integrity and 
family relations. Although many négociants were present in the mining areas, one of the 
female négociants recruited in Kisengo (Maman Henriette Kabala), for example, was the 
wife of the president of the diggers’ committee. 
5.2.2. Interactions between trading houses, cooperatives and négociants 
Relationships between trading houses, cooperatives and the handful of négociants 
recruited and qualified for trading coltan can be characterised as both ‘patron–client’ and 
interdependent (see Table 4). After signing contracts of collaboration, trading houses pre-
financed the cooperatives on a daily or weekly basis. The amounts varied, especially by 
the potential production of the mining area. For example, in Kisengo, where production 
approached one tonne of coltan during the peak period, funding provided by MMR to the 
CDMC is estimated at 25,000 USD/day.  
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 Interview with the village chief of Kisengo, July 2014.  
  
131 
Table 4. The coltan trade pre-financing scheme 
 Trading houses  Cooperatives  Négociants  Mineworkers  
Functions Pre-finance 
cooperatives  
Pre-finance 
négociants  
Appoint 
négociants at 
postes d’achat 
Hand over 
coltan to trading 
houses  
Purchase coltan 
at postes 
d’achat 
Often replaced 
by their 
collaborators, 
‘sous-couverts’ 
Mine in tunnels  
Sell coltan to 
négociants at 
postes d’achat 
Frequency of 
transactions  
Daily or 
weekly  
Daily  Daily  Daily  
Relationship 
type 
Based on written contracts Buyers–sellers 
 
In Kisengo for instance, this pre-financing scheme functioned as follows: MMR provided 
funds to the CDMC, which then pre-financed 21 négociants appointed at 14 postes 
d’achat. The daily amount per négociant ranged from 160 to 1,500 USD, allowing them 
to purchase 5–50 kg of coltan. When this pre-financing scheme functioned properly, it 
nourished the local economy with a steady circulation of cash. The above pre-financing 
system functioned in the same way in Kahendwa and Mai-Baridi but with only five 
négociants based in Kahendwa and two in Mai-Baridi (see Table 1).  
6. Effects of the reforms  
 
6.1 Effects on the livelihoods of the négociants  
This section builds on a life history to examine the implications of the reforms for the 
livelihoods of négociants. Mallett and Slater (2012: 56) have emphasised that the 
environment where livelihoods are made and business is done matters for understanding 
how economic reforms affect people’s activities. This is relevant in post-conflict areas 
such as Kalemie and Nyunzu, where the roles played by different groups of actors in 
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livelihood processes are worth exploring (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009). This section 
shows that, although the reforms yielded some advantages for négociants, they also had 
negative effects on them. These effects are situated at the level of policy measures 
regarding the organisation of the coltan market. 
 
Mwamba’s story  
Mwamba is a young man of 35 years. He has lived in Kisengo since 2008. He owned a 
tunnel before he got married in 2010. When MMR and the CDMC arrived in January and 
June 2010, respectively, followed by the iTSCi in April 2011, he said that the working 
conditions in Kisengo changed profoundly. MMR/CDMC fixed the purchase price of 
coltan, making it difficult to negotiate prices with other independent négociants. In 
September 2011, coltan was discovered in Kahendwa. Mwamba moved there. He first 
worked in Kahendwa as a mineworker. He was then recruited by Divin Wasolela (the 
négociant principal) as a CDMC négociant. Mwamba received funds from Divin 
Wasolela and was paid 2.2 USD per kilogramme of coltan he handed over to the CDMC. 
The CDMC was replaced by the CMMA in January 2012. Mwamba had accumulated 
many debts to mineworkers—estimated at 1,200 USD—because of cash flow problems. 
Unable to pay these debts, he was regularly in dispute with the mineworkers. In October 
2012, he paid half of the debt and returned to Kisengo, where he became an ordinary 
miner. In January 2013, he owned a tunnel at the quarry of Bovu and was appointed by 
the mineworkers as member of their committee. However, like many other mineworkers 
interviewed, on 12 July 2014, Mwamba described the following problems:   
When we sold coltan to the two négociants appointed by the CDMC 
at Bovu [Dunia Kayanda Mokili and Maman Henriette Kabala], they 
rarely paid us directly because of recurrent cash flow problems. We 
and our families have been living like birds. We rely on petty loans 
and use our valuable items [such as radios, shoes, etc.] as security 
deposits to obtain food or medicine from traders or pharmacists. 
Other négociants can give us micro-loans, too, but many of them are 
also indebted to local traders and both impose deadlines that we can 
rarely afford. 
 
Mwamba’s story highlights two important elements. First, it reveals the complex 
trajectory of a négociant switching roles to become a mineworker and how he was 
confronted with financial difficulties. Second, it highlights how mineworkers have 
experienced négociants. Importantly, in the conditions described in his statement, it is 
clear that both groups have been confronted with the same types of problems. 
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6.2 Effects of policy measures  
 
Policy measures have had implications for the livelihoods of négociants. Being in dispute 
with MMR and the doubling of the administrative costs associated with the trade of 3T 
from Katanga to other provinces made it difficult for many négociants to maintain their 
activities in the area. They were either forced out the mineral commodity chain or had no 
choice but to work with and for the trading houses and cooperatives. Additionally, 
according to the chief office of the Federation of Congolese Enterprises (Kisengo), a man 
of 45 years who had been established in Kisengo since 2007, many négociants were 
arrested by the mining police because they were unwilling to collaborate with MMR and 
the CDMC.
105
  
 
Table 5. Number of négociants by mining area, 2009–2014 
 Mining area 
Year Mai-Baridi 
(Kalemie) 
Kahendwa 
(Nyunzu) 
Kisengo 
(Nyunzu) 
Total for all 
areas 
2009 41 0 64 105 
2010 9 0 17 26 
2011 6 67 21 94 
2012 5 15 22 42 
2013 2 8 21 31 
2014 2 5 21 28 
Source: Primary data collected in 2014 
 
Table 5 shows that the number of négociants decreased over time. Although the table 
does not present data for all of the active 3T mining areas in northern Katanga, it reveals 
a general trend showing that trading coltan ceased to be an independent activity. 
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 Group interview with négociants, Kisengo, May 2014. 
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6.3 Purchasing coltan under trading houses and cooperatives  
6.3.1 Opportunities  
Working for trading houses and cooperatives yielded several advantages to the 
négociants. Neither state agencies nor other people in positions of authority (e.g. mwami) 
were then able to levy taxes or fees directly against the négociants. These, for instance 
the fee for the ‘cartes de négociants’ (the official authorisation to trade minerals), were 
paid by the cooperatives. However, this does not mean that illegal taxation completely 
disappeared, as the amount of 500–1,500 USD paid by the négociants in Kahendwa 
illustrated. Another advantage was that cooperatives paid the négociants an incentive of 
2.2 USD per kilogramme of coltan purchased, irrespective of price drops at the 
international and local markets. 
However, the amounts earned through these incentives varied considerably from one 
mining area to another and between négociants. Although incentive earnings were 
estimated at 10–25 USD/day overall, this depended on a number of factors. For instance, 
when tunnels entered a productive phase, négociants appointed at nearby postes d’achat 
were able to purchase more coltan ore than were those at other locations. This explains 
why other négociants were sometimes able to provide micro-loans to mineworkers, as 
Mwamba suggested. 
The incentives earned also depended on the quality and quantity of coltan produced. 
When a mining area was less productive or its coltan had a poor tantalum concentration 
(as was the case, for example, in Kilunga, another Nyunzu coltan mine), the cooperative 
(in this case, Vimated) had difficulty obtaining pre-financing from a trading house. This 
directly affected the cooperative’s négociants. 
Négociants used their incentive earnings to pay for a number of expenses. For instance, 
they paid for food rations, transport costs and a kind of salary (100 USD/month) to their 
‘sous-couverts’—people they appointed at the postes d’achat to purchase coltan for them. 
In some cases, mineworkers have been reported to sell ‘fake’ coltan to the ‘sous-
couverts’ (Wakenge, 2014). These factors demonstrate that, although négociants seemed 
to be favoured by the pre-financing system, in reality, many of them had several costs to 
cover, which implies that it would be too simplistic to state that they are the “big 
winners” in the resources game.  
Working with trading houses and cooperatives allowed and forced many négociants to 
undergo a process of sedentarisation. Although they were known to move frequently from 
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one mining site to another, always heading for those locations where they thought the 
minerals with the highest ore grades could be found, many négociants became 
permanently established in a specific mining area. Also, because otherwise they risk 
losing their membership of a given cooperative and may find themselves excluded from 
the buying process, sedentarisation became an important factor for livelihood 
diversification of négociants through engaging in activities besides trading coltan. 
6.3.2 Constraints 
The negative effects that working under trading houses and cooperatives had on 
négociants should not be neglected. The trading houses and cooperatives repeatedly faced 
problems with cash flow. These ‘coupures de fond’ were caused by logistical challenges 
inherent in the remoteness of mining sites located in rural areas where no banking system 
was available or by prices fluctuation at the international market. In the mines, all 
payments had to be made in cash. This cash had to be physically transported from a bank 
to the mines. The only bank branches were located in Kalemie, and these also depended 
on shipments of cash from banks in Lubumbashi. Such shipments were usually flown in 
weekly by commercial airlines, which operated irregularly and unreliably. As might be 
expected, these ‘coupures de fond’ presented many challenges for the livelihood activities 
of négociants. Without cash, négociants could not pay for minerals from the 
mineworkers, reinforcing patterns of credit and debt, as the story of Mwamba 
demonstrated.  
Additionally, in the study area, négociants were able to make use of the so-called ‘Bank 
Lambert’ to keep their activities afloat. ‘Bank Lambert’ (a nickname of the former 
Belgian Banque Bruxelles Lambert) denotes money lending by mineworkers or 
négociants on particularly strict terms, including interest rates of up to 50% and rapid 
repayment of the debt. Moreover, many négociants faced substantial financial losses. 
This resulted from the mobility patterns of mineworkers, who often moved from one 
mine to another, leaving their debts behind. In Mai-Baridi and Kahendwa, many of the 
négociants interviewed described this kind of constraint:  
Buying coltan depends on how we organise our ‘campaign’—that is, 
building trust relationships with mineworkers. We provide them with 
petty micro-loans and buy cigarettes or food rations for them 
individually or for their teams. We buy these items personally or 
obtain them on credit from local traders. However, often, we are 
unable to recover these debts, because many mineworkers leave the 
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mining areas or are unable to reimburse us, making us indebted to 
our cooperatives.
106
 
 
In this statement, it is clear that trust relationships play a key role in patterns of 
reciprocity and market exchanges, as has been noted in previous work (Grätz, 2004; Hart, 
1988). However, it also reveals that the relationships between négociants and 
mineworkers did not always have positive outcomes. As a result, many négociants 
became indebted to their cooperatives. They were unable to buy the quantity of coltan for 
which they received funds. From 2012 to 2014, these debts totalled 25,000 USD owed by 
a group of five CDMC négociants. As they could not pay their debts, some of these 
négociants were fired by the CDMC; others ran away.
107
 Trading under cooperatives had 
implications for both négociants and mineworkers.
108
 All of the constraints mentioned 
above—‘coupures de fond’, patterns of debt and financial losses made livelihood 
diversification very important for many négociants. 
6.4. Livelihood diversification by négociants’ households outside the mines 
Table 6 below shows how négociants diversified their livelihood portfolios in various 
ways. The livelihood activities of négociants and their households illustrate that, when 
confronted with risks, people may respond to the threat to their welfare and activities in 
many ways as Ellis (2000: 294) suggests. The table also shows that the specific activities 
chosen were not the same. Rather, the activities varied from one mining area to another 
and between individual négociants. The mining areas differed in terms of population size, 
accessibility and business opportunities. These factors largely determined the choices 
négociants made for engaging in particular activities. For example, in Kisengo, where 
there were relatively more inhabitants (17,000) and therefore likely many potential 
customers, 2 of the 21 négociants invested in the hotel trade.  
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 Group interview with négociants, Mai-Baridi and Kahendwa, March 2014. 
107
 Interview with MMR staff member, Kisengo, June 2014. 
108
 Group interview with mineworkers, Kahendwa, April 2014. 
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Table 6. Activities of 25 négociants in addition to purchasing coltan  
 Mining area  
Activity Kisengo 
(n = 19) 
Kahendwa 
(n = 4) 
Mai-
Baridi 
(n = 2) 
Total 
for all 
areas 
(n = 25) 
% 
Providing micro-loans 
to mineworkers’ 
households 
12 3 1 16 64 
Selling beer/alcohol 3 2 2 7 28 
Farming activities 6 1 0 7 28 
Providing motorbike 
transportation 
6 1 0 7 28 
Selling fuel 2 2 1 5 20 
Investing in cinemas 4 1 0 5 20 
Engaging in other 
activities (e.g. petty 
trade or shops) 
5 1 0 6 24 
Investing in the hotel 
trade 
2 0 1 3 12 
Logging/Selling 
planks 
3 0 0 3 12 
Source: Primary data collected in 2014 
Moreover, as discussed above, négociants had differing levels of financial assets and 
income. Some were financially better off than others and were able to invest, for instance, 
in cinemas or motorbikes for public transportation. 
Farming activities did not feature prominently in négociants’ livelihood diversification 
strategies. As Table 6 shows, of a total of 25 households, only 7 (28%) engaged in 
farming. In these cases, the farming activities were performed by the négociants’ spouses. 
These households reported that farming was something normal because they were 
‘autochthons’—peoples living in these villages before the mining began. A discussion 
with the spouses of the négociants who were not involved in farming revealed that they 
did not have much interest in farming, because they perceived it to be an activity that 
would take too much time, generate little income and fail to help them and their spouses 
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quickly in the face of financial problems. Our findings are consistent with past evidence 
of links between mining and farming activities in other mining areas across sub-Saharan 
Africa (Hilson, 2011). However, our findings have also shown that farming is only 
considered a viable livelihood option by négociants if they expect it to yield swift 
benefits. But agriculture rarely – if ever – produces quick benefits.  
Table 6 also reveals that providing micro-loans was the most widespread livelihood 
activity, engaged in by 16 of the 25 surveyed négociants (64%). Loans were 
predominantly provided to mineworkers’ households. As has been found elsewhere in 
eastern DRC, although patterns of debt and credit predated the reforms, shifts in the 
organisation of the coltan market introduced new types of relationships between 
négociants and mineworkers. Before the reforms, debts were mainly taken on for the 
purpose of producing minerals (Geenen, 2011a). This situation has changed profoundly. 
For example, the ‘Bank Lambert’ system mentioned earlier, which was the basis of 
micro-loans, gave loans of 20–50 USD, not for the purpose of producing coltan, but 
rather to enable mineworkers’ households to start a livelihood activity. After a month, the 
creditor of a 50 USD loan would be paid back 75 USD. This also suggests that many 
négociants and mineworkers’ households were confronted with credits and debts 
altogether. 
6.5. Mineworkers’ experiences of négociants 
Kissamba’s story  
Kissamba is a man from South Kivu in his 50s. He has lived in Kahendwa since 
December 2011 with his wife and three children—one son and two daughters, all 
between 11 and 16 years old. When Kissamba arrived in Kahendwa, he was an ordinary 
mineworker. In October 2012, he was appointed to the diggers’ committee, a position that 
allowed him to own five pits. On several occasions, Kissamba observed that 
mineworkers’ living and working conditions have not improved in spite of the reforms. 
He said that, although the CMMA claims to support the mineworkers, they continue to 
carry heavy sacks of mineral sand (kabondema) on their heads. He also added that 
‘coupures de fond’ were recurrent, and the mines lacked adequate equipment such as 
motor pumps. He asked, ‘How can négociants of the CMMA keep buying coltan “on 
credit” when mineworkers live off their day-to-day income and are not allowed to sell 
coltan to someone else?’ Similar to many other mineworkers, Kissamba expressed his 
disappointment with the reforms:   
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Trading houses and mining cooperatives operating in northern 
Katanga can be compared to a car without a driver, breaks or 
headlights, but that drives in the dark, over bumpy roads, without 
anyone being able to stop it. [Interview in January 2014] 
 
For mineworkers, the post-reform actors, namely, the trading houses, cooperatives and 
négociants, were seen as a single entity, and the reforms were almost always 
disappointing.  
 
Kissamba’s spouse sold peanuts and cassava flour at Kahendwa market. Before she 
started working at the market, she did not have any income-generating activity of her 
own. She said that her husband earned enough income from his five pits. However, in 
May 2014, the national mining ministry banned mining activities in Kahendwa (№ 
0143/CAB. MIN/MINES/01/2014, Article 3) because mineworkers extracted coltan from 
tunnels exceeding 30 m, a depth prohibited by the Mining Law (Heading I, Ch. 1, Art. 1). 
Deprived of mining as their main source of income, Kissamba’s spouse had no choice but 
to engage in petty trade. She obtained a micro-loan of 50 USD as start-up capital from a 
Kahendwa-based négociant who was also from South Kivu, her native region. After one 
month, she paid back 75 USD. The money she earned helped to pay the school fees for 
her children and to make ends meet. 
As Kissamba’s story reveals, although mineworkers’ households were charged a high 
interest rate, taking on debts was not only useful for wealth creation; debts became the 
main means of living. Following Van Dijkhorst (2011: 113), who found that an activity 
undertaken in a context of necessity may become a livelihood base, the present study 
found evidence that debts may illustrate patterns of resilience, adaptation and financial 
necessity in difficult times. 
More importantly, micro-loans and debts also served to build social cohesion and ‘group 
solidarity’ as Mauss asserts (quoted in Peebles, 2010: 226). Many mineworkers’ 
households contracted micro-loans from négociants who originated from the same 
geographical area as they did. Thus, these loans were not just economic transactions for 
income-generating activities. One négociant established in Kisengo since 2009 noted, 
‘When you give a loan or need cash, the only person who can help you “ni wako wa 
ndani kabisa”, meaning a person who knows who you are, what you do and where you 
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are came from’.109 Social relations and informal practices with mineworkers’ households 
allowed many négociants to cope with financial problems. Similarly, Knowles and 
Weatherston (2006) found that informal relations were an important determinant of 
earnings.  
7. Analysis and conclusions 
 
This study examined the implications of artisanal mining reforms on the livelihoods of 
middlemen (négociants). Considered key actors in the mining business in DRC, 
négociants are generally believed to enjoy a brokering position in the conduct of mining 
affairs. Studying their livelihoods in the wake of the reforms has provided a better 
understanding of their role in the local socially embedded economy and of how this has 
changed profoundly over time. 
Our findings indicate that changes in patterns of trading coltan have locally reshuffled the 
economic position of négociants. Before the reforms, négociants were practically 
independent traders, connected to and collaborating with urban-based trading houses 
(comptoirs). At this time, the négociants largely controlled the informal trade of coltan. 
Following reforms of mining aimed at cleaning-up the state of affairs in the mining 
business, the economic position of négociants has changed. A series of policy measures 
have been taken by the DRC national government and by the Katanga provincial 
government, including granting artisanal mining areas to mining cooperatives (and 
sometimes to trading houses). Trading houses and cooperatives, in turn, have acted to 
exclude some négociants, while recruiting and pre-financing others to purchase coltan 
from mineworkers. 
This study has shown that the mining reforms have created many opportunities for 
négociants. The trading houses and mining cooperatives have pre-financed négociants’ 
activities, paid them an incentive of 2.2 USD per kilogramme of coltan purchased and led 
many négociants to settle permanently in mining areas. However, these opportunities 
have been tempered by several constraints and a number of restrictions. For instance, 
recruited négociants were only able to purchase coltan for the trading houses and 
cooperatives, following the terms and conditions fixed by those entities. However, the 
trading houses and cooperatives often faced financial difficulties (cash flow problems), 
which repeatedly affected the négociants who participated in this study. The négociants 
                                                 
109
 Interview with a négociant, Kisengo, April 2014. 
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faced financial losses in their dealings with mineworkers and were often mired in patterns 
of credit and debt with local traders or with their cooperatives. As the stories of Mwamba 
and Kissamba demonstrated, these constraints and restrictions also affected the 
mineworkers. Thus, it cannot be taken for granted that mining reforms will increase the 
sustainability of people’s livelihoods. The findings of the present study are in sharp 
contrast to the often-held opinion that négociants are economically powerful and act to 
exploit mineworkers. In reality, they do not always enjoy an affluent or stable economic 
position. 
This chapter has shown that négociants diversified their livelihood portfolios in many 
ways, confirming that artisanal mining offers people opportunities to easily find a 
livelihood option (Hilson, 2011: 1033; Maconachie, 2011: 1056). However, this study 
has also revealed that these activities were not equal in nature. Some négociants were 
better off than others, wielding considerable economic power that seems to have been 
unleashed by the reforms. Other négociants lost their capital, were fired from the 
cooperatives, ran away or were only able to invest in petty trade. Still others survived by 
managing their financial problems through investments in non-farm activities such as the 
hotel trade, or by providing micro-loans to mineworkers’ households, as seen in the story 
of Kissamba. Likewise, Barrett et al. (2001) have shown that the wealthy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are able to diversify their activities, taking advantage of lucrative ‘non-farm’ 
income-generating opportunities. 
 
A key finding from the present study is that many négociants relied on their social 
spheres, trust relations and informal financing schemes to cope with financial problems. 
This reliance on social networks resulted from a number of the constraints discussed 
above. In sum, formal institutions (trading houses and cooperatives) faced difficulties in 
mediating easier access to livelihood assets for négociants, especially through the pre-
financing scheme. As a result, alongside the ‘formalised’ coltan market, social relations 
of exchange gained prominence. The ‘Bank Lambert’ system, which also helped many 
mineworkers’ households to make ends meet, illustrates this point. In spite of its 
constraints, this ‘bank’ allowed many négociants to provide start-up capital to these 
households on the basis of social ties and trust relations. The functioning of this system 
could also be seen as part of the ‘informal rules of the game’ (Helmke and Levisky, 
2004), through which people addressed their livelihood difficulties within their social 
networks (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002). In this way, people can build on kinships, trust and 
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reciprocity to diversify their livelihood opportunity (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004: 
17).  
 
Taken together, the findings presented in this chapter mean that reforming artisanal 
mining cannot be restricted to ‘formalising’ the coltan market. Reforms often create 
exclusion and marginalise certain groups of people (Fischer, 2007). Thus, our findings 
show that future reforms should draw on existing patterns of livelihood diversification. 
This approach would serve to implement efficient programmes built upon such a 
diversification. In northern Katanga, where such programmes do not currently exist, there 
is a need for further empirically based analyses exploring which institutional structures 
can best support these kinds of programmes. 
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Abstract  
This chapter examines the phenomenon of smuggling coltan into and out of artisanal 
mining areas. In northern Katanga, the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), a policy 
on conflict minerals, is meant to improve transparency in the trade of tin, tantalum (coltan) 
and tungsten. Ongoing mining reforms include increased economic oversight of the 
activities of middlemen (négociants) throughout this supply chain. The chapter approaches 
smuggling from a sociology of economic life perspective, closely examining how and why 
artisanal miners and mine-based négociants helped smugglers in the trafficking of coltan. 
The findings indicate that the social networks in which artisanal miners and mine-based 
négociants are embedded perform a double function. These networks allow the miners, 
négociants and smugglers to maintain close relationships and to breach official 
regulations—as is often assumed—but miners and mine-based négociants also rely on the 
same networks in their dealings with the smugglers. This chapter concludes that, rather 
than considering coltan mining areas to be ‘enclaves of regulations’, understanding and 
addressing smuggling in both local and broader contexts calls for a comprehensive 
approach. 
1. Introduction  
 
‘Nowadays, smuggling coltan is like witchcraft110. One cannot engage in it with unknown 
persons’. (Interview excerpt with coltan smuggler, Kalemie, January 2014)  
 
In crisis and post-crisis situations, people display different responses to institutions and 
policies. Based on their own interests, they may make their own interpretations to 
accommodate, circumvent and/or protest these entities (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009; 
Colebatch, 2009; Mosse, 2004). While it sometimes refers to related deceptive practices, 
this chapter is primarily concerned with the smuggling of coltan. Although smuggling 
goods—especially minerals—has characterised the informal economic sector in DRC for 
decades (MacGaffey, 1991), this study revisits this phenomenon, viewing smuggling as 
an important primary response that circumvents the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative 
(iTSCi) policy that has been in place in northern Katanga since 2011. Revisiting this 
long-held practice of smuggling is very useful today to providing an in-depth and 
contextualised analysis of the ways in which policy on conflict minerals, like iTSCi, take 
place and face challenges in the eastern Congo.   
                                                 
110
 Witchcraft refers to malevolent practices of sorcery done secretly. See, for example, 
Geschiere, P. (2003). Witchcraft as the Dark Side of Kinship: Dilemmas of Social Security in 
New Contexts. KINSHIP (2003), 16(1):43–61. 
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The iTSCi Programme aligns with international policy on conflict-free minerals in 
eastern DRC. Since the onset of the 2000s, the international community has urged the 
DRC government to reform its mineral sector, which was said to encourage various types 
of ‘networks of conflict economies’ (Utas, 2012: 11), to sustain war by allowing armed 
actors to reap benefits from the mining business (Global Witness, 2009). 
In northern Katanga, iTSCi aims to curb the smuggling of tin, tungsten and, especially, 
tantalum (coltan) (collectively known as ‘3T’). Given that the mining business has 
supposedly been militarised (Global Witness, 2009), iTSCi’s main objective is to 
improve the transparency of the trade of coltan (iTSCi, 2011). In addition, coltan is a 
Congolese mineral that has often been linked to discussions of conflict minerals in media 
reports and advocacy campaigns conducted by nongovernmental organisations (Nest, 
2011: 105–159). Making the coltan trade more transparent would ‘make an important 
contribution to the evolution of better governance of the sector, including its trade’ 
(Spittaels, 2010: 62) and help artisanal miners and négociants to carry out their activities 
more safely and efficiently. Why, then, have these miners and mine-based négociants 
cooperated with coltan smugglers, undermining iTSCi’s primary objective? 
 
In addressing this question, this chapter draws on a sociology of economic life 
perspective, which understands economic action to be embedded in social networks 
(Granovetter, 2005; Swedberg, 1991). Based on 19 months of fieldwork conducted 
mainly at three artisanal mining sites in northern Katanga, the study analyses how social 
networks in which mineworkers and négociants participate facilitated smuggling and, 
more importantly, how these networks changed and adapted their strategies in response to 
iTSCi as an external policy intervention. Thus, the chapter builds on the argument that 
people adapt their strategies of negotiating policy outcomes while trying ‘to make policy 
fit their own perspectives of the problem and goals’ (Hilhorst, 2013: 8). 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next two sections discuss the theoretical 
framework and elaborate on the methods of data collection and analysis. We then briefly 
introduce the local and historical context of 3T mining and the coltan trade in northern 
Katanga. This is followed by an outline of the policy on smuggling. The next section 
discusses the modus operandi of miners and négociants in liaising with and deceiving the 
smugglers. This is followed by an explanation of how iTSCi addressed smuggling and its 
significance in the study area. The final section discusses the main outcomes of this 
chapter.  
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2. Theorising the informal economy and social networks  
 
The sociology of economic life school of thought builds on the assumption that economic 
action is linked to or depends on actions and institutions that are non-economic in 
content, goals and processes (Granovetter, 2005: 35). This theory is important for 
understanding how debates on the informal economy, of which smuggling is an integral 
part, have evolved in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The informal economy, consisting of ‘economic activities taking place outside the 
framework of the state’ (Meagher, 2010: 12) has been documented extensively in many 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa since the end of 1980s (MacGaffey, 1991). Several studies on 
the informal economy have investigated the smuggling of minerals specifically 
(Deardorff and Stopler, 1990; Hilson and Potter, 2003; Oomes and Vocke, 2003). 
Scholars have shown that the growth of an informal and ‘invisible economy’ (Meagher, 
2010: 6) allows people to respond to state failures in service provision. 
In the 1990s, social networks gained prominence in social science research. Working 
with this concept enables the tracing of informal organisational processes (Meagher, 
2010: 23), and it has since been used to examine smuggling (Meagher, 1990) and other 
forms of behaviour (including corruption) that violate the laws or regulations of the state. 
Many authors have argued that, in the absence of efficient economic markets, personal 
and trust relations between people—especially sellers and buyers—and their networks 
play a key role in economic life (Granovetter, 1985; Hart, 1988; Nordstrom, 2004; Titeca 
and De Herdt, 2010). 
Opinions differ on whether social networks are beneficial in the context of economic 
development. Some scholars have asserted that people use social bonds or support 
networks to access resources and to foster a ‘logic of self-protection’ (Vlassenroot et al., 
2016: 17). Other researchers have stressed that certain types of social networks are 
detrimental to economic development, arguing that these networks foster social liabilities 
and encourage predatory or criminal activities such as mafias, drug trafficking and 
smuggling (Bayart, 2000; Reno, 2000; Roitman, 2001). 
 
Smuggling and cheating behaviours can be approached in multiple ways in terms of how 
they are perceived by social actors. De Sardan (2015), for example, has argued that these 
practices have variable legitimacies. They can take place in hidden or open manner 
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‘without anyone taking offence at them’ (De Sardan, 2015: 26). In their seminal study on 
cross-border trade and practical norms in Uganda’s West Nile region, Titeca and De 
Herdt (2010: 582), referred to a kind of ‘moral economy of smuggling’ that is strongly 
legitimate in the eyes of the local populations in reaction to the abandonment of the 
region by the central state. Kibreab (2004), in his study on cheating behaviours among 
refugees in the Horn of Africa, found that refugees had a double moral standard, in which 
cheating that was normally considered dishonest was acceptable when it concerned aid 
institutions. 
 
The above literature points to various types of networks, created in different contexts and 
for diverse ends, including for the purpose of smuggling. Although it does not do much to 
explain how smuggling networks may adapt and change their strategies in response to an 
external intervention (such as a policy), there has been significant interest in analysing 
how smuggling practices breach ‘formal regulations’, predominantly those of the state or 
those set by ‘formal’ institutions such as aid agencies (e.g. Kibreab, 2004). The present 
study will show that miners and négociants used social networks both for breaching 
‘formal’ iTSCi regulations and in their dealings with ‘informal’ smugglers. 
In this chapter, using an approach grounded in the sociology of economic life to 
investigate coltan smuggling was useful in two ways. First, this perspective facilitates the 
analysis of the details of why and how networks are structured around specific social 
actors and which noneconomic factors help these networks to emerge and persist. 
Second, this perspective is useful for situating smuggling and cheating practices around 
coltan in the local context, examining the meaning of these practices for the people 
involved. 
Analytically, this chapter aligns with the concept of ‘networks of conflict economies’, 
coined by Utas (2012). In his study on African conflicts and trans-border networks, Utas 
argued that these networks are very wide, ranging over neighbourhoods and cities, into 
the rural, and over the national and transnational. They frequently, but not always, range 
into the clandestine, if not illicit (Utas, 2012: 11). He described trans-border networks as 
groups of actors connected for economic, political or war agendas, and as complex, 
dispersed over geographical space, operating under the control of ‘big men’ and based on 
‘social relations’ (Utas, 2012: 8). 
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Although Utas mainly studied trans-border dynamics, his concept of networks of conflict 
economies was useful for the present study. In addition to looking at networks ‘from an 
actor-centred perspective’ (Utas, 2012: 11), his approach tallies with the sociology of 
economic life approach, which focuses on analysing economic activities as cultural, 
contextual and political phenomena rather than being purely based on rational actors’ 
economic decisions (Beckert, 2007; Granovetter, 1985). Additionally, it is interesting to 
explore how networks around coltan smuggling have adapted to iTSCi. This is very 
important given that networks are not static, stable or monolithic and can operate at 
different levels of society (i.e. local, provincial, national, regional and international) 
(Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015; Twijnstra et al., 2014; Taylor, 2003). 
  
Utas (2012: 13–14) identified four factors to consider when studying networks of conflict 
economies: i) the degree of power that individual ‘big men’ invest and the resources they 
possess; ii) the clandestine and unstable character of networks, which can make them 
efficient, flexible and adaptable to new functions; iii) the fact that networks cut across 
social and economic groups, as well as geographies; and iv) that these networks may also 
involve ‘criminal actors’. 
In this chapter, we discuss only the second and third of these factors: adaptation of 
networks and the fact they cut across social and economic groups. Discussing these two 
factors sheds light on the contribution of this chapter to the sociology of economic life 
literature. Our findings demonstrate that miners and négociants changed and adapted 
their smuggling strategies in response to iTSCi. However, contrary to Utas’ argument, 
these networks were not only under the control of ‘big men’ or ‘criminal actors’ but also 
involved less powerful actors, such as ordinary miners. 
3. Methods 
 
This chapter draws on qualitative fieldwork undertaken from June 2013 to March 2014 
and continued in early 2015. This work followed a multi-sited ethnographic approach 
(Marcus, 1995) and was conducted in northern Katanga (Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-
Baridi mines), in the city of Kalemie, and in South Kivu in the cities of Uvira and Misisi. 
The data were collected mainly through observing how mineworkers extracted coltan, 
processed and sold it to négociants. Also, the first author held in-depth individual 
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interviews, group interviews and informal conversations with miners, négociants and 
‘clandestine négociants’ (smugglers) of coltan (known as ‘hiboux’111—literally, owls). 
 
Gathering reliable data on smuggling is often difficult, given the lack of data on this 
practice, corruption and the concealing of information on it. Heemskerk (2005: 84) has 
contended that, ‘because of their lack of confidence in the good intentions of the 
government and researchers, miners may not reveal that they sell their product outside 
legal channels, and violate other regulations’. For this reason, gaining trust and collecting 
accurate empirical data among this population required a multifaceted approach (Ellis and 
MacGaffey, 1996: 25) and a long-term period of fieldwork in mining areas, urban 
locations and areas where clandestine négociants travelled.  
 
The first author collected data on smuggling practices through in-depth interviews with 
nearly 300 artisanal miners and 21 négociants, as well as informal conversations with 
these individuals during regular visits to the studied mining areas. Marcus (1995: 106–
108) has proposed that, when doing multi-sited ethnography, one may be ‘following 
people and things’. In line with this approach, the first author followed 11 clandestine 
négociants of coltan (hiboux) in various locations. However, this could not be carried out 
easily. Smuggling is characterised by great secrecy. Other challenges related to the 
geographical space this study covered and how dispersed these individuals were across 
this space. Additionally, as has been noted in related studies (Titeca and De Herdt, 2010: 
574), interviewing people such as hiboux regarding their activities can put researchers in 
the position of dealing with hidden and very sensitive issues such as bribes. When 
seeking such data, the first author repeatedly explained to the research participants about 
the type of questions he was going to ask (Kumar, 2005: 213), promised to maintain 
confidentially and to protect their privacy, and assured the participants that the data were 
being collected for academic purposes. The data were not shared with any third party. 
 
With the help of local research assistants, the first author first identified and contacted 
hiboux in Uvira, Misisi and Kalemie. Prior to iTSCi, these people had traded coltan in 
northern Katanga and were based in these cities, located roughly 180–250 km from the 
coltan mines. These hiboux were then asked whether they still had activities or ‘contact 
                                                 
111
 Earlier, this term was used in the province of North Kivu to refer to miners who were, 
according to Pole Institute (2010: 15), ‘experts in detecting and extracting cassiterite (tin)’. 
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persons’ (antennes) in the mining areas and if they could refer the first author to them. 
After explaining the research objectives, meeting with these hiboux on multiple 
occasions, and probably aided by the fact that many of these négociants were from South 
Kivu, the first author’s native province, he progressively gained their consent and trust to 
gather information on their activities, and they began to provide crucial data in a 
forthright manner. Of 16 former négociants initially met in Uvira and Misisi, 11 agreed to 
provide information on their antennes among which 9 were based in the coltan mines and 
2 in Kalemie. Once there, the first author searched for these people and conducted 
multiple interviews with them. He then cross-checked the data by alternating between 
them and the initial hiboux based in Uvira and Misisi.  
 
Other interviewees included 5 iTSCi field staff in Nyunzu and Kalemie; 7 civil servants 
in the division des mines (mining service) and 12 of intelligence agencies, such as the 
National Intelligence Agency (ANR) and Détection d’Activités Militaires Anti-Patrie 
(DEMIAP); inspectors of investigation in the division des mines in northern Katanga and 
the mining police (Police des Mines et Hydraucarbures, PMH). Many civil servants 
worked in mining areas, along trading routes used by the hiboux or in urban areas hosting 
coltan black markets. 
 
4. Local context of 3T mining and the coltan trade  
 
As was noted earlier (see Chapter 2), in northern Katanga, 3T mining—especially tin—
began in 1932, during the colonial era. Until 1960, Géomines was the sole industrial 
company established in Manono territory (central part of Katanga). After the Belgian 
Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) gained independence in 1960, 
Congo-Etain (renamed Zaire-Etain in 1973) replaced Géomines until 1995, when it 
ceased operations (De Koning, 2011). In 2007, several deposits of coltan were also 
discovered in Manono, Kalemie and Nyunzu territories. In December 2014, the Kalemie 
office of division des mines estimated that there were a total of almost 6,000 artisanal 
miners working in Nyunzu and Kalemie.
112
 Among these miners, around 2,390 extracted 
coltan in eight mining sites (iTSCi-Katanga mining list/8 April 2013).  
After 2007, the coltan trade became predominantly informal and opaque. Many coltan 
négociants originated from North Kivu and South Kivu. Through various intermediaries, 
                                                 
112
 Interview with Boniface Kyungu, chief office of the division des mines, Kalemie, June 2013. 
  
151 
they transported their parcels of the mineral by air, roads or boats to the cities of Uvira, 
Bukavu and Goma. At that time, their activities were closely interwoven with a web of 
cartels and various traders who engaged in smuggling minerals, an activity that has deep 
historical roots in DRC in general (MacGaffey, 1991) and in northern Katanga and South 
Kivu (Spittaels, 2010: 17). 
5. Policing smuggling and the trade of coltan 
 
5.1. iTSCi within a regional smuggling framework 
 
Although it was designed by the mining industry, iTSCi is part of a regional 
governmental framework aimed at curbing contraband minerals in the African Great 
Lakes region, especially in eastern DRC. This framework aligns with the conflict-free 
mineral policy narrative, following the idea that Congolese minerals are controlled by 
criminal cross-border networks (Tailor, 2003) and finance violent conflicts (Autesserre, 
2012). However, some négociants—in North Kivu, for example—continue to sell 
minerals illegally (UN, 2015: 35). To improve the security situation in eastern DRC and 
to contribute to state-building, improved transparency in trading 3T (and gold) is 
expected to cut the assumed ties between mining, violent conflicts and the involvement of 
warmongers in the mining business (Vogel and Radley, 2015).  
 
In pursuit of this aim, efforts to address mineral smuggling have been implemented at the 
regional and domestic levels. This first took shape in Lusaka on 15 December 2010, 
when 11 presidents of member states of the International Conference of the Great Lakes 
Region (ICGLR) signed the Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to Fight 
Illegal exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region. In November 2013, 
the ICGLR created a regional anti-fraud committee. Recently, a first meeting of this 
committee was held in Kinshasa on 17–18 April 2015, gathering ICGLR’s state agencies 
in charge of dealing with fraud and mineral contraband across the member countries. 
Additionally, on 20 October 2010, DRC’s government created a national commission 
against mineral contraband.
113
 iTSCi has also been expanded to countries neighbouring 
DRC, namely Rwanda (June 2011) and Burundi (May 2014). 
 
 
                                                 
113
 Decrees № 0719/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2010 and № 140/CAB.MIN/INT.SEC/2010. 
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5.2. Anti-smuggling provincial measures  
 
In Katanga and South Kivu, addressing smuggling has been an official priority of the 
provincial governments since the end of 2009. In October 2009, the governor of Katanga, 
Moise Katumbi Chapwe, raised administrative charges to 5 USD per kg on the transit of 
cassiterite and its by-products, including coltan, from Katanga province to any other 
province. This measure aimed to control contraband minerals, to increase taxes from 
mining to the provincial capital of Lubumbashi, while also stressing the ‘peaceful 
character’ of Katanga province (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015: 155). Similarly, on 15 
August 2013, Marcellin Chishambo, the governor of South Kivu, raised the frais 
rémunératoires, a tax paid by licensed négociants, from 0.20 USD per kg to 3 USD per 
kg of coltan and from 0.01 USD to 0.50 USD per kg of tin (decree № 13/030/GP/SK). 
Although it was also intended to control contraband minerals, the main purpose of this 
measure was to increase provincial tax revenues from mining. 
 
Because of the above measures, combined with additional factors, including a ban on 
mining activities in the North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema in 2010 and 2011 (Geenen, 
2012) and the prominent role of the Katangese policy network (Diemel and Cuvelier, 
2015: 154), iTSCi has been the most concrete initiative implemented in 3T mines and has 
addressed smuggling since 2011. By the end of 2014, iTSCi was being put into action in 
471 mining sites in eastern DRC, including 232 located in Katanga.
114
 As a result, iTSCi 
has made a huge contribution to improving the 3T trade in terms of stimulating the export 
of minerals. From 2011 to 2013, 1,000.53 tonnes of coltan and 15,561.99 tonnes of tin 
were exported from Katanga (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015: 158). In 2014, Kisengo alone 
produced 284 tonnes officially exported in Kalemie by Mining Mineral Resources 
(MMR), a trading house that has been established in the area since 2010.
115
 
  
5.3. Trading coltan under iTSCi 
 
By April 2011, iTSCi had transformed coltan mining areas from relatively free spaces for 
business into what can be seen as enclaves of regulations. ‘Regulations’ here, refer 
specifically to ‘procedures and organizational structures’ (De Sardan, 2015: 1) of the 
coltan market set up by iTSCi. Practically, iTSCi worked hand in hand with trading 
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 iTSCi general overview, 9
th
 OECD meeting, Paris, May 2015. 
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 Report of the division des mines, Kisengo, January 2015. 
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houses (such as MMR) and mining cooperatives (see Chapter 3). Although these entities 
had entitlements over 3T mines, they could only purchase coltan under iTSCi regulations. 
iTSCi field staff divided each mining area into sectors, subsectors and sites composed of 
several tunnels, allowing them to establish selling points (postes d’achat) within each 
site. No minerals from another site could enter into a site or be traded there. iTSCi field 
staff monitored, on a daily or weekly basis, the sale of coltan under iTSCi’s ‘tagging and 
bagging’ system. They also helped civil servants in the division des mines to record 
mineral statistics. All of these measures were meant to break up the existing networks of 
the informal coltan trade. However, in spite of the measures, miners and mine-based 
négociants collaborated with the hiboux. 
 
6. Smuggling coltan: practices, actors and significance  
 
Utas (2012: 13) has argued that, given their clandestine and unstable character, networks 
of conflict economies become efficient and flexible and may adapt new functions. The 
present examination of the use of fake minerals and the smuggling of coltan is highly 
relevant, because these were also the most reported practices in other 3T mining areas. 
Following Utas, we pay special attention to explaining how these practices, as well as the 
actors and networks involved, adapted to iTSCi regulations. 
 
6.1. Vragage 
Examining the practice known as vragage, it becomes clear that the belief that the coltan 
business can be perfectly ‘cleaned’ is based on wishful thinking. Etymologically, vragage 
comes from vrac, a French term literally meaning something left in a jumble. Similarly, 
miners and négociants used the term vrages to refer to fake minerals, worthless stones 
(sometimes called fausses matières or faibles matières), and the by-products of coltan or 
similar minerals, such as tin, which were often used for cheating or smuggling. 
Basically, the vrages were found only in certain places. They entered into the coltan 
mining areas through two main sources. First, the hiboux transported vrages from often 
remote 3T mines, mostly those where iTSCi was not yet implemented or had been 
suspended. In collaboration with drivers or local motorbike transporters, the hiboux 
concealed parcels of vrages on commercial trucks, in the reservoirs of motorbikes, in oil 
drums, and in sacks of charcoal and maize that were brought into coltan mining areas. 
Second, vrages came from the maman muturuse, a group of women who processed coltan 
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before it was sold by mineworkers at the selling points. After heating the coltan, the 
maman muturuse separated the genuine coltan from the by-products. The latter were 
rarely thrown away, leading people to believe that mineworkers and négociants used 
them afterwards as vrages.  
Selling vrages was cleverly organised. This process took place in private houses or in the 
bush rather than at iTSCi selling points. Many hiboux had local clients—predominantly 
miners or mine-based négociants. They were not chosen by happenstance. During many 
informal conversations with the hiboux who had been established in Kalemie since 2011, 
they noted that their clients were not only linked through economic relationships. Rather, 
their ties were, in one way or another, kinship- and/or trust-based (Hart, 1988)
116
. 
These clients fulfilled various tasks and used the vrages for diverse ends. They were able 
to inform the hiboux about the evolution of mining activities, the current coltan prices and 
the local security situation—for instance, the places where the mining police had erected 
checkpoints. Clients purchased vrages themselves and also helped the hiboux to sell them 
to other mineworkers or to mine-based négociants. In the second half of 2013, one kg of 
vrage cost around 15 USD in Kisengo and Kahendwa, approximately half the price of 
genuine coltan set by the Cooperative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC) and the 
Cooperative Minière Maendeleo, which was 40 USD in Kisengo and 28.80 USD in 
Kahendwa. 
Vrages were also used for mineral-producing ends and coltan trade. Mineworkers 
introduced vrages into their tunnels (chantiers) during the production phase. They mixed 
these vrages with the mineral sand found there to inflate the site’s productive potential. 
Mineworkers also mixed vrages with the coltan sold to négociants. In addition, sous-
couverts (lower-level mineral buyers often appointed by négociants at selling points 
mostly on the basis of trust relationships) used vrages to augment the quantity of minerals 
purchased and introduced these vrages in the purchases of négociants. This implies that 
négociants also used vrages before they handed over their parcels of minerals to the 
cooperatives. Even though the vragage was prohibited by iTSCi, none of the informants 
in this study denounced it.  
Three explanations may account for why vragage took place. First, this practice stemmed 
from the local organisation of the coltan market, which provided strong incentives for 
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cheating and price evasion because of the monopoly of certain actors like MMR. Also, 
given the limited production of coltan, the largest coltan trading house and cooperative—
MMR and CDMC—did not purchase tin in Nyunzu and Kalemie.Consequently, tin was 
mostly used as a vrage in these territories. Additionally, iTSCi was the only reform 
initiative implemented in the area, and mining activity continued in those areas where 
iTSCi did not expand or was halted, as it was in Kilunga.
117
 However, mineworkers in 
these areas had no one to sell to unless their mineral or their vrages were purchased by 
hiboux who were capable of marketing them elsewhere. 
Second, cheating and the smuggling of vrages resulted from the management politics of 
most trading houses and cooperatives. As mentioned above, there were significant 
variations in the prices set for coltan between and within the mining areas, depending on 
the concentration of tantalum. For instance, in late 2013, the price variation between 
Kisengo and Kahendwa approached 30%, pushing many mineworkers, local négociants 
and hiboux to search for promising market opportunities in Kisengo or elsewhere. The 
third explanatory factor for the use of vrages is their role as a source of income. Many 
négociants interviewed reported that mixing 10 kg of genuine coltan with 1.5 kg of tin or 
other fausses matières raised négociants’ income from 288.80 to 331.20 USD.118  
6.2. Hiboux 
The relatively uncontrolled nature of the coltan trade can also be seen when looking at the 
smuggling activities of the hiboux. These clandestine négociants either operated through 
local antennes or moved to coltan mining areas from other mining areas, urban cities or 
other provinces (e.g. from South Kivu to northern Katanga). Of the 11 hiboux followed in 
the present study, nine operated through antennes who were their close relatives. The 
other antennes were people with whom the hiboux had collaborated for years. Given the 
hiboux’s mobility, scattering throughout the study area and local connections, it was 
difficult to estimate how many hiboux there were, or how and when they formed their 
networks. Utas (2012: 10) has argued that networks of conflict economies are important 
to analyse but hard to pin down with precision. At the end of 2013, the Kisengo police 
station estimated that around 21 hiboux were smuggling coltan in Kisengo alone.
119
 
                                                 
117
 iTSCi was not implemented in all areas, because certain mines were less productive or the 
coltan produced there had a poor concentration of tantalum. 
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 Négociants in Mai-Baridi, Kahendwa and Kisengo, December 2013 and June 2014. 
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 Interviews with police chief and ANR staff members, Kisengo April 2014.  
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Although the trading houses, cooperatives, state agencies and mining police treated 
hiboux as illegal mineral buyers, the hiboux regularly visited coltan mines and their 
adjoining villages. Mine-based négociants of Kisengo and Mai-Baridi who worked for 
CDMC made the following comment that when they saw some faces of people known as 
hiboux coming to the mines, they guessed that coltan prices have increasing somewhere 
120
. In addition, four hiboux noted that they often visited Kisengo and Kahendwa. Once 
there, they would hide to avoid being seen, but they knew people to talk to in order to buy 
coltan.
121
 
Together, the above statements convey two interesting elements. First, coltan mining 
areas were not virgin territory for many hiboux, suggesting that locally based négociants, 
their antennes and hiboux seemed to know each other. They not only had economic 
exchanges but were also embedded in ‘networks of social relations’ (Granovetter, 1985: 
490). Such social relations between traders were earlier documented in DRC. In their 
study on trade networks between Congo and Paris, MacGaffey and Basenguissa (2000: 
16) showed that networks are more than economic transactions and emerge when people 
have long-term and recurrent relations. 
Both in and out of the mines, the hiboux were involved in two types of activities. As was 
discussed in the previous section, they first marketed vrages. They also smuggled coltan. 
This was ‘untagged’ and escaped iTSCi regulations. During their purchases, the hiboux 
outstripped the prices set by trading houses and cooperatives as a means of attracting 
clients. As an example, in October 2013, when the current price of coltan was 28.80 USD 
per kg in Kisengo, hiboux offered to purchase it for 35.50 USD per kg.
122
 This variation 
led mineworkers to wonder ‘why do hiboux never experience bankruptcy?’123 This 
question implies that, although they cooperated with them, many mineworkers also 
believed that the hiboux were better off and, to some extent, suspected them of reaping 
higher benefits from smuggling than the income these mineworkers earned. 
Coltan smuggling also flourished because of variations between prices set in mining areas 
and those found in the black markets of northern Katanga and South Kivu. In February 
2014, 1 kg of coltan cost 37.50 USD in Bukavu, 44 USD in Uvira and 34 USD in 
Kalemie. Each of these prices exceeded that set in the mines, which ranged from 28.80 to 
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 Interviews with négociants, Kisengo, November 2013. 
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 Interviews with hiboux, Uvira and Kalemie, May and October 2013. 
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 Informal conversations with miners at Matongo (Kisengo), October 2013.  
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 Group interview with miners at Matongo (Kisengo), June 2013. 
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40 USD.
124
 Price variations contribute to flourishing black markets, feed ‘broader 
patterns relating to cross-border smuggling’ (IPIS, 2012: 35) and sustain shadowy 
commercial networks characteristic of the Great Lakes Region economy (Taylor, 2003; 
Vlassenroot and Perrot, 2012). In Uvira, many hiboux said on several occasions that they 
travelled to Bujumbura for ‘business’,125 implying that they also traded minerals, 
especially coltan at higher prices than in northern Katanga and South Kivu. 
The hiboux used various means to transport smuggled coltan out of the mining areas. 
According to inspectors at the division des mines in Kalemie and civil servants at ANR in 
Misisi and Uvira,
126
 hiboux used either commercial trucks or motorbikes and conveyed 
their parcels mostly by road to Kalemie or via Misisi to Uvira or Bukavu. Some parcels 
were transported to Uvira by boat from Kalemie. Regardless of the itinerary, the parcels 
were sometimes broken down into small packages and then transported at various 
intervals. 
Finally, the hiboux negotiated their passage with civil servants in the areas where they 
travelled. When, on 16 February 2014, the first author asked whether they feared being 
arrested, many hiboux interviewed in Uvira remarked, ‘Tunajua kuongea na batu [We 
know how to talk to people]’. The hiboux reported that they bought off some civil 
servants in the areas where they travelled or obtained official but often fake documents 
from civil servants. These documents allowed them to transport coltan under the name of 
tin to evade certain taxes and to conceal its value and origin. Clearly, the hiboux were 
experienced in negotiating with the civil servants appointed to curb the trade of 
contraband coltan. Similarly, in their study on taxation at a border crossing between 
South Sudan and Northern Uganda, Twinjsra et al. (2014) found that norms and rules 
were constantly negotiated between traders and state officials. 
6.3. Cheating in dealings with the hiboux: a ‘weapon of the weak’? 
 
Cheating and smuggling practices were not used only to breach iTSCi regulations. They 
were also used against the hiboux themselves. In coltan mines, many hiboux operated 
within a web of actors. They had antennes to recruit other mineworkers and mine-based 
négociants or sous-couverts to purchase vrages or to allow them to smuggle coltan. These 
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 In December 2014, the price in Kisengo went down to 22 USD. 
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 Several interviews with hiboux, and ANR and DEMIAP staff members, Uvira, November 
2013.  
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 Several interviews, Kalemie, November 2013. 
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actors and their social networks formed what can be seen as close social cartels based 
predominantly on kinship, friendship or other trust-based relations that allowed them to 
develop and maintain their economic transactions. Locally, there were therefore many 
different cartels. This may explain why cases of condemning misconduct related to 
vragage or smuggling coltan rarely occurred in the study area.  
Importantly, smuggling was a two-way street. Within the cartels, miners and mine-based 
négociants also duped the hiboux. Instead of selling them genuine coltan, they also sold 
them vrages or other kinds of fausses matières. 
In the eyes of the miners and the local négociants, many hiboux were well off. They were 
convinced that the hiboux had the opportunity to sell coltan smuggled at better prices, 
were richer than they were and were exploiting them. Miners and local négociants often 
said that the Hiboux, na Muhindi, bote ni bamwizi tu [meaning that hiboux and expatriate 
staff of MMR, predominantly from India,
127
 who were working for the company, were all 
stealing from them]
128
. These words suggest that, although their objectives were not the 
same, mineworkers and négociants often viewed hiboux and MMR staff as similar 
groups. At the same time, although social networks were useful, relationships between 
mineworkers, négociants and hiboux were of subtle ‘conniving trust’. Although they 
could cooperate with the hiboux, miners and négociants were also able to deceive them. 
Cheating against the hiboux was not perceived to be a bad behaviour. Instead, the miners 
and négociants viewed this as an act of resistance against a group of hiboux who exerted 
control over the coltan black market and were probably exploiting them. This is better 
illustrated in the following account. 
 
In Kalemie and Uvira, the first author met, on several occasions, four hiboux to whom 
mineworkers and mine-based négociants had sold vrages (fausses matières). These 
hiboux said that this happened regularly. The first author then asked them whether, 
despite being deceived in this way, the hiboux planned to travel to the mines and were 
willing to continue their ‘clandestine’ trade. The hiboux confirmed their intention to 
continue going to the mining areas and to maintain collaboration with their antennes. 
Additionally, they said that they knew the mineworkers and négociants who had deceived 
them and were convinced that these persons would provide them with an in-kind 
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 Group interviews, Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi, June 2013 and February 2014.  
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reimbursement in the form of genuine coltan. Later, interviewed hiboux explained that, 
unless the deceivers left the mining areas, their antennes were responsible for convincing 
them to provide this reimbursement. However, and more importantly, the hiboux 
emphasised that those deceivers agreed to provide this reimbursement only after being 
convinced that the hiboux would purchase coltan at higher prices than before during their 
next visit to the mines.
129
 This shows that the social networks in which mineworkers and 
mine-based négociants participated played a key role in this ‘economy of cheating’ 
against the smugglers. 
6.4. Significance of smuggling 
Hilson and Potter (2003: 241) have pointed out that illegal mineral sales are most 
rampant in contexts where governmental or policy control of the mineral sector tends to 
be excessive. The smuggling practices described above and the following sequence of 
events provide evidence of this tendency. 
Although iTSCi contributed significantly to tracing the flow of coltan, cases involving 
smuggling were found. Some of these cases occurred outside of mining areas, making it 
difficult for iTSCi to address them. For instance, on 16 August 2013, 1,400 kg of coltan 
kept by Minserve, a mineral trading house with its head office in Kalemie disappeared 
from its depot. According to an interview at the chief office of the division des mines in 
Kalemie in December 2013, the hiboux were allegedly involved in the theft. Despite a 
commission of inquiry initiated by the Kalemie prosecutor (parquet de grande 
instance’/№ RI/991/Pr/KIT), the destination of the stolen coltan remained unknown at the 
time of this interview. 
Additional cases involving smuggling were also reported. It is difficult to estimate the 
total amount of vrages in circulation. However, in 2013, the Kisengo police station, for 
example, intercepted approximately 775 kg of vrages
130
 brought into Kisengo at 
checkpoints. In the same year, they also intercepted 965.3 kg of smuggled coltan.
131
 
According to one iTSCi field staff member, five cases of smuggling were reported in 
Kahendwa from February to September 2013.
132
 Meanwhile, many sources mentioned 
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that approximately 6,400 kg of smuggled coltan reached Uvira via Misisi that year.
133
 In 
2015, the provincial office of the National Commission against Mineral Contraband 
(Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Fraude Minière) reported that 60 tonnes of 
smuggled tin, tungsten and coltan were intercepted in Bukavu in 2015 (Radio Okapi, 18 
February 2016). Although one cannot conclude that all of these parcels originated from 
the northern Katangese region given the historical coltan production in North and South 
Kivu (De Failly, 2001), scrutinising their tantalum concentration led many civil servants 
in the mining service in Uvira to believe that many of these parcels did originate from 
northern Katanga.
134
 
7. Addressing smuggling 
 
By 2011, iTSCi had made significant strides towards addressing smuggling. First, iTSCi 
field staff monitored the ‘tagging and bagging’ of coltan. They also completed ‘incident 
reports’ related to four categories of practices: i) cases of smuggling and issues related to 
‘tagging and bagging’, for instance mistakes in data recording; the loss, damage and 
disappearance of tags; or recording higher than accurate weights for parcels of coltan; ii) 
acts of corruption; iii) acts of harassment, such as illegal taxes; and iv) acts of insecurity 
and human rights abuses committed against miners, négociants or other people by any 
entity in a position of authority. 
 
‘Incidents’ involving smuggling were repeatedly reported. However, these reports were 
‘confidential’ and kept secret. In the eyes of iTSCi field staff members, this secrecy 
prevented them from confronting with people who were directly or indirectly involved or 
suspected to have caused these ‘incidents’. In 2013, the Nyunzu-based iTSCi field 
coordination office completed approximately 20 incident reports monthly, of which five 
to seven concerned smuggling. In 2014, reports on smuggling were only four.
135
  
 
Reporting and addressing ‘incidents’, including those involving smuggling, were found to 
follow three procedures. Reports were first sent to iTSCi senior staff members in Kalemie 
or Lubumbashi. Then, these senior staff members contacted and eventually called in state 
officials or senior staff members of the mining cooperatives and trading houses, asking 
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 Interviews with the chief office of the mining service and agents of DEMIAP and ANR in 
Misisi and Uvira, November 2013 and February 2014. 
134
 Group interview with civil servants at the division des mines, Uvira, September 2013.  
135
 Interviews with the iTSCi coordinator and field staff members, Nyunzu, June 2014.  
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them to address those ‘incidents’ in which their staff members were allegedly involved in 
cooperating, for instance, with hiboux, dishonest mineworkers or mine-based négociants. 
The senior staff could then suspend them, warn them or terminate their employment. 
 
Smuggling was also addressed during meetings of the follow-up committees (Comité 
Local de Suivi, CLS), which were created at the instigation of iTSCi. Gathering staff 
members from iTSCi, the trading houses and cooperatives, together with miners’ 
representatives, négociants and state officials, the CLS were held on a monthly basis in 
either Nyunzu or Kalemie. However, CLS meetings were often delayed for financial 
reasons or because many participants were unavailable. Many CLS participants reported 
that, during the meetings, people or entities incriminated in smuggling coltan were often 
absent or felt offended when cases of smuggling involving their staff were publicly 
discussed
136
. This suggests that, although people participated in CLS meetings, the 
agenda of these meetings could be sabotaged. 
 
Addressing smuggling also aligned with legal requirements. According to Congolese 
Mining Law (Art. 300-303), smugglers are to be arrested, the smuggled and intercepted 
minerals are to be sold, and the amount earned is to be deposited into a national treasury 
bank account. In Nyunzu and Kalemie, no cases were documented in which the 
smugglers were arrested. Rather, public prosecutors’ departments seized parcels of coltan 
and sold them to trading houses, which ‘tagged and bagged’ them according to the iTSCi 
system. However, the profits from these sales were embezzled by the representatives of 
the public prosecutors’ departments.137  
 
Overall, iTSCi has clearly been an important whistleblowing mechanism to counteract 
smuggling. As was described earlier in this chapter, it yielded positive outcomes in terms 
of tracing the flow of coltan. However, in the view of some local actors (namely, miners, 
mine-based négociants, civil servants and staff members of cooperatives and trading 
houses), iTSCi field staff members’ work had an accusing character because they 
reported and denounced smuggling of coltan or any other illegal practice regarding the  
trade of coltan. Some négociants established in Mai-Baridi and Kisengo since 2010 who 
worked for CDMC lamented that iTSCi field staff members are so fast to accuse them. 
                                                 
136
 Expert interviews with iTSCi staff members, Kalemie/Nyunzu, July 2013.  
137
 Interviews with civil servants at the division des mines, Kalemie and Nyunzu, July 2013.  
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Thus, if the négociants inform them about everything they did, their reports threaten to 
cause them to be fired from CDMC, making the négociants jobless.
138
 
Hence, iTSCi was not perceived in a positive way, especially in terms of addressing 
smuggling. The sentiment expressed by négociants above also reveals fears about the 
consequences of total transparency in fully embracing the iTSCi system. This also 
confirms that policy and humanitarian and development interventions can generate 
unintended outcomes. Their rules, norms and principles are interpreted through 
interactions among various social actors (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009; Dijkzeul and 
Wakenge, 2010; Hyden, 2008). 
8. Discussion and conclusions  
This chapter has elucidated the process of smuggling coltan in northern Katanga, the 
roles of the key actors involved and the effects of measures mainly the iTSCi that have 
been taken to stop these illegal practices. In coltan mines of northern Katanga, iTSCi 
basically aimed to improve the transparency and oversight of the coltan trade. In this 
way, it intended to address the smuggling of coltan. As part of a regional conflict-free 
mineral policy, beyond iTSCi, there was an assumption that its activities could contribute 
to Congolese state-building. 
However, following the view that people have different responses to policy, the chapter 
considered smuggling as a primary case of responses circumventing iTSCi policy. 
Drawing on a sociology of economic life approach, which relies on the idea that 
economic action is embedded in social networks (Beckert, 2007: 9), the chapter analysed 
the procedures followed by artisanal miners, négociants and their social networks 
operating in coltan mining areas and between the Congolese regions of northern Katanga 
and South Kivu. 
Our key findings show that iTSCi technically organised the sale of coltan. It set out a 
number of regulations and involved official entities (trading houses and cooperatives) in 
purchasing coltan at the mine level. It also established official selling points where coltan 
was ‘tagged and bagged’. All of these procedures brought a great deal of clarity to an 
opaque situation where, prior to iTSCi implementation, a plethora of informal actors 
intervened in the coltan trade. 
                                                 
138
 Interviews with négociants, Mai-Baridi and Kisengo, February 2014. 
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For iTSCi, addressing smuggling meant breaking up pre-existing informal trade 
networks. However, our findings indicate that these networks were maintained by 
mineworkers and mine-based négociants and adapted the iTSCi regulations. Although 
iTSCi addressed smuggling through various mechanisms, including ‘tagging and 
bagging’ minerals, follow-up committees and reporting ‘incidents’, these procedures 
overlooked the social networks in which the mineworkers and négociants were 
embedded. In addition to iTSCi, the coltan trade was structured around a web of actors 
and networks. These included mineworkers, négociants, local traders, antennes of the 
hiboux, and sous-couverts. All of these actors were, in one way or another, connected to 
the hiboux or helped them to operate in mining areas. These networks were 
predominantly based on personal and trust relations, which highlights the importance of a 
socialised conception of human action in economic transactions (Granovetter and 
Swedberg, 1992). 
The present study reveals that the use of social networks was beneficial for mineworkers 
and négociants. Given that coltan prices varied in the mining sites, the politics of price 
fixing by trading houses and cooperatives differed and the fact that there were variations 
in coltan purchase prices between the northern Katanga and South Kivu, all these 
situations provided strong economic incentives for cheating and smuggling. Meanwhile, 
social networks of mineworkers and négociants served to maintain an opaque circuit 
around coltan trafficking, as the operations of vragage, for instance, illustrated. In fact, 
the vragage was condoned by all the participants involved in it. This attitude resembles to 
what De Sardan (2015: 27) has observed when researching on practical norms in Africa 
and beyond, arguing that people involved in practices like ‘illegal’ payments view these 
as ‘small cheats that are part of the game’. In northern Katanga, the organisation of social 
networks leads us to conclude that economic life was socially embedded in and worked 
through these networks (Hilhorst et al., 2017). Disregarding this social embeddedness 
explains why iTSCi faced challenges. 
Thus, the operations of social networks explains why smuggling continued. Smuggling 
breached and hampered the iTSCi regulations. Importantly, this study has shown that 
social networks also served miners and mine-based négociants seeking to cheat the 
hiboux. Cheating smugglers is often hidden and underreported in many studies on 
smuggling. Smuggling is also likely to undermine state effectiveness, as was illustrated 
by the significance of coltan smuggling and the involvement of civil servants in 
facilitating the hiboux smuggling operations. The potential of smuggling activities 
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undertaken by state and non-state actors—e.g. armed groups—to trigger further ‘conflict 
minerals’ requires further investigation. 
Utas (2012) has described networks of conflict economies as being shaped by instability 
and evolving in a clandestine way, making them flexible, adaptable and under the control 
of ‘big men’. The findings of the present study indicate that these features cannot be 
restricted to conflict settings alone. Rather, these findings suggest that many of these 
characteristics can also be found in post-conflict economies such as northern Katanga, 
where the networks formed around hiboux (who may be seen as ‘big men’) were very 
flexible in adapting their smuggling activities. However, this was not a role filled by the 
hiboux alone. Ordinary miners, who may be seen as ‘less powerful’ actors, were also 
involved in these activities. In her seminal research on the gold trade in Kamituga (South 
Kivu), Geenen (2011a: 433) described similar cheating practice like the vragage after 
finding that the ‘commission agents’ of gold sellers generated additional profits by 
buying quantities of gold to sell elsewhere or by using their manual balance to cheat 
when weighing the gold. 
Finally, the present study has shown the interconnectedness between mining areas and the 
wider context of iTSCi policy. The level of organisation of the hiboux and the complex 
nature of their activities in this context indicate the existence of informal networks around 
the coltan trade. Of course, this cannot be attributed to iTSCi alone. This study indicates 
that additional factors, such as bribes or inter-provincial price imbalances, strongly 
promote the smuggling of coltan. There is therefore a need to move beyond considering 
coltan mines to be ‘enclaves of regulations’. It is necessary to develop both a 
contextualised and a global approach (Cuvelier et al., 2014: 26) to conflict mineral 
policies such as iTSCi, and attention should be paid to understanding the logics behind 
existing informal structures (Van Bockstael and Vlassenroot, 2009) of which miners and 
négociants are a part. This would help to ‘rule the old game of coltan smuggling’—in 
other words, to address deeply rooted smuggling practices in a more efficient manner.  
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7.1. Introduction  
 
In this thesis, I have analysed the implications of the initiatives set out to ‘formalise’ 
artisanal mining in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for artisanal miners 
(creuseurs) and middlemen (négociants). These initiatives aimed to bring mining under 
state control while addressing conflict minerals, that is, minerals thought to feed violence, 
conflicts and the involvement of armed actors in the mining business (Autesserre, 2012). 
The thesis is focused on one of these initiatives: the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative 
(iTSCi). Designed by the International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) in 2009, iTSCi is the 
most widely implemented conflict mineral policy in eastern DRC (Chapter 2). iTSCi is a 
mechanism that works by ‘tagging and bagging’ loads of minerals from the mineworkers’ 
shafts to the export points in order to determine the origin of 3T minerals and to prevent 
these from entering the international market. 
 
This study is important because of the realisation of two objectives. First, the study aimed 
to provide insights into how iTSCi is concretely implemented in 3T mining areas and 
how it has altered the organisation of mining and the trade of coltan. Second, this thesis 
aimed to examine how this organisation has affected creuseurs and négociants regarding 
their livelihoods and access to minerals, and how these two groups have responded to 
iTSCi. To provide an ethnographic account of the changes that iTSCi has introduced in 
artisanal mining areas, the main question that this thesis sought to answer is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main conclusions presented in this chapter build upon the findings reports in the 
preceding chapters. Each chapter has its own conceptual vocabulary. Together, these 
compose the theoretical framework of this thesis. In the introductory chapter, the main 
research question formulated above was broken down into five sub-questions. These 
guided the data collection, the analysis and the structuring of the chapters. The sub-
questions were formulated as follows: 
How have initiatives to reform artisanal mining (iTSCi in particular) affected 
institutional change, how does this relate to changes in patterns of coltan 
production and trade, how were creuseurs and négociants affected by these 
changes, and how did these groups respond in the coltan mining areas of 
Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai Baridi (northern Katanga) from 2009 to 2014? 
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1. What are the contexts of coltan mining and reforms in northern Katanga? 
2. How, following the implementation of iTSCi, have mining cooperatives as newly 
introduced institutions interacted with pre-existing miners’ organisations? 
3. How have these interactions altered patterns of property rights and access to coltan? 
4. What implications have the changes in property rights and access to coltan had for 
the livelihoods of négociants? 
5. How have creuseurs and négociants responded to iTSCi? 
 
This concluding chapter outlines several thematic issues that were first presented in the 
introduction to this thesis. The chapter also reviews the evidence confirming my working 
hypothesis that, although the pre-existing organisation of mining in DRC was shaped by a 
number of structural problems associated with artisanal mining (e.g. the informal 
character of the coltan trade, abuses of creuseurs by armed actors, and the smuggling of 
coltan), the ongoing mining reforms have reproduced these problems and also generated 
new challenges. 
Rather than listing the findings per chapter, this chapter draws a number of in-depth and 
cross-cutting findings that emerge from the thesis as a whole. Linking the five sub-
questions to the objectives of this thesis, this chapter aims to demonstrate how the 
findings from the five chapters contributed to attaining these objectives. The chapter also 
reflects on the implications of the cross-cutting findings elaborated here for policy and 
future research on artisanal mining in eastern DRC. 
Each chapter of this thesis contributes to attaining the overall objectives by discussing 
one specific theme. Chapter 2 presents the historical context of artisanal mining and 
mining reforms. Chapter 3 focuses on mining cooperatives. Chapter 4 is about conflicts 
over property rights and access to minerals (coltan). This is followed by Chapter 5, which 
centres on the livelihoods and socioeconomic position of négociants, also paying 
attention to how creuseurs experience this group of mineral brokers. Finally, Chapter 6 is 
about smuggling and therefore explores the responses of both négociants and creuseurs 
to the ongoing reforms taking place around the iTSCi policy. 
The following section outlines my analytical approach and indicates the main findings 
per chapter. For the subsequent sections, each section presents one overarching and cross-
cutting finding, providing examples from and referring to the relevant chapters that 
illustrate the significance of this finding in this thesis. Each section ends with my 
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argument relating to that finding. The last part of this chapter presents three policy 
implications with regard to mining reforms and suggested areas for future research. 
7.2. Core concepts and empirical chapters  
 
To address the research questions outlined above, I adopted three complementary 
analytical approaches. First, the thesis used an actor-oriented approach in the analysis of 
the local dynamics of the mining reforms taking place around iTSCi. This thesis has 
shown that the implementation of the iTSCi programme and subsequent changes are 
socially constructed and negotiated between various actors at different levels, including 
the institutional level (e.g. mining cooperatives). 
 
Second, the thesis followed the sociology of economic life school of thought. This 
approach draws on the main idea that economic action is a form of social action that is 
socially ‘embedded’, meaning that it is linked to or dependent on action and institutions 
that are non-economic in content, goals and processes (Granovetter, 2005; Hilhorst et al., 
2017). As I have argued, this theory allowed me to move away from the official 
regulations and formal market exchange promoted by iTSCi to examine how the reforms 
are socially constructed and shaped, predominantly through social networks. 
 
Third, this thesis introduced the original concept of ‘enclaves of regulations’. These 
enclaves refer to the mining areas where iTSCi or other reforms are in force. This thesis 
has shown that, although these ‘enclaves’ appear to be ‘closed’ and insulated from the 
environment in terms of the locally applied rules for the mining and trading of minerals 
(e.g. ‘tagging and bagging’), in reality, such closure is not complete. It would be more 
appropriate to consider these ‘enclaves of regulations’ as semi-autonomous fields with 
porous boundaries (Moore, 1973).  
 
This thesis has presented five empirical chapters:   
 
In Chapter 2, which explored the contexts around artisanal mining and mining reform in 
northern Katanga, it was shown that there is a long history of the organisation of mining 
in the Katangese province. The reforms therefore did not enter into an arena of anarchy, 
or an institutional void. Rather, they added a layer to the already existing forms of 
organisation. 
  
169 
Chapter 3 studied the formation and working of the mining cooperatives created with the 
objective of improving the governance of mining. This chapter demonstrated that these 
cooperatives have been an emergent—rather than durable—solution in terms of 
representing the interests of artisanal miners. 
 
Chapter 4 examined issues regarding access to minerals. Here, it was demonstrated that 
the ongoing reforms have given rise to new social tensions and local conflicts around 
property rights and access to minerals. 
 
Chapter 5 focused on the livelihoods and socioeconomic position of négociants, showing 
that the reforms have affected this group of mineral brokers in different ways. Some 
négociants were well off, whereas others have been excluded from the mineral 
commodity chain. These findings contradict the widespread opinion that négociants are 
always abusive brokers in the mineral production and commodity chain. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6, on the responses of miners and négociants to iTSCi, demonstrated that 
coltan smuggling is a deeply rooted practice. Despite the reforms, smuggling is entangled 
in the activities of various networks and continues in different forms. 
 
Methodologically, this thesis is grounded in the ethnographic tradition. Specifically, this 
work adopted three methodological approaches: multi-sited ethnography, historical 
ethnography and research uptake. These approaches were useful in studying peoples’ 
history, activities, accounts and interactions in their own contexts and for a long period of 
time and helped in the dissemination of findings. To achieve these aims, research in 
mining communities requires the development of methods and data collection techniques 
(e.g. playing football as a particular form of participant observation, research uptake or 
other related techniques). This would help to reduce the distance between the academic 
researcher and the people in the studied communities and to discuss the findings with 
other academics, policymakers and practionners in the mining sector . 
 
7.3. Cross-cutting findings   
 
This section outlines four cross-cutting findings of this thesis on the following topics: a) 
historical continuities; b) the new shapes taken by violence associated with mining; c) 
reinforcing network-like constructions and d) looking beyond ‘enclaves of regulations’. 
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Paying attention to the issues raised in this thesis and to the series of policy 
recommendations outlined below will help to answer a question I was asked in the course 
of conducting this research: Where will what you write go, and how can this change our 
lives?
139
 By asking this question, the creuseurs participating in this study showed that 
they expected the conclusions of the study to contribute to changing the how the current 
reforms work.  
7.3.1. Historical continuities 
One major cross-cutting finding of this thesis is that the mining reforms, beneath the 
changes that these initiatives have brought about—regarding, for instance, the 
introduction of ‘formal’ institutions (mining cooperatives) and the organisation of the 
coltan market—,have furthered several historical continuities. This is quite remarkable in 
a country that is always characterised as being governed by a non-functioning state. .  
In Chapter 2, on the context of artisanal mining and reforms, it was shown that, since the 
colonial area, predominantly for economic reasons, the state has granted vast mining 
concessions to private mining actors, that is, large-scale extractive companies (Hönke, 
2013; Rubbers, 2006). Although these historical entitlements did not concern the northern 
part of Katanga because the region was historically agrarian (Mwanyimi-Mbomba, 
1988)
140
, the initiation of coltan mining in 2007 and the subsequent reforms created an 
open moment for granting concessions—in the form of Artisanal Exploitation Zone 
(AEZ), of which there were eight in total—to a series of private actors, namely mining 
companies, trading houses and mining cooperatives. In the study area, where iTSCi has 
been in force along with the establishment of Mining Mineral Resources (MMR), a large 
Indian trading house, the effects of the privatisation of mining were noticeable. For 
instance, MMR was granted all of the rights regarding the mineral trade, allowing this 
company to engage in contractual relations with mineworkers and négociants, who, in 
exchange for material or financial assistance, were obliged to sell or purchase minerals 
only at prices fixed by the company. 
As has also been noted in previous studies (Cuvelier et al., 2014; Johnson, 2013), while 
iTSCi has itself achieved a near monopoly as a conflict mineral policy in eastern DRC, its 
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 Group interview with miners, Kisengo, August 2014.  
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 This is the case although gold, cassiterite and coal have been extracted since the colonial 
period. See, for instance, Omasombo, J. (ed.) (2014). Tanganyika. Espace fécondé par le rail et le 
lac. Tervuren: Musée royal de l’Afrique Centrale, pp. 63–67.  
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implementation in northern Katanga tends to reinforce a robust monopoly of trading 
houses, particularly MMR. This has exacerbated tensions with creuseurs (Matthysen and 
Montejano, 2013: 31) and encouraged a lack of competition among coltan buyers. 
The outcome of the cooperation between trading houses (MMR), mining cooperatives, 
négociants and creuseurs has not always been peaceful. As was shown in Chapter 4, 
which examined conflicts over accessing minerals, relationships between MMR and the 
creuseurs have repeatedly been characterised by conflict. This situation illustrates a 
general historical trend in the Katanga region, where many large-scale extractive 
companies with ties to political elites clashed with creuseurs over accessing minerals. 
These companies also excluded or marginalised the creuseurs because this group is 
considered to be intruders into the companies’ concessions (Cuvelier, 2011a; Hönke, 
2013). Therefore, the Katangese realities confirm the tendency towards marginalising 
creuseurs that has been extensively documented in the literature regarding artisanal 
mining in other mineral-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ballard and Banks, 2003; 
Fischer, 2007; Geenen and Claessens, 2013; Hilson, 2003). 
Chapter 3, on mining cooperatives, suggests another dimension of continuity. Prior to the 
reforms, artisanal mining was dominated by the influence of many actors, including 
warmongers, powerful entrepreneurs such as customary chiefs, and military officials 
(Garret et al., 2009). Following the reforms, these actors seem to have been replaced (or 
had their roles reproduced) by ‘big men’, who are predominantly state elites and 
customary chiefs. This thesis has shown that the role of these ‘big men’ in the design or 
working of new institutions (especially the mining cooperatives) and the ways in which 
these institutions affect the organisation of mining are key to understanding the changes 
occurring after the mining reforms.  
 
Chapter 6, which is about smuggling, is also a good illustration of continuity. Before the 
reforms, northern Katanga was the most important supplier of smuggled coltan to South 
Kivu (Spittaels, 2010). Despite the efforts of iTSCi, the trading houses and the 
cooperatives to address coltan smuggling, the situation continues to play into the hands of 
the smugglers (known as hiboux, or owls) to such an extent that smuggling minerals 
remains a deeply rooted practice (Wakenge, 2014). 
 
In sum, as shown in Chapter 3 (on mining cooperatives), powerful people—‘big men’—
have taken over the cooperatives as emerging institutions so that, instead of originating 
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from or blending with pre-existing miners’ organisations, the cooperatives’ way of 
working signals that power is shifting to the urban elites. In addition, Chapter 6 (on the 
smuggling of coltan), has shown that hiboux continue to smuggle minerals. Although 
smuggling has become relatively marginal (Wakenge, 2014), it is done by the same 
people as before the reforms, because the hiboux, who were predominantly négociants in 
the study area, adapted to the reforms. 
 
However, the marginality of smuggling also suggests that, after the reforms, the coltan 
trade is better organised. It is monitored, recorded and formalised; in other words, it is 
traded under official channels. A telling example is that the recorded volume of coltan 
officially exported from 2011 to 2013 approached 1004.53 tonnes in the Katanga 
province (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015: 158), which stands in sharp contrast to large-scale 
smuggling reported before the reforms (Spittaels, 2010: 17). Before iTSCi, ‘comptoirs 
tended to under-state the volume or value of their exports so as to reduce tax liability, and 
some were allegedly involved in smuggling’ (De Koning, 2010: 7). 
 
7.3.2. Reinforcing network-like constructions 
Building on historical continuities, this thesis demonstrates that the ongoing reforms 
encouraged the development of various networks or network-like constructions. These 
networks have thrived around many issues regarding the organisation of mining and 
helped explaining how social relationships among mining actors (e.g. miners and 
négociants) permeated the formal relations and arrangements around mining and the 
coltan trade. 
 
In Chapter 4, which is about conflicts over accessing minerals, it was shown that a kind 
of ‘elites’ networks’ (Fahey, 2011: 170) seem to exist around granting entitlements to 
trading houses and mining cooperatives. The present study found that the evolving 
networks comprising elites of the Katangese provincial government, the international 
mining companies and the mining cooperatives turned artisanal mining sites into an arena 
of conflict. These networks were connected to state authorities at different administrative 
levels, from Lubumbashi to local-level echelons of the state apparatus. In these particular 
reform conflicts, which occurred over property rights, the state authorities did not stand 
alone. They could either rely on the support of their collaborators or intimidate them. The 
words of the administrator in charge of finances in Nyunzu territory are illustrative of this 
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intimidation: ‘No one knows what happens regarding mining activities in Nyunzu. 
Someone who wants to find more [...] faces intimidation from high-ranking state 
authorities based in Lubumbashi or Kalemie’ (Chapter 4). Thus, the mining reforms have 
become an opportunity for ‘predation and private appropriation [...] for state elites to 
acquire and redistribute resources’ (Englebert, 2009: 3). Thus, foreign interventions, 
albeit well-intended, are easily instrumentalised, resulting in the production and 
reproduction of neo-colonial systems. .  
 
The recurring term of ‘networks’ features prominently in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5, 
covering the implications of the reforms for the livelihoods and economic position of 
négociants, demonstrates that négociants relied on their social networks to cope with 
economic hardships and to diversify their livelihood portfolios. To make ends meet, 
miners’ households also relied on the social networks in which they were embedded with 
the négociants. 
Chapter 6, on coltan smuggling inside the mining areas and between northern Katanga 
and the province of South Kivu, describes in detail the role played by social networks in 
maintaining the ‘economy of smuggling’. In explaining how these networks are 
constructed and how they operate, this thesis builds on the conceptual notion of the 
sociology of economic life (Granovetter, 1985), which helped in the exploration of how 
and why creuseurs and mine-based négociants allowed the hiboux to engage in coltan 
trafficking. It is argued that, through the mine-based négociants’ social networks, the 
hiboux were able to adapt to the reforms. Many négociants and mineworkers feel 
disenchanted with the terms of the reforms or find themselves excluded, and many of 
them have resorted to a continuation of smuggling practices. Thus, the social networks of 
creuseurs and négociants enabled the circumventing of the compulsory monopoly of 
prices set by MMR and the cooperatives. These networks also protect these local actors in 
their dealings with large-scale smugglers. The literature on the smuggling of minerals or 
other goods focuses predominantly on explaining how people breach official or state 
regulations (Deardorff and Stopler, 1990; Hilson and Potter, 2003; Meagher, 1990; 
MacGaffey, 1991; Titeca and De Herdt, 2010). This thesis adds to this debate by 
demonstrating that creuseurs and mine-based négociants also rely on the same networks 
to cheat in their dealings with the smugglers. 
This thesis argues that the organisation of networks works around the formal market 
exchange and transparency in trading minerals promoted by the reforms. This study 
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therefore shows that an overemphasis on promoting formal market exchange also 
provides space for informal activities performed through networks. The intrusion of elites 
into local arrangements regarding mining and the use of networks for livelihood 
diversification or for smuggling exemplify a persistent trend towards the importance of 
informal social ties that, in one way or another, shape the mining reforms. Hence, 
ironically, the more formalisation is put forward, the more opportunity for 
‘informalisation’ is offered. In sum, this thesis maintains that the efficiency of the 
ongoing reforms depends on the capacity of the Congolese state to grasp and understand 
the reasons why these networks continue to operate.  
 
7.3.3. Violence associated with mining has taken new shapes   
The third cross-cutting finding pertaining to this thesis is that, beyond iTSCi’s technical 
role in the organisation of the coltan trade—and the relatively improved security at 
mining sites (Ken and Montejano, 2013: 33)—the mining reforms have engendered new 
forms of violence. 
 
In Chapter 4, which concerns conflicts over property rights and access to minerals, it was 
argued that the reforms have been detrimental to creuseurs and négociants. In some 
cases, trading houses and cooperatives have prevented these two groups from accessing 
the most productive mines (such as Bovu, in Kisengo), illustrating ‘new modes of 
disarticulation and dispossession’ (Vogel and Radley, 2015: 409). Although trading 
houses and cooperatives have provided technical assistance (e.g. découverture) to 
creuseurs and pre-financed the purchase of minerals by négociants, these practices can be 
seen as strategic, designed to maintain their influence over the creuseurs and négociants. 
In reality, this assistance was carried out in such a way that the trading houses and 
cooperatives were able to leverage their powerful economic positions and ties with state 
authorities (including the Congolese police) to oust the creuseurs and négociants from 
the mines. In this thesis, these new forms of conflicts are labelled ‘reform conflicts’. 
These question of whether the mining areas where reforms take place can be seen as 
‘terr(it)or(ies) of peace’ remains (Vogel and Raeymaekers, 2016). 
 
The newly coined phrase of ‘reform conflicts’ refers to how the mining reforms have 
engendered new tensions regarding property rights and access to minerals. The 
understanding of the intensity of these tensions is a matter of the scale, period and 
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problem-solving mechanisms used to address them, and the tensions varied from one 
mining site to another. In Kisengo, for instance, tensions have been more acute than at the 
other mining sites. The tensions in Kisengo regularly resulted in violent and open 
confrontations between MMR, the Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo 
(CDMC) and the mineworkers over many issues, including coltan prices. Additionally, 
these tensions led to the exclusion of miners from the most productive mining areas (e.g. 
the Bovu quarry). In Kahendwa, ‘reform conflicts’ resulted from the Katangese state 
authorities’ instrumentalisation of property rights to the Kahendwa mine. State authorities 
used their power position to concurrently grant Kahendwa to different trading houses and 
cooperatives, thus creating tensions among them. Crucially, these tensions negatively 
affected the mining activities of creuseurs and négociants. 
 
Chapter 5, dealing with the implications of the reforms for the livelihoods and 
socioeconomic position of négociants, demonstrated that the mining reforms are 
associated with marginal livelihood conditions. For instance, all of the mine-based 
négociants depended on a selection process and on a daily pre-financing system run by 
the trading houses and mining cooperatives. In reality, these entities were regularly 
confronted with cash flow problems. As a result, from 2009 to 2014, the number of 
négociants was reduced from 105 to only 28, and the estimates of creuseurs dropped 
from approximately 10,000 to around 2,500. This estimates suggest that the focus on 
violence that has informed the reforms leads to a blind eye to other effects, in particular 
for people’s livelihoods and their access to the sector. Importantly, despite the relative 
improvements in the coltan trade, both négociants and creuseurs have lost their 
bargaining position in the mineral supply chain and in their dealings with trading houses 
and cooperatives. This can be seen as a ‘policy paradox’ (Thomas and Mthembu-Salter, 
2016) in the sense that one would expect the better organisation of the mineral market to 
improve people’s livelihoods. In previous work, debates on the livelihoods of négociants 
are dominated by a tendency to treat this group as the most privileged in the mineral 
supply chain (Global Witness, 2006; Kilosho, 2011; Maconachie and Hilson, 2011b; 
World Bank, 2008). This thesis adds to these debates by arguing that, contrary to this 
widespread opinion, the mining reforms have affected négociants’ livelihoods in different 
ways. Some négociants are relatively well off, whereas others have been pushed out of 
the commodity chain or have become trapped in indebtedness. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that the mining reforms are shaped significantly by 
instrumentalisation, in the sense of ‘elite capture’, meaning that power may be exercised 
by authorities in the pursuit of individual interests rather than community interests 
(Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). In my view, this can be seen as a kind of political violence, 
where ‘Congolese authorities cunningly smother reform initiatives but without 
completely suffocating them’ (Trefon, 2011: 9). This kind of instrumentalisation of the 
reforms negatively affects the living conditions of creuseurs and négociants in many 
ways. For example, Chapter 4 points out how state authorities in the provincial capital 
city (Lubumbashi), in the district capital city (Kalemie) and at the territorial level in 
Nyunzu instrumentalised the reform policy for their personal benefit. Either these 
authorities were bought off by trading houses or mining cooperatives, or they condoned 
the practices of these entities vis-à-vis the creuseurs (e.g. when the trading houses or 
mining cooperatives set mineral prices, often through unilateral means). 
Instrumentalisation also relates to the fact that state authorities tended to privilege the 
economic interests of certain multinational companies and trading houses. For instance, 
Chapter 5 shows that MMR, which was considered by Katangese officials to be the most 
‘serious mineral buyer’ (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015: 156) and ‘was given favourable 
treatment by the Katangese government’ (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015: 156; Johnson, 
2013), used its privileged and dominant economic position to exclude many négociants 
from the 3T mineral supply chain. 
 
This thesis argues that the path to mining reform has altered the nature of violence around 
mining. Despite the positive effects of the reforms in organising the mining and trade of 
coltan, new actors, alliances and conflicts have emerged. The thesis has also shown that, 
in most of the accounts of conflicts around resources, the complexity and effects of 
‘reform conflicts’ have been underestimated and poorly understood. One element that is 
often missing is the analysis of how and through what means the systems of economic 
exploitation developed by armed groups during the Congolese wars manage to persist in 
the post-conflict context and to develop over time and in another fashion. 
 
7.3.4. Looking beyond ‘enclaves of regulations’ 
This thesis demonstrates that artisanal mining sites where the reforms are in force cannot 
be seen as ‘enclaves of regulations’. The dynamics in these areas are more complex and 
need to be studied further, taking such complexity into account. In reality, mining areas 
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are connected with and experience the influence of various actors whose interests are 
closely related to the mining business. 
For instance, Chapter 2, on the context of artisanal mining and mining reform, shows that 
the establishment of AEZ is not a decision taken at the local level, that is, in the mining 
area. In urban cities, AEZ are demarcated by ministerial decree and granted to mining 
cooperatives—and in rare cases to trading houses. The entitlement of AEZ can thus play 
into the hands of people exerting powerful positions, as was shown in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 3, about the mining cooperatives, illustrates how these newly created institutions 
were formed and how they have been predominantly controlled by urban-based ‘big 
men’. The working of the cooperatives is informed by the interests of these elites, and 
this thesis has shown that these cooperatives are seen by mineworkers as an ‘appendage 
of the trading houses’ and are therefore considered top-down, urban creations. As a 
result, many creuseurs viewed the cooperatives as ‘etiquette’, conveying that these 
institutions did not represent their interests. Thus, the thesis concludes that the idea that 
mining cooperatives exist and perform as locally grounded mineworkers’ organisations 
does not hold true. 
Like Chapter 3, Chapter 4, which addresses conflicts over accessing minerals, also 
cautions against looking at the mining sites undergoing reform as ‘enclaves of 
regulations’. The idea of ‘enclaves of regulations’ is at odds with a metaphor expressed 
by a participant in this study: ‘The Katangese mining business can be compared to a 
football team. However, during the game, it is not the competitors—but the referees—
who are the players on the pitch’ (Chapter 4). This metaphor illustrates the extent to 
which conflicts occurring over the governance of mining sites were, in fact, produced by 
the political elites to whom the term ‘referees’ refers. For example, the Katangese 
Minister of Mines took advantage of her power position to influence policy on property 
rights, especially in the mine of Kahendwa. This influence became an impediment to the 
working of the trading houses in Kahendwa and affected their interactions with the 
Nyunzu-based authorities, as well as with creuseurs and négociants. As Hilhorst (2013: 
8) argues, ‘policy is the result of interaction between different stakeholders, who try to 
make policy fit their own perspectives and goals […] and according to their own 
understanding, interests and ambition’. 
Lastly, Chapter 6, on coltan smuggling between northern Katanga and South Kivu, 
explains in detail how and why hiboux operated despite the iTSCi traceability scheme 
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being in place at the mining sites. Not only is there a significant imbalance of mineral 
prices between the two regions, but also the hiboux were connected to numerous actors 
(their antennes, creuseurs, négociants and other traders) who were located in or regularly 
visited the mines. 
This thesis has therefore shown that mining reforms are not micro-level phenomena. 
Rather, they exist in relation to much broader dynamics. For that reason, improving 
transparency in the trade of minerals is contingent upon understanding, for instance, the 
reasons why the prices of minerals are uneven between different locations, such as urban 
cities and provincial capital cities, where smuggled minerals are sold on the black market. 
7.4. Policy implications and future research 
 
This section outlines a number of policy implications and future research activities that 
would build upon the findings presented in this thesis. 
7.4.1. Policy implications  
This thesis is part of the research programme entitled ‘Down to Earth: Governance 
Dynamics and Social Change in Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in DRC’, which was 
funded by the WOTRO Science for Global Development programme of the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research. This research programme aimed to understand 
ordering processes in mining sites in Katanga and South Kivu provinces and how these 
have been affected by the reform initiatives targeting artisanal mining. In the last 15 
years, it is clear that these two Congolese regions have become the pioneer cases for 
traceability and due diligence efforts. Basically, the reform initiatives aim to make the 
Congolese artisanal mining sector more transparent and to prevent ‘conflict minerals’ 
from entering the international market. In 2014, 13 reform initiatives—10 focusing on 3T 
and three on gold—were operational in eastern DRC (Cuvelier et al., 2014: 5). 
However, as far as the implementation of these initiatives is concerned, the impact of the 
mining reforms has been ambiguous and limited (Cuvelier et al., 2014; Geenen, 2012; 
Vogel and Radley, 2015). This is problematic, because these initiatives have not only 
generated new challenges, as this thesis has demonstrated, but also—and more 
importantly—many of them have failed to improve people’s living conditions. To change 
this situation, policymakers need to take into account the following three issues: 
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 A key point of this thesis for policymakers is the call for contextually informed 
reforms. Reform initiatives, such as iTSCi, are often considered and experienced as 
top-down initiatives by people on the ground, because they feel that they have not 
been consulted or given the opportunity to express their opinion about the reforms. As 
has been shown in this thesis, iTSCi is based on ‘tagging and bagging’, a kind of 
ready-made technique. In reality, reforms—and the institutions embodying them—are 
socially negotiated, evolving processes (Long, 2001). They gain social meaning in 
practice. Actors in and around the reforms strategically seek to advance their interests, 
leading to altered, ‘negotiated’ arrangements on the ground. Thus, policies should be 
accompanied by qualitative monitoring to gauge the local responses and assess the 
intended and unintended outcomes. The results of this monitoring can be used as 
feedback loops to adapt the policies accordingly. 
 
 It is critical to continue addressing the new challenges raised by the mining reforms. 
The ongoing implementation of initiatives focusing mainly on trying to make the 
mining sector transparent tends to overlook the effects of these initiatives on people. It 
is therefore crucial to put the central focus on the millions of people depending on 
artisanal mining for their livelihoods in DRC who live in marginal, poor and often 
violent livelihood conditions. This means, among other things, the development of 
alternatives for people who are removed from the mines. 
 
 Third, this research indicates that mining reforms are complex processes. In 3T mining 
areas, these processes are predominantly shaped by the design, working and 
interactions of local actors and institutions, especially the mining cooperatives, which 
are actually dominated by the influence of ‘big men’. The questions then become how 
to create inclusive institutions and, in a related vein, how to give voice to the people 
themselves (creuseurs, négociants, etc.), so that they can influence the process of 
reforms locally, nationally and internationally. 
 
7.4.2.  Future research  
The current research primarily focused on only three artisanal mining sites of 3T in 
northern Katanga. In all of these sites, iTSCi was in force and only coltan was extracted 
and traded. It would be beneficial for further research to target mining sites where iTSCi 
has not yet been implemented and where tin (cassiterite) or tungsten are extracted. 
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Targeting these sites is important because the experiences of the creuseurs and 
négociants with trading houses, mining cooperatives and state agencies may differ. 
This study focused on creuseurs and négociants, and future research could explore the 
implications of the mining reforms for the living conditions of two groups of people: civil 
servants and Pygmy populations. Following the reforms, there is a significant reduction 
of state services operating in the artisanal mining sites, and the illegal taxation of 
creuseurs and négociants seems to diminish. It would therefore be interesting to examine 
how civil servants experience the reforms, what the reforms mean for this group and for 
the state agencies they represent, and how civil servants engage the state when 
performing their duties (for instance ‘tagging and bagging’ loads of minerals). 
In terms of Pygmy populations, in Kalemie and Nyunzu, I was unable to find any 
Pygmies working as miners. As Pygmies are known to be indigenous to the study area 
(Omasombo, 2014: 101) and it was a Pygmy (named Kalegelege) who is said to have first 
found coltan in Kisengo in 2007, it was surprising that there were no Pygmies engaged in 
artisanal mining. The reason for this was not uncovered. In northern Katanga, after years 
of violent conflicts pitting Pygmy populations and Bantu against each other over access 
to resources (Okapi, 2016), it is important to examine the past and present position of 
Pygmy populations regarding mining. 
A third topic for future research concerns the importance of studying the impact of the 
social projects undertaken by trading houses and cooperatives in mining communities. In 
addition to providing technical assistance to creuseurs and pre-financing the mineral 
purchases of négociants, trading houses such as MMR undertake a series of projects (e.g. 
building schools or hospitals, restoring roads, paying the salaries of civil servants) as part 
of their corporate social responsibility agenda. It would be interesting to examine the 
impact of these projects for the development of the mining areas. 
Finally, this thesis focused on only one reform initiative (iTSCi) and was undertaken at 
mining sites where only one trading house (MMR) operated. This decision allowed me to 
gauge in detail the different facets of the reforms and the realities around this specific 
initiative. However, it would be useful to compare iTSCi (and affiliated trading houses 
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and mining cooperatives) with other initiatives implemented in eastern DRC aiming to 
make the Congolese mineral supply chain more transparent
141
. 
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SUMMARY 
        
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the mining sector has the potential to play a 
pivotal role in post-conflict reconstruction (World Bank, 2008), and artisanal mining 
sustains the livelihoods of millions people in the country (PACT, 2010). However, in the 
last 15 years, minerals from this artisanal mining have been ill-reputed. Eastern DRC has 
often been characterised by chronic instability and violent conflicts (Autesserre, 2010; 
Stearns, 2011) because it is widely believed that minerals in this region have attracted the 
greed of national and foreign armed groups, who benefit from the mining business. 
 
Although this ‘greed hypothesis’ has been criticised for its inconsistent performance in 
explaining resource-related conflicts (Le Billon, 2010; Ross, 2006), various national and 
international reform initiatives have gained momentum (Verbruggen et al., 2011). These 
initiatives aim to make the Congolese artisanal mining sector more transparent and to 
prevent ‘conflict minerals’ from entering the international market. In 2014, 13 reform 
initiatives—10 focusing on 3T (tantalum, tin and tungsten) and three on gold—were 
operational in eastern DRC (Cuvelier et al. 2014: 5). The implicit assumptions are that 
mining reforms will fully ‘clean’ artisanal mining of violence and corruption and that this 
will contribute to sustaining people’s livelihoods (Garrett and Mitchell, 2009: 12).  
 
This study investigated initiatives intended to ‘formalise’ artisanal mining in DRC—in 
other words, they aimed to bring mining under state control. The study especially focuses 
on the effects of one among these initiatives—the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative 
(iTSCi)—on two groups of actors: miners (creuseurs) and middlemen (négociants). This 
thesis thus presents a fine-grained case study of the iTSCi. Designed by the International 
Tin Research Institute in 2009, iTSCi provides a means of determining the origin of 3T 
and documenting the trading chain for these minerals by ‘tagging and bagging’ the loads 
of 3T near miners’ shafts (at postes d’achat/selling points or buying stations), at counting 
offices (comptoirs) and in mineral depots, before the minerals are exported through the 
international market. 
This is a qualitative study undertaken at three coltan mining sites of northern Katanga: 
Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai-Baridi. Coltan has been extracted at these sites since 2007. 
From March 2013 to September 2014, data were collected using participant observation 
of people’s practices (extraction/sale of coltan and various types of interactions between 
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trading houses, cooperatives, mineworkers (creuseurs) and middlemen (négociants), as 
well as detailed in-depth interviews with creuseurs, négociants and their households. 
Data were also collected from the staff of mining cooperatives, trading houses, state 
authorities and civil servants—predominantly of the Service d’Assistance et 
d’Encadrement du Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM) and the Division des Mines. The 
last group of informants were a group of clandestine coltan négociants (known as 
hiboux—literally, ‘owls’), who were followed in the study. 
 
The purpose of this research is to study the micro-dynamics of changes after the reforms 
following the implementation of iTSCi. The study thus provides insights into how iTSCi 
is concretely implemented and how it has altered the organisation of mining and the trade 
of coltan. The study also aims to examine how this organisation affected creuseurs and 
négociants. The main research question of this study is as follows:  
 
How have initiatives to reform artisanal mining (iTSCi in particular) affected 
institutional change, how does this relate to changes in patterns of coltan 
production and trade, how were creuseurs and négociants affected by these 
changes, and how did these groups respond in the coltan mining areas of 
Kahendwa, Kisengo and Mai Baridi (northern Katanga) from 2009 to 2014? 
 
Analytically, the study adopted three main theoretical perspectives. First, an actor-
oriented approach was taken, building on the premise that individual actors have the 
agency, knowledge and experience to reflect upon their situation and to respond to 
changes in their surrounding context (Giddens, 1984). Although the examined mining 
reforms consist predominantly of ‘ready-made’ techniques such as iTSCi’s ‘tagging and 
bagging’, analysing reforms with an actor orientation helps to highlight people’s reactions 
and responses. This includes how reform policies are applied in institutions (e.g. mining 
cooperatives), how they interact, how they are assigned meaning and how they are 
negotiated by social actors (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009). 
 
Second, the study builds on the sociology of economic life, which holds that economic 
action is a form of social action that is socially ‘embedded’, meaning that it is linked with 
or dependent on actions and institutions (such as social networks) that are noneconomic 
in content, goals and processes (Granovetter, 2005). This perspective facilitates the 
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analysis of the livelihoods of négociants, including mechanisms of smuggling minerals 
into and beyond the mining areas where iTSCi is in force. 
 
Third, this thesis introduced the original concept of ‘enclaves of regulations’. These 
enclaves refer to the mining areas where iTSCi or other reforms are in force. This thesis 
has shown that, although these ‘enclaves’ appear to be ‘closed’ and insulated from the 
environment in terms of the locally applied rules for the mining and trading of minerals 
(e.g. ‘tagging and bagging’), in reality, such closure is not complete. This thesis has 
demonstrated that it would therefore be more appropriate to consider these ‘enclaves’ as 
semi-autonomous fields with porous boundaries. 
 
Apart from the introduction and the concluding chapters, this thesis is composed of five 
chapters. Chapter 2 explores the evolution of the mineral sector in the Katanga province. 
It analyses the history of mining, the initiation of artisanal mining and how the ongoing 
reforms have been informed by this history. In this chapter, it is shown that there is a long 
history of the organisation of mining in the Katangese province. The reforms therefore 
did not enter into a stage of anarchy, or an institutional void, but they added a layer to 
already existing forms of organisation. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on mining cooperatives as newly introduced institutions aimed at 
governing the artisanal mining sites. Through a single case study, the chapter analyses 
how these cooperatives —especially the Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo, 
CDMC—were introduced into the mining areas and how they interacted and blended 
with pre-existing miners’ organisations. This chapter demonstrates that cooperatives have 
been an emergent—rather than durable—solution in terms of representing the interests of 
artisanal miners. 
In Chapter 4, I provide a different perspective on ‘conflict minerals’. I thus introduce the 
notion of ‘reform conflicts’ to emphasise that, although ongoing reforms aim to sever the 
supposed linkages between the artisanal mining business and violent conflicts, these 
reforms have become a driving force behind the emergence of new conflicts over 
property rights and access to minerals. 
Chapter 5 is about livelihoods. It analyses how the reforms have influenced the 
livelihoods and socioeconomic position of négociants. This chapter also explores what 
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kind of opportunities the reforms have offered to this group of mineral brokers often 
considered powerful in the mineral supply chain and explains what kind of constraints the 
négociants have confronted and why they have opted to diversify their livelihood 
portfolios. The chapter has shown that the reforms have affected this group of mineral 
brokers in different ways. Some négociants were well off, whereas others have been 
excluded from the mineral commodity chain. These findings contradict the widespread 
opinion that négociants are always abusive brokers in the mineral production and 
commodity chain. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses the responses of creuseurs and négociants to iTSCi. Although the 
mining sites where iTSCi is in force appear to be ‘enclaves of regulations’, I explore the 
strategies of creuseurs and négociants to bypass iTSCi and the reforms, especially around 
the coltan trade. This chapter demonstrates that coltan smuggling is a deeply rooted 
practice. Despite the reforms, smuggling continues in different forms. 
 
All of the elements highlighted above suggest that mining reforms have undergone a 
major shift, from addressing the initial problems associated with ‘conflict minerals’ to 
creating or reinforcing various types of problems, such as the influence of ‘big men’ in 
the mining business, coltan smuggling and the emergence of new conflicts over accessing 
minerals. This means that reform initiatives such as iTSCi should be based on knowledge 
about the actual situation. Thus, understanding and addressing these new types of 
problems calls for a comprehensive approach at both local and broader levels. 
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RÉSUMÉ  
 
En République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), le secteur minier pourrait 
potentiellement jouer un rôle central dans la reconstruction post-conflit (Banque 
mondiale, 2008), d’autant que l’exploitation minière artisanale fait vivre des millions de 
personnes (Pact, 2010). Toutefois, depuis quinze ans, les minerais tirés de l’extraction 
artisanale pâtissent d’une mauvaise réputation. La RDC orientale a été le théâtre d’une 
instabilité chronique et de conflits violents (Autesserre, 2010 ; Stearns, 2011). L’opinion 
selon laquelle les gîtes miniers de la région ont attisé la convoitise de groupes armés 
nationaux et étrangers qui tireraient des bénéfices des activités minières est largement 
répandue. 
 
Bien que la valeur explicative de cette « hypothèse de la convoitise » ait été critiquée 
quant aux conflits liés aux ressources (Le Billon, 2010; Ross 2006), divers projets de 
réforme ont été formulés à l’échelle nationale et internationale (Verbruggen et al., 2011). 
Ces initiatives visent à favoriser la transparence du secteur minier artisanal congolais et à 
empêcher des « minerais de conflit » d’accéder aux marchés internationaux. En 2014, 
treize projets de réforme, dix relatifs aux « 3T »
 142
 et trois relatifs à l’or, avaient été 
initiés en RDC orientale (Cuvelier et al. 2014 : 5). Un postulat implicite sous-tend ces 
initiatives : « laver » l’exploitation minière artisanale de la violence et de la corruption, 
contribueraient à améliorer les conditions de subsistance de la population (Garrett et 
Mitchell 2009 : 12).  
 
Cette étude s’intéresse aux initiatives de réforme du secteur minier en RDC, en d’autres 
termes celles qui tentent d’assurer le contrôle de l’Etat sur le secteur minier143. 
Particulièrement, l’étude examine les effets indésirables de l’une de ces initiatives (Le 
programme iTSCi Tin Supply Chain Initiative, « Initiative pour la chaîne 
d’approvisionnement de l’étain » sur deux principaux groupes d’acteurs : les mineurs (dit 
« creuseurs») et les intermédiaires (dit « négociants»). Élaboré par l’ITRI (International 
Tin Research Institute, « Institut international de recherche sur l’étain », Royaume-Uni) 
                                                 
142
 L’abréviation « 3T » se réfère aux trois types de minerais exploités en RDC : l’étain ou « tin » 
en anglais (la cassitérite), le tantale (le coltan) et le tungstène (la wolframite). « Coltan » est une 
contraction de colombite-tantalite couramment utilisée en RDC orientale. Le coltan, composé de 
deux minéraux, le niobium et le tantale, est utilisé dans le secteur des technologies de pointe. Voir 
Nest, M. (2011). Coltan. Cambridge : Polity Press, pp. 3–30. 
143
 L’étude est actuellement traduite en Français et cette version sera publiée.    
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en 2009, le programme iTSCi consiste à assurer la traçabilité des minerais 3T à chaque 
étape de la chaîne d’approvisionnement en « étiquetant et emballant »1 les lots depuis les 
puits d’extraction jusqu’aux postes d’exportation des minerais sur le marché 
international.  
 
Cette étude qualitative s’est intéressée à trois sites d’exploitation du coltan situés au nord 
du Katanga : Kahendwa, Kisengo et Mai-Baridi, opérationnels depuis 2007. Les données 
ont été collectées entre mars 2013 et septembre 2014 par le biais d’une observation 
participative des pratiques (extraction/négoce du coltan, interactions entre comptoirs 
d’achat, coopératives, creuseurs et négociants), ainsi que d’entretiens approfondis avec 
les creuseurs, les négociants et leurs familles. Des données ont également été collectées 
auprès du personnel des coopératives minières, des comptoirs d’achat et des services de 
l’État, et auprès de fonctionnaires (ceux du Service d’assistance et d’encadrement du 
small-scale mining, le SAESSCAM, et de la Division des mines, principalement). Un 
groupe clandestin de négociants en coltan, connus sous le nom de « hiboux », a 
également été suivi dans le cadre de l’étude. 
 
Cette étude vise à examiner les changements consécutifs à la mise en œuvre de iTSCi au 
niveau local. L’étude analyse la manière dont iTSCi est concrètement mis en œuvre, 
comment cette initiative a modifié l’organisation de l’extraction minière et du commerce 
de coltan. En plus, l’étude entend examiner la manière dont cette organisation a affecté 
les conditions de vie des creuseurs et des négociants. La question principale de la 
recherche est la suivante :  
En quoi les initiatives de réforme du secteur minier artisanal (et en particulier, le 
programme iTSCi) sont-elles influencé les mutations institutionnelles et 
l’évolution des modes de production et de commerce du coltan ; en quoi ces 
évolutions sont-elles affecté les négociants et les creuseurs ; et comment ces 
derniers s’y sont-ils adaptés dans les zones d’exploitation du coltan de 
Kahendwa, Kisengo et Mai-Baridi (nord du Katanga) entre 2009 et 2014 ? 
 
Trois axes d’analyse principaux ont été retenus. Le premier est centré sur les acteurs, 
partant du principe qu’à l’échelle individuelle, ceux-ci ont les capacités, les 
connaissances et l’expérience nécessaires à la formulation d’une réflexion sur leur 
situation et sur leur adaptation aux évolutions du contexte (Giddens 1984). Au-delà des 
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techniques « préfabriquées » introduites par la majorité des réformes, telles que 
l’« étiquetage et emballage » appliqué par le programme iTSCi, une analyse axée sur les 
acteurs met en lumière les réactions et modes d’adaptation des populations. Cette analyse 
prend en compte la question de la mise en œuvre institutionnelle des réformes (par 
exemple, via la création de coopératives minières), celle des interactions 
interinstitutionnelles, et celle de la signification accordée par les acteurs sociaux à ces 
institutions et des rapports que ceux-ci négocient avec elles (Christoplos et 
Hilhorst 2009). 
 
Le deuxième axe d’analyse examine la vie économique d’un point du vue sociologique, 
l’action économique étant considérée comme une forme d’action socialement « ancrée », 
c’est-à-dire que la vie économique est liée à ou déterminée par des actions et des 
institutions (comme les réseaux sociaux) dont la nature, l’objet et le fonctionnement sont 
non-économiques (Granovetter, 2005). Ce point de vue permet en particulier de porter un 
éclairage sur les modes de subsistance des négociants, y compris sur les mécanismes de 
trafic clandestin de minerais vers et hors des zones d’application du programme iTSCi. 
 
En troisième lieu, cette thèse introduit la notion d’« enclaves réglementées ». Ces 
enclaves font référence au zones minières où iTSCi est mis en œuvre. Dans les faits, 
l’étude démontre que ces zones ne sont ni localisées, ni étanches en termes d’application 
des règles en rapport avec la vente des minerais (par exemple d’« étiquetage et 
d’emballage »). L’étude soutient qu’il serait plus approprié de considérer ces enclaves 
comme des espaces aux frontières poreuses.  
À part l’introduction et la conclusion, cette étude comprend 5 chapitres. Chapitre 2 porte 
sur l’évolution du secteur minier en province du Katanga. Ce chapitre analyse l’historique 
du secteur minier, retrace le début de l’artisanat minier et la manière dont les réformes se 
sont construites sur ces dynamiques historiques. Il est démontré que l’histoire minière du 
Katanga s’inscrit sur le long terme. Par conséquent, les réformes en cours ne sont pas 
construites sur un vide institutionnel mais apparaissent comme un complément aux 
formes d’organisations préexistantes.   
 
Le chapitre 3 se focalise sur les coopératives créées dans l’optique d’améliorer la 
gouvernance du secteur minier. À partir d’une étude de cas—particulièrement celui de la 
Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo, CDMC—, ce chapitre examine les 
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interactions entre coopératives et les structures préexistantes des creuseurs. Il démontre 
que les coopératives apparaissent comme une solution émergente—plutôt que durable—
en matière de représentation des intérêts des artisans-mineurs. 
 
Chapitre 4 offre une autre perspective à la compréhension de la notion des «minerais des 
conflits». Il introduit la notion de «conflits des réformes» pour expliquer que bien que les 
réformes voulaient mettre un terme aux liens entre conflits et les affaires du secteur 
minier, les réformes ont conduit à l’émergence de nouvelles tensions sociales et de 
conflits locaux autour des droits de propriété et des modalités d’accès au coltan. 
 
Le Chapitre 5 se focalise sur les conditions de subsistance des négociants. Il analyse la 
manière dont les réformes ont impacté les conditions de subsistance et la position 
économique des négociants. Ce chapitre examine les opportunités offertes par les 
réformes en cours à ce groupe d’intermédiaires. Il explique pourquoi les négociants 
s’engagent dans des activités de diversification de leurs moyens de subsistance. L’étude 
démontre que les réformes ont impacté les négociants de diverses manières. Certains 
négociants sont mieux nantis, d’autres ont été exclus de la chaine d’approvisionnement 
des minerais ou ont vu leur marge de manœuvre considérablement amenuisée. Ces 
résultats contredisent l’opinion largement répandue selon laquelle l’activité des 
négociants aurait systématiquement un caractère usurpatoire vis-à-vis des creuseurs.  
Chapitre 6 examine les réponses des creuseurs et négociants à iTSCi. Malgré que les sites 
miniers où iTSCi est mis en œuvre apparaissent comme des ‘enclaves réglementées’, ce 
chapitre explore les stratégies développées par les creuseurs et négociants pour 
contourner iTSCi et les réformes, particulièrement autour du commerce de coltan. Ce 
chapitre démontre que le trafic de coltan est une pratique profondément enracinée et que 
malgré les réformes, la fraude des minerais se poursuit sous différentes formes.  
L’ensemble des observations évoquées ci-dessus montrent que, loin de leur intention 
initiale (répondre à la question des « minerais de conflit »), les réformes du secteur minier 
ont généré et aggravé toute une série de problèmes, comme la mainmise des « big men » 
sur la filière des minerais, le trafic clandestin du coltan, et l’émergence de nouveaux 
conflits concernant l’accès aux minerais. Cela signifie que des initiatives de réforme telle 
que l’iTSCi doivent se nourrir d’une connaissance concrète de la situation. De cette 
manière, comprendre et résoudre les nouveaux problèmes que pose les réformes exige 
d’adopter une approche globale intégrant différentes échelles géographiques.  
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SAMENVATTING  
 
In de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC) heeft de mijnbouwsector het potentieel om 
een sleutelrol te spelen in de wederopbouw na de oorlog (Wereldbank 2008). Artisanale 
mijnbouw vormt bovendien een vitale bron van levensonderhoud voor miljoenen mensen 
in het land (Pact 2010). Maar in de voorbije 15 jaar hebben de grondstoffen afkomstig uit 
deze vorm van mijnbouw een kwalijke reputatie gekregen. Oost-Congo wordt vaak 
voorgesteld als een gebied dat gebukt gaat onder chronische instabiliteit en gewelddadige 
conflicten (Autesserre 2010; Stearns 2011), omdat algemeen wordt aangenomen dat de 
mineralen in deze regio de hebzucht van nationale en buitenlandse gewapende groepen 
hebben opgewekt: zij zouden profiteren van de mijnbouw-business. 
Hoewel deze “hebzucht-hypothese” kritiek heeft gekregen wegens de beperkte verklaring 
die ze biedt voor conflicten rond natuurlijke rijkdommen (Le Billon 2010; Ross 2006), 
hebben diverse nationale en internationale initiatieven (gebaseerd op deze hypothese) 
opgang gemaakt (Verbruggen et al. 2011). Deze initiatieven zijn erop gericht de 
Congolese artisanale mijnbouwsector transparanter te maken en te voorkomen dat 
‘conflictmineralen’ op de internationale markt zouden worden verhandeld. In 2014 waren 
in Oost-Congo 13 hervormingsinitiatieven operationeel: 10 daarvan waren gefocust op de 
3T-mineralen (tantalum, tin en wolfram) en 3 op goud (Cuvelier et al. 2014: 5). Men ging 
ervan uit dat de mijnbouwhervormingen artisanale mijnbouw vrij zouden maken van 
geweld en corruptie, wat dan een positieve invloed zou hebben op de manier waarop de 
mensen in hun levensonderhoud voorzien (Garrett & Mitchell 2009: 12). 
In deze studie werden initiatieven onderzocht die tot doel hadden artisanale mijnbouw in 
Congo te ‘formaliseren’ – ze waren er met andere woorden op gericht om mijnbouw 
onder de controle van de staat te brengen. De focus van de studie lag in het bijzonder op 
de effecten van één van deze initiatieven - het ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) – 
op twee groepen actoren: de mijnwerkers (creuseurs) en de tussenhandelaren 
(négociants). Het proefschrift biedt dus een fijnmazige case study van iTSCi, dat 
ontworpen werd door het International Tin Research Institute in 2009. Itsci maakt het 
mogelijk om de oorsprong van 3T-mineralen te determineren en de handelsketen voor 
deze mineralen te documenteren via een systeem van “bagging and tagging”: zowel op 
het niveau van de mijn (bij de zogenaamde aankooppunten of “postes d’achat”), als bij de 
handelshuizen (comptoirs) en in de pakhuizen (dépôts) worden allerlei gegevens over de 
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ladingen grondstoffen verzameld en opgeslagen in een databank, voordat de mineralen op 
de internationale markt worden gebracht. 
Dit is een kwalitatieve studie die ondernomen werd op drie coltan-mijnsites in Noord-
Katanga: Kahendwa, Kisengo en Mai-Baridi. Op deze sites wordt al sinds 2007 coltan 
gedolven. Tussen maart 2013 en september 2014 werden gegevens verzameld via 
participatorische observatie van de praktijken van de mensen (het delven en de verkoop 
van coltan en verschillende soorten interacties tussen handelshuizen, coöperatieves, 
mijnwerkers (creuseurs) en tussenhandelaren (négociants), alsook via gedetaileerde 
diepte-interviews met creuseurs, négociants en hun huishoudens. Gegevens werden ook 
verzameld bij de staf van mijnbouwcoöperatieves, handelshuizen, en ambtenaren – 
hoofdzakelijk van de Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small-Scale Mining en 
de Division des Mines. De laatste groep informanten waren een groep clandestiene 
coltan-handelaren (die bekend stonden als hiboux – wat letterlijk ‘uilen’ betekent), die 
gevolgd werden in de studie. 
Het doel van dit onderzoek is om de micro-dynamieken van veranderingen te bestuderen 
in de periode na de hervormingen die volgden op de implementatie van iTSCi. De studie 
biedt dus inzichten in de wijze waarop iTSCi concreet werd geïmplementeerd en hoe het 
de organisatie van de mijnbouw en de handel in coltan heeft veranderd. Daarnaast beoogt 
deze studie ook te onderzoeken welke impact dit hervormingsprogramma had op de 
creuseurs en de négociants. De centrale onderzoeksvraag van deze studie luidt als volgt: 
Hoe hebben initiatieven om artisanale mijnbouw te hervormen (en in het bijzonder 
iTSCi) institutionele verandering beïnvloed, hoe is dit gerelateerd aan 
veranderingen in patronen van coltan-productie en –handel, welke gevolgen 
ondervonden de creuseurs en de négociants van deze veranderingen, en hoe 
reageerden deze groepen in de coltanmijnbouwgebieden van Kahendwa, Kisengo 
en Mai Baridi (Noord-Katanga) van 2009 tot 2014? 
Op analytisch vlak hanteerde deze studie drie centrale theoretische perspectieven. Om te 
beginnen werd er een zogenaamde actor-oriented approach gevolgd, uitgaand van de 
premisse dat individuele actoren de agency, kennis en ervaring hebben om over hun 
situatie te reflecteren, en om te reageren op veranderingen in hun omgeving (Giddens, 
1984). Hoewel de onderzochte mijnbouwhervormingen vooral bestaan uit ‘ready-made’ 
technieken zoals de ‘bagging en tagging’ van iTSCi, maakt een analyse vanuit deze actor-
oriented benadering het mogelijk om de reacties en antwoorden van mensen in de verf te 
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zetten. Het gaat dan onder meer over hoe de hervormingsmaatregelen worden toegepast 
in instituties (bvb. de mijnbouwcoöperatieves), hoe ze met elkaar interageren, hoe er 
betekenissen aan worden toegekend, en hoe ze worden onderhandeld door sociale actoren 
(Christoplos & Hilhorst 2009). 
Ten tweede bouwt de studie voort op inzichten uit de economische sociologie, een 
discipline waarin men ervan uitgaat dat economische activiteiten een vorm van sociaal 
gedrag zijn en dus sociaal zijn ingebed: ze zijn gelieerd aan of afhankelijk van acties en  
instituties (zoals sociale netwerken) die niet-economisch zijn qua inhoud, doelstellingen 
en processen (Granovetter 2005). Het volgen van een dergelijke benadering maakt het 
mogelijk de vormen van levensonderhoud van négociants te analyseren, inclusief de 
mechanismen voor het smokkelen van mineralen in en voorbij de mijnbouwgebieden 
waar iTSCi van kracht is.  
Ten derde wordt in deze thesis het originele concept ‘enclaves of regulations’ 
geïntroduceerd. Deze enclaves verwijzen naar de mijnbouwgebieden waar iTSCi of 
andere hervormingen van kracht zijn. Dit proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat, hoewel deze 
‘enclaves’ op het eerste gezicht afgesloten lijken te zijn van de  buitenwereld wat betreft 
de regels die er worden toegepast voor het ontginnen en verhandelen van mineralen (bvb. 
‘tagging & bagging’), er toch geen sprake is van een volledige afsluiting. Het proefschrift 
heeft duidelijk gemaakt dat het daarom beter is om deze enclaves te beschouwen als 
‘semi-autonome sociale velden’ met poreuze grenzen. 
Naast de introductie en de concluderende hoofdstukken telt het proefschrift nog vijf 
andere hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van de evolutie van de 
mijnbouwsector in de provincie Katanga. Het analyseert de geschiedenis van de 
mijnbouw, het begin van de artisanale mijnbouw, en de manier waarop de huidige 
hervormingen door die geschiedenis gekleurd worden. In het hoofdstuk wordt aangetoond 
dat er een lange geschiedenis van georganiseerde mijnbouw is in de provincie Katanga. 
De hervormingen werden dus niet geïntroduceerd in een context van anarchie of in een 
institutioneel vacüum, maar ze voegden wel een extra laag toe aan reeds bestaande 
vormen van organisatie.  
Hoofdstuk 3 focust op de mijnbouwcoöperatieves als pas geïntroduceerde instituties die 
tot doel hadden de artisanale mijnsites te besturen. Via een single case study onderzoekt 
het hoofdstuk hoe deze coöperatieven – en met name de Coopérative des Artisanaux 
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Miniers du Congo, CDMC – geïntroduceerd werden in de mijnbouwgebieden en hoe ze 
interageerden en vermengd geraakten met al eerder bestaande mijnwerkersorganisaties. 
Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat de coöperatieves een ontluikende – eerder dan een duurzame 
– oplossing zijn wat betreft het vertegenwoordigen van de belangen van de artisanale 
mijnwerkers. 
In hoofdstuk 4 bied ik een ander perspectief op de conflictmineralenproblematiek. Ik 
introduceer de notie van ‘reform conflicts’ om te beklemtonen dat, hoewel de huidige 
hervormingen bedoeld zijn om een einde te maken aan de veronderstelde links tussen de 
artisanale mijnbouwbusiness en gewelddadige conflicten, deze hervormingen de 
drijvende kracht zijn geworden achter het ontstaan van een nieuw type van conflicten, die 
draaien rond eigendomsrechten en toegang tot grondstoffen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over bronnen van levensonderhoud. Het analyseert hoe de 
hervormingen de vormen van levensonderhoud en de socio-economische positie van 
négociants hebben beïnvloed. Het hoofdstuk gaat ook na welke kansen de hervormingen 
hebben geboden aan deze ertsenhandelaren, die vaak als machtig worden beschouwd in 
de mineralenhandel, en het legt uit met welke beperkingen de négociants geconfronteerd 
zijn, en waarom ze ervoor gekozen hebben om hun livelihood portfolio te diversifiëren. 
Het hoofdstuk toont aan dat de hervormingen deze groep van ertsenhandelaren op 
verschillende manieren hebben getroffen. Sommige négociants hebben  het er goed van 
afgebracht, terwijl anderen uitgesloten zijn geraakt van de toevoerketen. Deze 
onderzoeksbevindingen weerleggen de wijdverspreide opvatting dat négociants altijd 
misbruik maken van hun positie als tussenpersoon in de grondstoffenhandel. 
Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert hoe creuseurs en négociants hebben gereageerd op iTSCi. 
Hoewel de mijnsites waar iTSCi van kracht is ‘enclaves of regulations’ lijken te zijn, 
onderzoek ik de strategieën van creuseurs en négociants om iTSCi en de hervormingen te 
omzeilen, vooral in de coltanhandel. Het hoofdstuk toont aan dat het smokkelen van 
coltan een diepgewortelde praktijk is. Ondanks de hervormingen blijft het smokkelen op 
verschillende manieren doorgaan. 
Al de hierboven aangehaalde elementen geven aan dat de mijnbouwhervormingen een 
grote verschuiving hebben ondergaan: van het aanpakken van de initiële problemen in 
verband met conflictmineralen naar het creëren of versterken van verschillende soorten 
problemen, zoals de invloed van ‘big men’ in de mijnbouwbusiness, de coltansmokkel en 
het ontstaan van nieuwe conflicten rond de toegang tot mineralen. Dit betekent dat 
  207 
hervormingsinitiatieven zoals iTSCi gebaseerd zouden moeten zijn op kennis over de 
situatie zoals ze echt is. Dus om deze nieuwe types van problemen te begrijpen en te 
kunnen aanpakken is er nood aan een alomvattende benadering op zowel het lokale 
niveau als op bredere niveaus. 
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